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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Empirical background 
The thesis is grounded in empirical data collected from an online discussion forum, 
which is also referred to as a message board. The case online forum was an informal 
discursive space participated in mostly by frontline retail workers of the same company 
with more than 2,000 stores distributed all over the US. 
The participants in the forum experienced problems at their respective workplaces. 
Many of them attributed the company’s bankruptcy to these problems. The forum was 
saturated with criticisms of management’s failure, concerns about the company’s 
business continuity, job security, other related problems, as well as negative 
psychological experiences, such as stress and frustration. Despite such a negative 
atmosphere, I observed from the message board that for those visiting the forum, 
reading and posting messages appeared to bring about subtle but worthwhile positive 
effects. Similar effects have been observed during difficult times in terms of informal 
discursive practices, such as fantasy (Brown and Humphreys 2006, Gabriel 1995), 
cynical distance (Fleming and Spicer 2003), dis-identification or self-alienation (Costas 
and Fleming 2009), and catharsis (da Cunha and Orlikowski 2008). These studies point 
to intricate and reflexive relationships between actors’ attempts at establishing and re-
establishing positive identities and unintended results of the maintenance of existing 
organizational structures (Clarke, Brown and Hailey 2009). In other words, informal 
discursive practices constitute processes of organizing, not necessarily in ways that 
bring about tangible material consequences but in ways that establish and re-establish 
positive identities through certain interaction settings.  
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In these postings there is a research puzzle: are actors consciously seeking to actualize 
positive identities or are they merely affirming their inability to be engaged with the 
organization’s strategy in any other way, because of their relatively powerless positions 
in the failing enterprise? Talk is cheap and sharing their powerlessness and frustration 
with others by sharing similar experiences may function as a kind of ‘support group’. If 
the latter were the case, they would be concerned not so much with creating more 
positive identities nor with the firm’s failings serving to reinforce their weak position in 
existing power relations; instead, they might simply inscribe values or moral sentiments 
which they hold dear. 
There are ambivalent relationships of informal discursive practices in their effects on 
formal organizations and on individual actors’ wellbeing, and their motivations towards 
and consciousness of such effects. It appears that the relevance of mundane discursive 
practices for processes of organizing, especially those with material consequences, may 
be minimal. Mundane utterances often appear fragmented in comparison to generic 
literary narratives, which are devised with particular beginnings, middles, and endings 
(Whittle, Mueller and Mangan 2009, see also Boje 2001). Besides, even if mundane 
conversations appear to be organized in one way or another, to the extent that they 
collectively weave certain discourses, the implications of such organized conversations 
for formal organizations vary from context to context. Such ambivalence is potentially 
confusing for researchers confronted with the empirical messiness of mundane 
discursive practices compared to the conjectural simplicity of discursive views on 
processes of organizing, such as ‘organizing is talking’ or ‘talking is organizing’ (Boden 
1994, Weick 2004). 
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In order to address such ambivalent relationships between mundane discursive practices 
and processes of organizing, this study focuses on how mundane utterances are 
exchanged. More specifically, since in order for mundane utterances to bring about any 
material consequences they need to be read and responded to form a chain of utterances, 
of varying lengths, frequencies and number of participants, this study looks closely at 
the alternate successions of acts of reading and issuing utterances. By so doing, it delves 
into micro processes of mundane discursive practices in ways that unravel skills and 
knowledge that are supposed to be enacted by each individual actor. The point is 
emergence of particular rules, norms and other institutions which are pertinent to rather 
broader contexts from actors’ simple skills and knowledge that enable mundane 
discursive practices. The next section will explain how I approached the investigation 
into the micro processes by which utterances were read and issued. 
1.2 Processes of organizing and discursive practices as a constitutive element 
Discursive practices are known to involve a capacity to organize participants’ ways of 
sensemaking and acting (Weick 2004). As they talk to each other, discourses take shape 
and particular ways of doing things emerge in ways that accord with meanings pertinent 
to these discourses (Alvesson and Karreman 2000). For some scholars, discursive 
practices are a sphere in which organizing is taking place, rather than an instrument with 
which people plan and accomplish relevant tasks to formulate and maintain 
organizations (Boden 1994, McPhee and Zaug 2009, Taylor and van Every 2000). 
Strands of discourse analyses, including conversation analysis, as well as studies 
adopting social practice theory, have revealed that organizational actors are capable of 
influencing, even if without knowing, a variety of structuring properties as they are 
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engaged in organizationally defined tasks and obligations. The actor’s subjectivity is 
implicated in such relational and emergent ways of understanding relationships between 
actors and organizations. Reasons for actions can be attributed, if only implicitly. 
Simply, for discursive approaches to organizational phenomena, actions considered 
without recourse to actors’ reasons or intentions are of little meaning in establishing 
explanations about organizational events and phenomena. 
Reasons or intentions of actors are usually interpreted and attributed from observable 
actions, including verbally issued utterances and those inscribed in texts. A report on a 
seemingly objective fact can be related to certain relevant actors and/or entities; the 
fact’s being considered thus and possible subsequent events can be attributed to 
attributions of the actors’ reasons and/or intentions, as well as their roles and positions. 
It is, in other words, conventionally assumed that certain reasons precede actions.  
The thesis will question if reasons or intentions necessarily precedes actions, while 
admitting the necessity for analyses of organizational events and phenomena, which are 
comprised of diverse actors’ diverse actions, to account for their reasons and intentions 
for actions (Czarniawska 2013, 2010). Theoretically, it has been argued by Weick 
(1979) that meanings are retrospective constructions by reference to what has already 
elapsed. Empirically, several studies adopting practice theory reveal that even 
phenomena conventionally believed to be occurring in the human mind and to be a 
precondition for particular ways of practicing, such as interests and sincerity, were 
instead cumulative consequences of particular ways of practicing (Bjørkeng, Clegg and 
Pitsis 2009, Taylor and van Every 2000). Together these seem to indicate that acting 
precedes meanings, reasons or more generally the consciousness of actors. When people 
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act, more intricate processes are operating other than reasons constructed in retrospect 
can explain. This thesis offers an alternative explanation about what enables actors to 
act by focusing on people’s capacity of imagination that anticipates the existence of 
others. Acting is, without exception, directed toward some other actors or actants (cf., 
Tsoukas [2005] for the public aspects of thinking); thus morality is necessarily 
implicated in action. Such actors as are anticipated are not necessarily composed of 
clearly definable identities or material physical attributes but rather, fairly ambiguous 
images or a vague sense of anticipation, insofar as such images or a sense can be 
captured by human consciousness. 
To explain the power of discursive practices to organize people’s thoughts and actions 
in one way or another, this thesis assumes that a sense of morality, or simple distinction 
between good and bad, is already implicated in the act of issuing utterances and 
reading/hearing others’ utterances. However, assuming that acting precedes reasons, 
meanings and even consciousness of actors, motivations, goals and reasons for acting 
cannot be attributed to morality. Morality is also an abstract concept that is a 
consequence of particular ways of acting. In other words, this thesis intends to address a 
seemingly subtle but actually critical problem in respect of morality arising from the 
conventional assumption that reasons precede actions.  
More specifically, this thesis sees any account of reason or forms of representation of 
reality as usually over- or under-specifying the world as it is. Regardless of variable 
degrees of reflexivity or creativity it is not possible for human beings to see the world as 
other than what appears to be already denoted in discursively particular ways. 
Furthermore, both the ways of denoting reality and the ways of interpreting that reality 
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denoted as such are inevitably partial in respect of descriptive precision. There is always 
a considerable surplus of possible description beyond any given meaning. Therefore, 
attributing a certain event to certain reasons inevitably involves someone’s arbitrary 
judgment, regardless of it being either broadly or narrowly agreed to by a plurality. 
Nonetheless, insofar as any reason is inevitably partial, so is this thesis. Hence, rather 
than attack the conventional assumption that reasons precede actions, this thesis 
addresses as precisely as possible the processes by which actors denote reality. By so 
doing, it aims to appreciate each actor’s capacity to make connections between discrete 
and fragmentary events, phenomena, things, abstract concepts and actors.  
1.3 Reason, rationality, relevance 
In everyday organizational settings, decisions are continually made based on certain 
reasons so that decisions are to be approved or disapproved according to their rationality 
or irrationality; however, reasons either over- or under-specify facts. They rarely denote 
reality precisely. Reasons are more like stories than causal propositions in that they 
support decisions by verisimilitude rather than by falsification (Bruner 1991). Reasons 
also share with stories such properties as relevant actions sequenced into particular 
orders and accounts of actors who are supposed to commit to these actions. There are 
more important but less recognized properties shared between reasons for everyday 
decision processes and stories. Implicit principles and assumptions on which actors act, 
mostly without noticing, are as revealing as actors going through action sequences in 
particular orders. Similar transitions are experienced on the part of readers (Barry 1997, 
Boje 2001, Ricoeur 1984/1990). The narrative mode of reasoning can thus better 
explain the rationality which is pursued in the decision processes in everyday 
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organizational settings, by taking into account the relational aspect of the processes by 
which rationality is assessed and agreed or disagreed. 
Reality denoted in reasons or in other forms of representation of the grounds of action 
rarely makes us notice the fact that the represented reality is denoted in particular ways. 
Nor, do we notice the important potential of transitions in meaning or renewed 
understandings of principles and assumptions on which we act. Put differently, people 
appear quick to assess the relevancy of the reality presented to them, such that why and 
how the reality was denoted and by whom and for or against whom is rarely 
systematically examined. Simply, facts are dealt with as facts, once they are found to be 
relevant. In effect, whatever transitions must have been experienced by way of going 
through certain ways of reasoning or representations of reality appear to be appreciated 
only minimally and spontaneously. The senses most likely to be obtained are 
concordance or discordance, acceptance or resistance. Overall, it is difficult to imagine 
transitions in time from presentations that are given fixed forms, especially when these 
continue to be supplied rather quickly and abundantly. It seems that while people are 
competent in assessing relevancy of the increasing number of discrete reality and 
making sense of it, their consciousness is directed more at definitive attributes than at 
the important potential of transitions in meaning. It is further assumed that people tend 
to preclude the processes through which they come to terms with reality over time. In 
effect, the world may appear to them increasingly fragmentary circumscribed by 
definitive boundaries (Gabriel 2008).  
This thesis addresses the following questions: first, how fragments of reality that are 
denoted in particular ways and thus circumscribed by definitive boundaries can be 
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understood in an associative manner, bringing them into the flow of time; second, in 
what ways mundane discursive practices can contribute to awareness of the implicit 
principles and assumptions on which we act, in order to redirect our ways of seeing the 
world from the currently dominant ways of reasoning that focus on identification and 
classification of things by substitutable attributes represented as the logico-scientific 
mode of reasoning to ways of reasoning that make associations between seemingly 
discrete things, actors, events, phenomena, more abstract principles and assumptions 
represented as the narrative mode of reasoning (Czarniawska 1999)? 
In this thesis, it is assumed that connections between discrete fragments of reality are 
made within the narrative mode of reasoning. Such connections are, in fact, being made 
continuously. Otherwise, we would not be able to go about everyday life making 
practically rational decisions. Nonetheless, in the process of making practically rational 
decisions actors appear to discern reality relevant to them rather quickly and the 
assessment of relevancy affects subsequent reasoning and ways of seeing reality in 
significant ways. What is key is how people assess the relevancy of discrete fragments 
of reality that they encounter on a day-to-day or moment-by-moment basis.  
While rationality is known to be an inconclusive construct bounded by limited cognitive 
capacity and depending on contexts, relevancy is even more so in as much as, if 
something is assessed as being rational, it can still be either relevant or irrelevant at 
different times and places to different actors. Relevancy thus appears to involve more 
primitive and less definitive feelings and intuition. In order to analyze such ambivalent 
relevancy and processes by which to assess it, this thesis draws on Weick’s (1987) 
processual view of theorizing organizational communication. Specifically, from the 
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model that is grounded in action-research procedures, this thesis derives the following 
processual understandings of practices of theorizing which can be applied analogically 
to analyses of mundane discursive practices: (1) theories are not necessarily aimed at 
describing reality precisely but denote reality in particular ways to catalyze subsequent 
refinement of existing contextually specific but relatively implicit knowledge systems, 
(2) five criteria of relevance: descriptive relevance, goal relevance, operational 
relevance, non-obviousness and timeliness, serve to explain what makes theories useful 
in practical settings. They do so in ways that make visible the processes by which 
theories may or may not be found relevant, be understood better and be refined over 
time. (3) Both the denotation of reality and assessment of the relevance of it are creative 
and social activities in the sense that they both anticipate renewed understandings of 
reality and the existence of others for whom these theories are assumed to be of 
relevance.  
By referring to these three understandings, discursive practices can be regarded as a 
sphere in which mutually independent utterances are connected by each actor’s 
imagination of relevancy. More specifically, utterances are seen to be denotations of 
reality that do not necessarily entail precise descriptions. Utterances as denoted reality 
are in principle mutually independent. Hence, the taken-for-granted successive 
occurrence of utterances in mundane discursive practices needs to be seen as being 
constructed by each utterer’s creative imagination about what is relevant or irrelevant 
with respect to content and context. Moreover, imaginative connections are constructed 
by each actor anticipating knowing better what s/he has been encountering.  
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A critical assumption is that mundane utterances do not necessarily re-present actors’ 
reality as they experience it. Rather, mundane utterances represent how actors assess 
relevancy of their own reality in terms of content, ways of denotation and possible 
contribution to the world: the reality they denote is premised on believing that the 
consequences of any interventions they make on this basis turn out to be positive. Hence, 
the processes by which relevance in these terms is assessed are supposedly accounted 
for by interpreting mundane utterances. In doing so, any interpretation of mundane 
utterances needs to address the utterers’ capacities to make connections between a 
variety of things, actors and other contextual and abstract properties surrounding them. 
Interpretation needs to address how actors did what they do, rather than how precisely 
facts or subjective experiences of actors are represented; no one, including the actors 
themselves, can prove which interpretation is the most precise.  
1.4 Structure of thesis 
In order to demonstrate how actors assess the relevance of a variety of encounters 
through mundane discursive practices, framed as above, empirical data analyses were 
conducted. In Chapter 2, Weick’s (1987) model for practically relevant theorizing of 
organizational communication that offer the five criteria of relevance was elaborated. It 
explains how these criteria were applied to the analyses of the messages posted to the 
case online forum to reveal that communication was enabled by each actor’s assessing 
relevance in terms of the five criteria by creating connections between mutually 
independent discrete messages. 
In Chapter 3, a thread of messages posted to an Internet discussion forum, a message 
board, was analyzed to demonstrate discursive practices as successively occurring 
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discrete utterances. Thus, this analysis explicates that while each participant must have 
reasons for and purposes in posting messages to the forum, such reasons and purposes 
cannot be limited to communicative ones, such as conveying and seeking for certain 
information, but also involve each participant’s pursuit of interests and concerns, such 
as consistent and coherent identity and inscription of particular values, which may or 
may not be expected to be shared with others. The participants in conversations might 
reciprocate each other by exchanging information but the processes of reciprocation are 
more intricate than symmetrical collaborative interactions. Each participant’s utterances 
need to be examined in accordance with the five criteria of relevance in order to 
understand why and how the participants who had respective interests and concerns 
managed to post messages in ways that satisfied relevancy, both in terms of content and 
context, also in terms of their respective sense of meaningfulness. The analysis reveals 
that the processes of sensemaking resonate with the participants’ assessment of 
relevance in terms of the five criteria. The messages posted to the forum can be 
understood as processes by which the messages were by and large assessed to be useful 
to the extent that they evoked many participants to take actions in the form of posting 
messages. In other words, the analysis makes clear that mundane utterances are not so 
much representational device as means of pursuing meaningfulness, which is what 
appeared to enable the participants to post messages.  
In respect of the seemingly crucial but ambivalent meaningfulness, a clue is offered by 
the non-obviousness of the five criteria of relevance in Weick’s (1987) model. A sense 
of non-obviousness is referred to as a sense that a certain denoted reality adds 
‘supplements that are not redundant with context-specific knowledge’ (Weick 1987: 
106). This indicates that in order for one to establish a sense of non-obviousness, s/he 
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must be capable of managing intricate relationship between sameness and otherness. Put 
differently, non-obviousness, as one of the five criteria of relevance requires actors to 
discern either subtle or significant distinctiveness of reality denoted in others’ utterances 
by reference to reality in which they are operating. Different from the rest of the criteria 
of relevance, non-obviousness thus entails imaginative transposition between subjective 
‘I’ and objective others. This intricate transposition can be analyzed by focusing on 
creative as well as social aspects entailed in mundane discursive practices comprised of 
denoted reality and responses to it. The key is the actors’ capacity of imagination 
because both the creative and social aspects are enabled by actors’ anticipation of the 
existence of things, actors and a variety of abstract properties, which are not necessarily 
present, yet to come into being, or even what might not be materialized. By accounting 
for the intervention of each actor’s creative and imaginative transposition between 
subjective ‘I’ and objective others, the analysis demonstrates that mundane discursive 
practices can be understood as a micro-foundation of social orderliness in the sense that 
each actor is predisposed to be social, rather than rationally self-interested, going about 
their everyday life by enacting competencies to assess the five different relevancies, and, 
more importantly, mutually independent discrete denotations of each other’s reality are 
connected by each actor’s imagination.  
In Chapter 4, the analysis moves on to unravel how the participants’ assessment of 
relevance, which involves invisible processes of imagination, can be interpreted from 
their messages. To do so, drawing upon narrative frameworks, particularly Ricoeur’s 
(1984/1990) theory of emplotment, a framework of analysis was developed, which I 
refer to as the triad of mimetic processes. The framework is capable of explicating 
processes by which the participants assessed relevance by reference to the five criteria 
21 
 
in ways that take into account not only synchronic but also diachronic ways of 
referencing these. In other words, the imaginative capacities with which participants 
obtained a sense of non-obviousness were captured by assuming that the intricate 
transpositions between subjective ‘I’ and objective others should be taking place in 
ways that make connections between heterogeneous properties in terms of both 
synchronic timeless causal relations and diachronic sequential orders, and mediate these 
into particular meaningful wholes.  
Based on the framework developed as above, the analysis focuses on what the 
participants accomplished by posting messages to the forum. Considering the fact that 
messages appear to have been posted not only to exchange information but also to 
satisfy each participant’s concerns and interests, the messages posted to the forum are 
classified into three distinct plots which represent the participants’ capacities to denote 
reality in particular ways: (1) presenting reality by identifying and classifying a variety 
of things, actors and abstract concepts, (2) defining contexts, and (3) mediating 
substantive and contextual information into meaningful wholes. With these three 
distinct plots, utterances produce three distinct meanings: (1) identities of things, actors 
and a variety of abstract quasi-objects which can be classified into appropriate 
categories, (2) behavioral norms, definitions of relationships between concerned human 
and/or non-human actors and other interaction order (Goffman 1959/1990), and (3) 
subjective meaningfulness unique for each actor at a specific point in time and space. 
The analysis reveals that the triadic model is capable of accounting for not only the 
participants’ three distinct but interrelated competencies to make better sense of reality 
but also the power/rule constitution along the meaning-interpretation nexus (Clegg 
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1989). In other words, mundane discursive practices can be seen as the micro-
foundation of a variety of institutions and social orderliness to the extent that each 
actor’s rather simple skills and knowledge to make connections between heterogeneous 
properties, which are necessary to use symbolic resources, such as words, stories and 
discourses, already entail each actor’s sense of moral appropriateness as well as 
correctness in terms of pragmatic rules of use of language. It did so by elaborating skills 
and competencies of the participants in the case online forum with which to plot a 
variety of properties along the triad of mimetic processes.  
Through this analysis, it was confirmed that mundane discursive practices were a sphere 
where mutually discrete utterances were associated with one another by each actor who 
was capable of playing both actor’s (author’s) and observer’s (reader’s) roles by 
imagination. Put differently, interactions can better be understood as diegetic 
successions of acting (issuing utterances) and understanding the acting (utterances). In 
addition, the triad of mimetic processes exemplify the role that takes advantage of an 
asymmetrical relationship between an actor (an author) and observers (readers), in 
which the former cannot control how the latter understands (reads) its denotations. 
Because of the tripartite roles borne by each actor, insofar as the messages posted to the 
forum are concerned, the issuers of the messages might be concerned not so much with 
distinction between their identities and others’ identities, or their definitive subjectivity 
as with appropriateness in terms of the successful conclusion of interaction with others 
in the forum. This, however, does not mean that the participants were indifferent to the 
meaningfulness of their acts in posting messages to the forum. Rather, while the sense 
of meaningfulness or non-obviousness is a criteria of relevance crucial as to whether or 
not they decided to post messages, linear causation from the sense of non-obviousness 
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to a certain action cannot be assumed. The creative imaginative aspect of the 
transposition between subject and object and the distinction between self and others 
entailed in the assessment of non-obviousness and how this translates into actions, 
operates on a relational assumption or in anticipation of interactions with others. This 
finding reminds one that each participant was concerned with being good in relation to 
others as well as displaying self-interested desires.  
Combined with the preceding findings that the participants were capable of issuing 
utterances by assessing the five different relevance, the skills and knowledge to make 
synchronic and diachronic connections and to mediate these into particular meaningful 
wholes as accounted for by the triad of mimetic processes can be analyzed as stories or 
story fragments (Boje 2001). By analyzing mundane utterances as both synchronic and 
diachronic connections, social reality is imagined to be negotiated at the micro level 
between actors as well as to be represented in ways that transcend the different levels of 
analysis, such as micro-macro and individual-group-organization, thus, constituting 
power and rules in particular ways. In order to account for the intricate relationship 
between the seemingly inflating denotations enabled by the rather flexible criteria of 
relevance and each actor’s voluntarily imposing limits on denotations, the triad of 
mimetic processes will next be put into the diegetic successions of acting 
(narrating/uttering) and understanding (reading) acting. By so doing, ‘ethics as practice’ 
(Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes 2007), which should overcome ‘an unwavering 
moralistic model’ (108) of ethics, is substantiated by the messages posted to the case 
online forum.  
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In Chapter 5, the empirical analysis shifts its focus to how each actor pursues both 
moral appropriateness and the maximum extension of her/his interpretation of reality 
without any absolutely foundational evidence, rule or principle. Based on the foregoing 
analyses and continuing to draw upon Ricoeur’s (1984/1990) triadic model of 
emplotment, the processes by which to assess relevancy are re-established as relational 
diegetic processes. Specifically, the process is framed as diegetic successions of acting 
(narrating/uttering) and understanding (reading) acting. It does so in order to examine 
mundane utterances as a micro-foundation of a variety of institutions and dominant 
discourses that in turn structure individual actors’ actions and thoughts across different 
contexts.  
What is key to the empirical analyses is that interactions are seen as alternate 
successions of actions, in which each actor acts as both an actor and an observer and 
certain institutional orders emerge as each actor acts on a hypothetical and inferential 
basis by taking advantage of the asymmetrical relationship between an actor and an 
observer. Through the alternate successions of actions in which each actor is capable of 
intervening both as an actor and an observer, discrete actions are connected with each 
other by each actor’s imagining certain meaningful wholes at particular points in time 
and space. Moreover, the diegetic successions of the triads account for the intricate 
linkage between the imaginative aspect of interactions and material reality by 
elaborating how each actor sets the limits of denotation/interpretation of reality. Words 
can denote reality in virtually infinite ways to an extent that is fallible, but they are 
incapable of denoting what is non-existent or absolute nothingness (Eco 1999); thus, we 
can identify something meaningful in material real world even from words which seem 
completely irrational and irrelevant by following the triad of mimetic processes. 
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After depicting the triadic model, adapting it as that which consists of ‘intention for 
happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’ and the diegetic successions of the triads, through 
which interactions are constructed by each actor’s imagination, two episodes were 
analyzed to explain how morality is being acted out in mundane conversations, drawing 
on the concept of ethics as practice (Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes 2007). One of the 
two episodes is about the establishment of particular behavioral norms pertinent to the 
forum and the other concerns demotion of an employee who worked on the 
development of a database for effective communication between stores and the 
headquarters. The analyses, in particular, emphasize that morality is defined through the 
diegetic and asymmetrical succession of reading/observing and acting (issuing 
utterances). Rather than presuming the existence of universally applicable categories 
about good and bad, these analyses explains how morality is defined through 
appropriation of others’ actions (utterances) to which readers/observers attach their 
sense about good or bad, creating additional meanings normally recognized as morality. 
In other words, while actors are sensitive to morality and their conducts appear to be 
guided by it, morality is a consequence of acting that is enabled by each one’s 
anticipation of doing or being good. Moreover, the analyses demonstrate that the sense 
of meaningfulness, involving the belief of doing good rather than bad, translates into 
relevant ways of acting in terms of the maximum extension of interpretation of reality 
and the consensual validation of interpretation with others, or simply, content and 
context.  
These analyses together exemplify the fact that each actor’s ‘intention for happiness’ is 
evoked receptively by paying attention to a variety of things and thus should be fulfilled 
by pursuing the maximum extension of interpretation of reality (‘power’) and the sense 
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of moral appropriateness, which can be obtained through consensual validation about 
interpretation with others (‘norm’). Put differently, even each one’s desires, which are 
prevalently believed to be accounted for at least retrospectively by rational reasoning, 
are actually rather receptively evoked and defined in relation to other actors. Everyone 
knows finitude, including one’s own, but can never be sure about when and how, due to 
the infinite nature of possibilities (Ricoeur 1990/1992). Hence, it can be understood that 
both substitutive (paradigmatic, synchronic, reversible) and associative (syntagmatic, 
diachronic, irreversible) reasoning as depicted by the triadic model represent efforts by 
fragile humans longing for certainty that they are doing good, invoking definitive 
identities in the face of infinite possibilities, and permanent consistency and continuity 
in the face of obvious finitude.  
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by proposing a framework with which to enrich varieties 
of plot by focusing on the importance of strengthening the capacities of reading texts as 
aspects of reality enunciated in words (Ricoeur 1973). As the foregoing analyses 
exemplify, mundane communications are enabled by the imaginative capacities of each 
actor to read others’ utterances. Despite the lesser visibility of imagination or the act of 
reading, it was found that the five criteria of relevance in Weick’s (1987) model and the 
triad of mimetic processes built upon Ricoeur’s (1984/1990) theory of emplotment were 
capable of accounting for how imaginative capacities are enacted in mundane discursive 
practices. These also revealed that even if reading and writing are interrelated activities 
and the skills and competencies required for them are nearly identical (Czarniawska 
1998), there exist critical differences between them. 
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First, opportunities of reading naturally surpass those of writing. Hence, enriching 
alternative plots that are supposed to be employed in the act of reading is considered to 
be important not only for sifting through ever increasing denotations to get to reality but 
also for enhancing conversations with others in a constructive manner. To enrich 
alternative ways of denoting reality will bring about a virtuous circle by further 
inducing others to contribute to the world by denoting reality in ways that enable others’ 
emplotment. In this way, the world will be experienced in a manner that fully 
appreciates the associative power each of us is endowed with and which each of us 
bestows in going about everyday life. 
Second, somehow related to the difference in opportunities, strengthening capacities of 
reading can, even if marginally, address the issue of power imbalances. They will 
contribute not only to helping actors provide their ambiguous and ineffable thoughts 
and feelings with somehow intelligible forms/styles by diversified alternative plots but 
also enhance the application of imagination to realities which, otherwise, might possibly 
remain untold. 
Third, since human ways of knowing proceed with hypothetical or abductive inferences, 
good theories are likely to be realized by increasing the varieties of hypotheses, 
including the possible sophistication of theories as they are used (Weick 1987, 1979). 
To materialize such continuous supply of good theories over time, the capacity of 
reading needs to be strengthened in ways that assume the existence of truth by reference 
to aspects of reality denoted in particular ways. 
Fourth, drawing upon Czarniawska’s (1999) call for writing management and 
organization as a genre but rather radically shifting the focus on to reading, the 
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proposed framework can be debated as to whether or not a kind of disciplinary identity 
of management and organization studies can be established by renewing the conception 
of language as both an accounting device and data or narrative frameworks for 
investigating and reporting organizational events and phenomena. As this thesis 
emphasizes, denotations of reality in words represent only aspects of reality. So do 
researchers’ denotations about organizations. If it is the case, is it not necessary that 
theories denoted in words or researchers’ narratives should more explicitly aim at 
diversifying their plots in ways that induce both academic and business audiences to 
accordingly diversify their plots?  
To make this seemingly absurd question somehow debatable, I suggest in the 
concluding chapter that there are peculiar relationships between human beings, time and 
words. In other words, I argue, we can start by acknowledging the fact that words, 
typically written texts, are the result of human beings’ being as speaking, writing, 
reading subjects, whose texts might have just been elapsed or perhaps they date from 
long ago. Human beings, who pursue sufficient degrees of substantive interest, segment 
texts by discerning those capable of ‘speaking to’ their being. More importantly, such a 
conception about human beings and words need not be drawn into conventional 
scientific fields, including linguistics. On the contrary, it should stick to language as 
being practiced by a majority of people. Thus, the task of management and organization 
studies is to translate any kind of denotation in ways that contribute a diversification of 
plots for the target audiences. I assume that management and organization studies 
occupy the most appropriate position to exploit the power of words, which are devised 
with the virtually identical agencies of human beings, in ways that realize better 
organizing in terms of material and psychological wellbeing at both individual and 
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societal levels simply because the discipline deals exclusively with people’s everyday 




CHAPTER 2 ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANCY IN MUNDANE DISCURSIVE 
PRACTICES 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the framework with which to analyze mundane discursive practices will 
be elaborated. It will lay out several important theoretical grounds for the analyses of 
empirical data collected from an Internet discussion forum (or a message board) in the 
subsequent chapters (Chapter 3 to 5). Since this thesis aims to account for organizing 
properties entailed in mundane discursive practices in ways that do not presume a priori 
reasons or goals of actors, it focuses on each actor’s skills and knowledge with which to 
accomplish mundane discursive practices. Mundane discursive practices are seen to 
consist of mutually independent utterances such that these are assumed to be associated 
with one another by each actor’s enacting certain skills and knowledge.  
In this chapter the focus is placed on the process of assessing relevancy through which 
actors become able to take actions without waiting for particular reasons to be validated 
in rational scientific terms. In other words, mundane discursive practices are possible 
without each actor’s establishing particular reasons, goals or motivations for 
participation. Rather, as actors read/hear others’ utterances and issue utterances, they 
possibly acquire more or less renewed understandings of reality. By establishing 
mundane discursive practices as alternate successions of mutually independent 
utterances, the subtle but critical renewal of understandings of reality can be taken into 
account. The analyses of the process of assessing relevancy entailed in mundane 
discursive practices will exemplify the relationships between the process of assessing 
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relevancy, transitions in meaning in this process, and what actually enables actors to 
take actions (issuing utterances).  
2.2 Weick’s theory of theorizing organizational communication 
The framework for analyzing the process of assessing relevancy is derived from 
Weick’s (1987) processual model for theorizing organizational communication. Weick 
(1987) explains practices of theorizing organizational communication in a strongly 
processual manner. Drawing upon an action research methodology he frames the act of 
theorizing as a continuous process in which: (1) theories denote particular aspects of 
reality in particular ways rather than describe reality as precisely as possible; (2) 
theories become useful when the denotation is found to be relevant. Relevant theories 
will help actors understand better their reality by revealing their implicit and context-
specific principles and assumptions. (3) Theories will be improved, renewed or replaced 
in accordance with the improved understandings of reality.  
According to this recursive circular model, theories are catalysts that enhance 
understandings of and insights into a diversity of experiences, rather than precise 
descriptions of a variety of material objects, events and phenomena, or more abstract 
principles and assumptions. Hence, it is assumed that when theories are seen to be 
relevant enough to draw people’s attention to phenomena they become useful for 
interpreting ‘what might be happening’ (106). Such theories as are deemed relevant 
contribute to the refinement and renewal of understandings of reality by virtue of their 
application onto practical fields of experience.  
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Based on this assumption, Weick (1987) proposed five criteria of relevance: descriptive 
relevance, goal relevance, operational relevance, non-obviousness and timeliness. These 
attributes are expected to increase the relevance of theories, strengthening the whole 
processes of theorizing in respect of better understandings of organizational 
communication. The model, in other words, suggests that there are many theories which 
are valid but not utilized in practice in full, as well as those whose validity is yet to be 
confirmed but which are utilized to refine understandings of reality as people confirm 
the (in)validity of such theories in practice.  
What is important is how theories become relevant enough to be projected onto people’s 
practical fields of experience. Theories need to be internally coherent and consistent to 
enable practitioners to examine particular causal relations and thus be confined within 
particular boundaries. In addition, mutually independent theories also need to be 
connected with each other through practitioners’ capacities to imagine relevancy. When 
this occurs practices of theorizing, as a whole, contribute enhanced understandings of 
reality. Hence, Weick’s processual model can be understood to take into account 
transitions in the meanings of theories through the flow of time (temporal 
contingencies). Theories may or may not be assessed as being relevant and be better 
understood as they are put into practices. Temporally contingent processes imply 
creative invention of meanings both on the side of theorists and on the side of 
practitioners. In short, the five criteria of relevance suggest a mode of reasoning similar 
to narrative as well as logico-scientific ways of judging the relevancy of theories. The 
processes by which theories might be found to be relevant, be applied in practice and be 
better understood are assumed to be connected by inventing meanings creatively rather 
than by establishing linear causation between certain properties of theories and these 
33 
 
criteria. In practice, not a few theories might possibly be assessed in ways understood to 
be provisionally relevant (Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013). 
2.3 Five criteria of relevance 
Among the five criteria, descriptive relevance and timeliness of theories can be 
evaluated almost intuitively by identifying attributes of events, phenomena, subject 
matter, constituent things, actors and institutions that the theories describe, doing so 
without regard to transitions in meanings in time. By contrast, goal relevance, 
operational relevance and non-obviousness serve to explain how theories in use are 
assessed in ways that take into account transitions in the meanings of theories. Without 
considering temporal contingencies those theories in use would appear to be self-
contained and discrete.  
That which it intends to address (goal relevance) is a fundamental property of a theory; 
however, this property does not define whether a theory will evoke actors’ interest. In 
order for actors to pay sufficient attention to theories, operational relevance is 
sometimes more critical than goal relevance because it assesses the feasibility of 
theories by reference to contexts in which the theory is supposed to be applied, such as 
implementing entities and relationships. Theories deemed less feasible are rarely taken 
seriously even if the subject matter they intend to address is worthwhile and reasonable. 
Once deemed feasible in terms of operationalizability it is possible that a theory will be 
understood better as it is projected onto a practical field of experiences.  
Non-obviousness holds a critical stake in the inconclusive and context-dependent 
process by which the relevance of theories is assessed. As Weick defines it, non-
34 
 
obviousness acknowledges that a certain theory adds ‘supplements that are not 
redundant with context-specific knowledge’ (106). What is to be noted in this definition 
is: (1) the assumption that people operate on some implicit but contextually specific 
knowledge; (2) people are capable of discerning subtle similarities/dissimilarities 
between what they already know and what is yet to be known. In other words, people 
are capable of imagining what is not necessarily present in front of them. By imagining 
what is not present people literally make sense of what is in front of them. Non-
obviousness thus indicates that people are capable of making connections between 
discrete things and abstract principles and assumptions by making comparisons 
identifying how these are similar or dissimilar. 
As has already been mentioned above, the processes by which relevance of theories is 
assessed entail aspects of creative invention and non-obviousness deserves close 
examination in this regard. Non-redundancy posited in the definition of non-
obviousness explains actors’ creative capacities in a continuous rather than 
discontinuous manner. As Weick pointed out, both denoting reality in particular ways 
and understanding such denoted reality are creative inventions rather than apprehension 
of a priori defined attributes of a variety of things. Non-redundancy, in short, entails 
connections or connectedness created by people’s imagination.  
People distinguish more or less variable attributes of things, abstract principles and 
assumptions in order to obtain a sense of connectedness not only to separate one thing 
from another to obtain definitive attributes. Categorization always ensues from 
identification of similarity/dissimilarity. Besides the capacity of identification and 
categorization, people are capable of making connections by imagining a series of 
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movements. Put differently, successions of discrete events are understood inclusive of 
the ways these events are sequenced. The connections being produced by imagining a 
series of movements are, to put it another way, connections in the flow of time from the 
past to the present and to the possible future. Non-redundancy or the sense of non-
obviousness can be established by identification/categorization and imagining a series 
of movements.  
With regard to the acknowledgement of non-redundancy people are ordinarily capable 
of seeing connections from at least two distinct points of view, for instance implicit and 
locally specific principles and more general and explicit ones. Without at least two 
comparable images of the connections produced either by identification/categorization 
or by imagining a series of movements, it would not be possible to discern degrees of 
redundancy. By mediating images seen from these distinct points of view, people 
manage knowing what is redundant or not.  
The sense of relevancy in terms of non-obviousness explains the fundamental source of 
people’s imaginative capacities with which they make connections between diverse 
things, actors, more abstract principles and assumptions, both in terms of substantive 
attributes and in terms of temporal transitions of events and phenomena. More critically, 
the story-like character of theories implicated in the whole processes of theorizing 
organizational communication modeled by Weick is identical with stories as defined by 
narrative frameworks. These reveal implicit or hidden principles and assumptions on 
which particular actors act as they encounter events and phenomena sequenced in 
particular orders (Boje 2001 quoting Ricoeur (1984/1990)). Put differently, a sense of 
relevancy is created by a ‘certain teleology – sense of purpose’ (Czarniawska 2004: 13), 
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an anticipation of an ‘excess of seeing’ (Bakhtin 1990: 22, Jabri, Adrian and Boje 2008), 
or a faith in the existence of coherence (Weick 1987). The five criteria of relevance, 
non-obviousness in particular, thus serve to explain the fundamental motivation which 
enables actors to take actions by drawing our attention to the subtle sense of purpose 
and anticipation that is entailed in actors’ imagination about what is not necessarily 
present in front of them as well as to how meanings are being produced and reproduced 
in the whole practices of theorizing and assessment of theories.  
2.4 Appreciative theorizing and mundane discursive practices 
Weick’s (1987) model, thus, addresses the following important but implicit 
predispositions that guide theorizing: 
(1) Theorizing operates on the multiple foci of meanings that are produced by 
denoted reality that holds together relevant things, actors, events, phenomena 
and abstract principles and assumptions in a manner that enables actors to 
examine relationships between the varieties of properties by denoting reality in 
particular ways. 
(2) The multiple foci of meanings are that of abstraction, that of deconstruction and 
re-assemblage, and that of application to the practical field of experience. 
(3) Theorizing is temporally contingent in the same manner as stories reveal implicit 
principles and assumptions which bind characters’ thoughts and actions together 
with particular sequential orders. 
(4) Theorizing is motivated and continued by imaginative creativity of actors. 
37 
 
How can this model be applied to mundane discursive practices in order to analyze 
processes by which actors assess the relevance of each other’s utterances in ways that 
make connections between utterances? The common features shared between the 
practices of theorizing organizational communication and mundane discursive practices 
are the connections to be made between discrete denotations of reality and temporal 
contingencies. 
In respect of accuracy, generality and parsimony, the five criteria of relevance conflict 
(Langley 1999, Weick 1979). Hence, it is predicted that Weick’s (1987) model, which 
sees theories as a catalyst in the sense that they enhance better understandings of reality 
of both practitioners and theorists (see p. 17), will not solve the problem concerning the 
proliferation of mutually incoherent theories. According to Weick (1987), that many 
fragments of theories seem to be mutually conflicting is inevitable, due to the following 
reasons: (1) the non-existence of a universally applicable theory; (2) the different levels 
of analysis at which differently delineated hypotheses often predict mutually conflicting 
outcomes; (3) the limited imaginative capacities of people to interpret a variety of 
theories in ways that enable one theory to cohere with many others. He suggested that 
since the practices of theorizing are part of broader social practices, not only individual 
theories but also the whole practice of theorizing might be considered relevant.  
Specifically, it is possible for theorizing to become relevant in a number of ways. First, 
by methodological sophistication, which enables systematic and precise interpretation 
of individual theories so as to contain fragmentation to certain manageable degrees. 
Second, by normatively grounded growth of the entire field of management and 
organization studies, which nurtures positive social forces in terms of development of 
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researchers’ competency and in terms of development and choice of research 
questions/agendas. Third, by questioning and revisiting the more fundamental 
ontological and epistemological grounding of organizational communication, which 
might possibly result in organizational communication being seen as an irrelevant 
subject for formal theorizing, due to its utterly inconclusive character, given the extreme 
context-dependency and the ever-shifting interests and concerns of actors involved, for 
which only locally specific principles and assumptions held implicitly by particular 
actors might account. 
Despite the somewhat ironic suggestions, Weick emphasizes the embeddedness of 
theorizing in broader social practices such that theories, even if they denote reality only 
partially, can be useful not only because of scientific rigor but also by virtue of being 
practiced during certain periods of time in particular locales (Eisenhardt 1989). The 
connection with the practical field of experience indicates that Weick’s (1987) 
processual view of theorizing indicates how to go about studying the general 
communication landscape in which people’s denoted reality increasingly looks more 
fragmented than coherent, as communicative activities exponentially grow (Gabriel 
2008).  
Specifically, irrespective of content materials, utterances have a capacity to generate 
additional meanings to offer readers/observers opportunities to consider ‘what might be 
happening’. Also, the act of reading/observing involves readers’/observers’ creative 
deconstruction and re-assemblage of utterances to make sense of them. Experiences in 
which people encounter and assess utterances that may or may not be revealing in 
respect of their implicit principles and assumptions involve creative invention as much 
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as denotation of reality and understandings of the denoted reality found in Weick’s 
model of theorizing. In other words, as his model implies, insofar as actors operate on 
certain principles and assumptions, even if implicit and context specific, what is key is 
how such principles and assumptions can be related to one another as well as how the 
boundaries are defined with clearly specified attributes and definitions.  
More importantly, regardless of formal theorizing or banal chatter, it is assumed that 
people’s capacity to make connections between discrete things, events and phenomena 
can be reduced to that of imagining what is not necessarily present. Hence, it is assumed 
that even from the point of view of formal theorizing, the process by which to make 
connections between seemingly discrete self-contained theories might be explained by 
examining mundane discursive practices in which mutually discrete utterances appear to 
be communicating with one another in such a natural way that it draws little attention to 
the discreteness of utterances. In other words, even in practical communication settings, 
people are engaged in processes to assess relevance and these processes can be analyzed 
by applying the five criteria of relevance. In fact, in mundane discursive practices, 
actors are supposed to identify and classify a variety of things, actors, events, 
phenomena, abstract principles and assumptions, to understand appropriate ways of 
denoting reality by reference to different contexts, and to be concerned with making a 
unique contribution to the world they belong to, arrived at through obtaining the sense 
of non-obviousness. 
2.5 Summary 




(1) Discrete utterances are connected by each actor’s sense of relevance. 
(2) Relevance is assessed not only in terms of paradigmatic, synchronic and 
reversible correspondence between particular properties/attributes described in 
utterances and the five criteria of relevance but also in terms of how such 
properties/attributes are sequenced in particular orders.  
(3) Among the five criteria of relevance, non-obviousness drives the processes of 
making connections between discrete utterances by creating continuously new 
meanings with each one’s capacity to imagine what is not necessarily present in 
front of her/him. 
In the subsequent chapters (Chapter 3 to 5), these critical properties of mundane 
utterances will be demonstrated through analyses of empirical data collected from an 
Internet discussion forum. The next chapter will see in detail processes by which actors 
read and issue messages by making connection in accordance with their respective sense 
of relevance. This analysis will exemplify the multiple dimensions of relevance which 
actors consult in their making sense of reality, the transitions of the meanings in the 
flow of time through mundane discursive practice comprised of acts of reading and 
uttering, and the sense of morality entailed in them. The five criteria of relevance offer 
an alternative framework with which to know processes by which actors are engaged 
with mundane talks with others in accordance with their respective assumptions and 
principles. What is important is the fact that actors can act rationally in their own ways 
without any absolutely foundational evidence, rule or principle. Everyday conversations 
proceed in a hypothetically inferential manner. 
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CHAPTER 3 CONNECTING DISCRETE REALITIES DENOTED IN 
UTTERANCES 
3.1 Skills and knowledge to make connections 
Mundane discursive practices can be regarded as a successive occurrence of discrete 
utterances that denote reality in particular ways, in the terms established in the previous 
chapter. Hence, discrete utterances are not intrinsically connected with each other. 
Rather, it is each participant’s conception of the relevance of other utterances that 
connects them. When an actor establishes her/his denotation of reality in response to an 
utterance that s/he encounters then this establishes its relevance, which in turn, becomes 
an occasion for further utterances. The belief that reality is denoted in particular ways 
defined as relevant for certain audiences, whose relevancies are shared, serves as an 
occasion for further utterances. In other words, mundane discursive practices entail 
actors’ relatively implicit and context-specific skills and knowledge with which to 
establish and maintain communicative relationships with others by making judgments 
on relevancies of each other’s denotation of reality (O’Connor 2000). 
In this chapter analysis will explicate the discreteness of utterances posted to an Internet 
discussion forum. The participants in the forum are skilled and knowledgeable with 
regard to the matters under discussion. They are able to take into account with whom 
they are communicating and relate to the intersubjective meaningfulness of participation 
in the forum. The analysis will show how to access the seemingly implicit and context-
specific principles and assumptions held by ordinary people (the participants in the case 
online forum). The discreteness of utterances and the subtlety implicated in the 
processes of making connections between them draws our attention to the criticality of 
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the processes by which each actor connotes a sense of relevancy in establishing and 
maintaining communicative relationship with others as they make sense of a variety of 
encounters. 
The Internet discussion forum as the setting for the case will be overviewed briefly 
before the analyses of the empirical data, which focus on the transitions in meaning 
identified in several discourses drawn from the case online forum by applying Weick’s 
(1987) model. The empirical analyses will demonstrate the discreteness of utterances. 
As external observers we share with the participants in the case online forum the 
capacity to make imaginary connections between discrete utterances. As will be 
elaborated later, the capacity to create imaginary connections between discrete 
utterances concerns a rather primitive but critical ability to make sense of actions. Since 
actions take place in the flow of time, this ability to make sense of actions involves 
diachronic as well as synchronic understandings of a variety of encounters: 
synchronically, we almost instantaneously apprehend a variety of properties/attributes; 
diachronically we attend to flow by associating relevant properties with one another into 
particular sequential orders. We observe that in an online forum these merge to some 
extent.  
The analysis in this chapter emphasizes the diachronic aspect of understandings in 
explaining the assumptions and principles that people who are engaged in mundane 
discursive practices bring to bear. In this respect, the five criteria of relevance derived 
from Weick’s (1987) model serve to analyze mundane utterances in terms of both actors’ 
synchronic and diachronic ways of making sense of reality. Typically, while each one’s 
assumptions and principles are less visible in denotations, Weick’s model helps us 
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understand how we can read such non-obvious properties by reference to obvious ones. 
What is key is to put mundane discursive practices into the flow of time. The five 
criteria of relevance will do so by offering ‘operational relevance’ as temporally 
contingent ways of assessing relevance, ‘descriptive relevance’, ‘timeliness’ and ‘goal 
relevance’ as temporally non-contingent ways of assessing relevance. By applying these 
temporally distinct criteria of relevance to mundane utterances, we are likely to become 
aware that obvious similarities/dissimilarities that are normally observed in a collection 
of data not only serve as resources from which particular principles or causal relations 
can be derived by abstraction along the substitutive logic but also enable actors to act in 
more or less relevant ways. As they act based on their assessment of different 
relevancies, even if only assumptive, they possibly renew understandings, typically, of 
what they think they already knew but did not know how and on what grounds, i.e., 
implicit and context-specific assumptions and principles. As such, we will become able 
to take into account the non-obvious relevance that is supposed to be experienced by 
actors, thus, account for their experiences without overlooking the critical moments for 
them at which they obtain renewed understandings and/or ways of understanding reality. 
It will, thus, be emphasized that putting discursive practices in the flow of time and 
looking at the transitions of meaning are of significance for better understanding 
processes of organizing by means of mundane discursive practices. Each member’s 
skills and knowledge to make connections between discrete properties are considered to 
entail sources of social orderliness or collective actions. The analysis applying the five 
criteria of relevance will indicate that imagination that makes connections between 
discrete utterances is not a completely unruly action but a social practice that entails 
particular practical rules. By assessing different relevancies, each actor appears to be 
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enabled to denote reality on an assumptive basis in anticipation of responses from others 
who assess relevancies of denoted reality and possibly denote their realities. In other 
words, actors’ assessment of different relevancies can be understood as inherently 
interactional and social practices which involve particular rules and actors’ skills and 
knowledge to establish and comply with such rules. 
With regard to such practical rules embedded in social practices, the analysis will 
suggest that in assessing relevancies, actors connote their respective sense of evaluative 
appropriateness. Thus, the skills and knowledge to make connections are understood to 
be intrinsically orientated towards being good by complying with particular criteria 
from which certain rules necessarily emanate. Focusing on the intrinsic rule-orientation 
embedded in mundane discursive practices, the next chapter will develop a framework 
with which to account for, in a holistic manner, the processes of assessing different 
relevancies entailed in mundane discursive practices. It will do so by drawing upon 
narrative frameworks, typically Ricoeur’s (1984/1990, 1991) theory of emplotment. 
Theory of emplotment or plot is capable of accounting for the non-obvious but critical 
moment at which actors obtain renewed understandings as they follow particular plots 
(Boje 2001). It can also explain the transitions of meaning in ways that exemplify the 
asymmetrical relationship between an author and readers mediated by texts by focusing 
on actors’ mundane skills and knowledge to make connections in both a synchronic and 
a diachronic manner. Narrative frameworks are of relevance for accounting not only for 
diachronic progressions of events and phenomena but also for the intertwined 
relationship between the synchronic and diachronic ways of making sense of reality.  
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Regardless of whether or not one can reproduce events and phenomena as they actually 
happened precisely in terms of chronological order, the skills and knowledge to 
sequence relevant properties into particular orders enable one to understand a variety of 
encounters in the flow of time, including variable contexts in which those events and 
phenomena took place. Such additional information is the surplus of denotation, which 
mundane utterances produce. Moreover, it is readers/observers who read more or less 
surplus from others’ utterances regardless of utterers’ awareness of surpluses. Because 
of alternate successions between the acts of reading and denoting, which give rise to the 
surplus of denotation, no meaning is actually exchanged in the same way as material 
objects are handed over from an actor to another. Rather, meaning is renewed at every 
turn of conversation. As such, narrative frameworks are effective in accounting for 
mundane discursive practices in everyday practical settings, rather than mere 
interpretation of texts. 
3.2 Case context 
The case Internet discussion forum (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Forum’) was founded 
by one of the employees working for a nation-wide discount retail department chain in 
the USA (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Company’). (Although he had to leave the 
Company after it decided to close his store, the Forum remained active after his 
resignation.) The Forum is a private forum hosted by one of the major Internet service 
providers (ISPs). While the Forum appears open to the public in terms of viewing, those 
who wish to participate should first register themselves with the ISP by creating 
respective identities (user ID) that enable them to post their messages to the Forum. The 
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founder acts as an administrator of the Forum who has the authority to delete posts and 
reject participation by filtering the ISP IDs at his discretion. 
The Forum operates publicly in terms of accessibility; thus, virtually anybody can 
subscribe. The majority of the participants are employees or ex-employees of the 
Company, or those who have specific interests in the Company’s performance, such as 
individual shareholders, experts in and advisors for investment and so forth. The Forum 
operates informally with respect to the Company’s formal structures, with participation 
being completely voluntary, in the sense that the Company has no direct control over 
participation. 
During the period in which the Forum was active, from May 2001 to October 2002, the 
Company went through two critical events: filing to the Bankruptcy Court (officially 
announced on 22
nd
 January 2002) and closing 284 stores (officially announced on 5
th
 
March 2002), which made more than 20,000 jobs redundant. The subscription to the 
Forum rose steeply after the official announcement of the bankruptcy (614 visitors with 
the ISP ID as at Feb. 18, 2002 compared to 114 as at Jan. 1, 2002). Hence, it appears 
that most of the participants in the Forum were looking for information concerning 
these critical events and participants from the Company were likely to be suffering from 
anxieties and uncertainties, especially about their future. (In this study, hereafter, the 
participants refer to employees and ex-employees of the Company.) 
While the majority of the participants appear to be aware of their company’s 
unfavorable performance before the bankruptcy, probably in part because of the scale of 
the Company, they are not quite sure about what is going on in the whole Company, 
what will be happening, what consequences the bankruptcy will have for them, and how 
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they ought to respond. Their participation in the Forum can thus be regarded as a key 
part of their efforts at making sense of the bankruptcy and ensuing events, in order to 
cope with their anxieties and uncertainties. Indeed, as the participants talk in the Forum, 
they appear to be confirming that their company has been doing badly for the last few 
years. Their experiences at their respective locales indicate that the Company may need 
to be drastically reorganized. Infrastructure is deteriorating, information systems, 
including checkout registers, are outdated, merchandise is not properly supplied to 
stores, and intensive rationalization measures appear only to be targeting employees’ 
payroll. Even worse, it appears that these measures do not turn out to be effective. 
Nonetheless, in the Forum, the most dominant opinion is that they had better do what 
they can do at their respective workplaces. Probably, bankruptcy of a company of over 
2,000 stores is such a big issue that practically no other alternative seems to be left to 
them. The processes through which the participants collectively arrived at such a 
modest opinion are the focus of the subsequent analyses. 
3.3 Data  
The number of posts is in total 14,502, posted during a period of 17 months (May 2001 
to October 2002) by 806 posters. Through a close reading of the posts open coding was 
conducted to identify themes from the contents and contexts talked in the posts. 7,206 
posts out of 14,502 which were posted between May 2001 and April 2002 were chosen 
for the subsequent analyses: these are considered to represent the participants’ efforts at 
making sense of the bankruptcy and store-closures.  
3.4 Themes: Transitions in meaning 
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Despite the seeming significance of the bankruptcy and ensuing company-wide 
reorganization which must have evoked the participants’ anxieties about possible job 
losses, they talk chiefly about their immediate experiences, which are filled with 
problems they encounter at their respective workplaces. Therefore, themes identified in 
their messages are mostly those related to store operations, such as understaffing, 
dysfunctional signage, pricing or inventory management systems, unreliable suppliers 
designated by the Company’s management, and so forth. 
Based on the framework derived from Weick’s (1987) model of practices of theorizing 
organizational communication, I focused on the ways in which themes shift from those 
related to store operations to other topics. The following four patterns were detected in 
the ways in which their conversations proceeded and developed further themes: 
(1) Talking about store-level problems leads the posters to talk about gaps between 
what they wish to do for the benefit of the Company and what the Company’s 
management appears to make the most of. 
(2) Talking about store-level problems leads into the posters’ awareness of 
emotional attachment to the Company and to the retail industry. 
(3) Talking about store-level problems leads them to talk about relationships with 
customers or the general public. 
(4) Talking about store-level problems leads them to discuss normative issues that 
often ensue in reflections on the usefulness of the Forum. 
I saw these patterns as the participants’ ways of sensemaking because these shifts or 
emergence of themes occur as a result of their attaching some meanings to their talk 
about the initial theme (problems encountered in their day-to-day operations). More 
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importantly, the shifts of the themes from those concerning store operations to those 
involving broader contexts, as indicated above, can be considered reflective of the 
participants’ anticipation for knowing better about the bankruptcy, ensuing events and 
phenomena that they are not quite sure about. 
By reading the messages posted to the Forum in terms of these shifts in theme or 
transitions in meaning, it became evident that the participants demonstrated 
competencies in establishing and managing communicative relationships with others. 
Specifically, they make assumptions about relevancy both in terms of the substance of 
utterances and in terms of their appropriateness in the Forum. In the case of pattern (1) 
above, the participants managed to express their analytical competencies about how a 
retail company should be run in ways that it could make profit. In the case of pattern (2), 
they succeeded in establishing themselves as committed and loyal employees. In the 
case of pattern (3), their conversations suggested that they were aware of the broader 
contexts in which they operated, such as relationships between employees of a 
bankrupted company and customers, media and the general public. All these indicate the 
participants’ abilities to establish understandings about phenomena that they are not 
quite sure about, in ways that appropriate facts described in others’ utterances and keep 
conversations ongoing in the Forum without serious disruption. In so doing, as appears 
in pattern (4), the fact that they occasionally mention normative issues and the 
significance of the Forum indicates that they made judgments of good or bad. Actually, 
in the other patterns (1) to (3) their value judgments, or at least preferences, were 
indicated: they display themselves as competent, loyal and broad-minded characters. 
Hence, as Weick’s (1987) model posits, the participants appear to act in accordance 
with particular principles and assumptions, even if implicit and context-specific. 
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Otherwise, it would have appeared both to the participants and to external observers that 
the activities taking place in the Forum were rather more disorganized than organized, 
in which case the Forum might have ceased to be active sooner than I observed. 
The activities in the Forum demonstrate convergence in meanings, as shown in the 
patterns above, and the participants’ collective preferences and intentions for sustaining 
the activities in the Forum could be assumed. However, in subsequent analyses it will 
become apparent that the messages posted to the Forum do not communicate with each 
other. In other words, it is not possible to assume that each actor’s intention to 
communicate with others was materialized simply by posting messages because the 
messages did not communicate directly with each other. Rather, because the messages 
do not communicate with each other, each participant had to, or rather was allowed to, 
establish her/his own understandings of the events in the real world (their respective 
workplaces), of people participating in the Forum, and their concerns, interests, 
preferences and even selfhood, by reference to others’ postings.  
The analysis starts by demonstrating the discreteness of the messages. It then examines 
processes by which discrete messages are connected with each other by each poster’s 
capacities to discern and create relevant utterances in a particular context (in the Forum). 
This analysis will indicate the subtle but inevitable normative qualities implicated in 
their imaginative capacities to create connections between discrete utterances. Also, it 
will exemplify the fact that their imaginative capacities can be understood as being 
evoked by their anticipation of better knowing what is going on, a need to know, 
without specific purposes and motivations.  
3.5 Discreteness of utterances in conversations 
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As an example aimed at showing the discreteness of utterances which denote reality in 
particular ways in which diverse actors appear to communicate with each other, a thread 
of messages is taken up as below.  
Table 3.1 An example thread representing the participants’ uncertainty and 
anxiety 
[Post A] 
Subject: I Have To Ask 
Date: 17/02/2002 
Time: 05:00 
Poster Name: ur2blue 
 
How many folks in here HONESTLY think we will make it as a company? 
This is all so hard to believe but I think this company has been in trouble 
for at least the last 6 to 7 yrs. Hope it can be repaired! 
I would really like to see how other employees are feeling. 
Do you ever as […] employees get the feeling no one really cares how you 
feel or what you think? 
This is not being negative! Just want to tALk about the real issue. Will we 
be here talking about [the Company] this time next year? 
[Res. 1] […] I think we have a 50 50 shot, my greatest fear is with our 
leadership...we have none. If there is anyone at the top that cares about the 
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 company, instead of themselves, then maybe (the 50% positive),if not I am 
really scared! 
17/2/02 by rph85234 at 05:09 
[Res. 2] 
 
[…] if the corporate honcho's do not focus on customers and insuring they 
have positive experiences in stores We may not see a turnaround. I […] see 
store associates overworked, underpaid, understaffed […] I wonder how 
many "Honcho's" actually go into stores???and buy??? unless it is to see 
the little people and insult their overworked attitudes One thing is for sure 
if the customers come to stores and have positive experiences they come 
back but if they don't they don't The store's need raises and help and 
support from the "elites" Payrolls should be expanding […] Your 
thoughts?? 
17/2/02 by gadc1989 at 05:13 
[Res. 3] 
 
[…]After this past year it certainly felt like no one cared and nobody was 
listening, but […] many of Mark Schwartz's policies are starting to be 
reversed. Will it be a case of too little being late? I don't think so, because 
[…] We were proud of our history, its compassion and family feel. We 
worked hard […] because we cared for our store, community and fellow 
associates. […] You do not INTIMIDATE a WORLD CLASS COMPANY, 
you build it through trust and rewards for your associates and they perform 
at WORLD CLASS levels because they care. As I think about all the money 
we wasted this year on signing, fixtures, wobblers, etc., I can't help but 
53 
 
think how many salary dollars they would have translated into, […] how 
many less hours we would have had to cut from people who truly needed 
them. However, that year is gone, […] we cannot let that mire us in 
negativity. […] You can bash us and we'll show up the next day ready to go 
get em again. DO NOT UNDER ESTIMATE our tenacity. So to answer 
your question, put me down as TRULY BELIEVING that we will be here 
next year. […] 
17/2/02 by sickoXXX at 05:36 
[Res. 4] 
 
I believe that we will be here. We are getting rid of things that cost this 
company money. It makes sense to close stores that are not profitable. It 
makes sense to file chapter 11, in order to be relieved of $250,000,000 in 
leases. It makes sense to have the bluelights come from the store level. It 
makes sense to have the store appear open and customer friendly. It makes 
sense to have up-to-date computers and registers. I believe that the right 
decisions are now being made. […] 
17/2/02 by myblueyeswideopen at 05:46 
[Res. 5] Maybe. There will need to be lots of changes. I personally have no faith in 
leadership. […] We're merchants. We sell stuff. Sales are what produce the 
profits, […]. It's really very simple....put stuff on the shelves, have enough 
employees to keep it stocked, face it, find it, and ring it up. Keep the aisles 
uncluttered, the floor swept, and all the lights burning to create a pleasant 
appearance […]. Those of us in the stores understand all this. The folks in 
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Troy do not and that's why we're in the fix we're in. You can't neglect the 
stores and expect to make up that profit at HQ […] 
17/2/02 by ecc1521 at 05:46 
[Res. 6] 
 
I think that we're all worried about that. IMO I think that we will IF (A BIG 
IF!)Chuck and Co. realizes what is wrong with our company. We need to 
lower expenses and this should NOT be hours in the stores. […] 
[The Company] has a lot of loyal customers who want to shop here but 
would you really blame them if they went to the other side of the street 
where they can get help? For the most part our prices are competitive […] 
We need help on the floor and checkouts plus we need to get our mdse. in 
and onto the sales floor. If we can get these done I believe we'll survive. I'm 
trying not to dwell on the past but rather the future […] 
WE CANNOT KEEP MAKING THE MISTAKES THAT WE DID IN 
2001!!!!!! Thanks for the vent. 
17/2/02 by cuda17mc at 06:14 
[Post B] 
 
I am loving your answers. It makes me know more than ever that the 
store employees did not fail. You know I can't help but wonder, WHY 
our executives did [not] know how much trouble we were in as a 
company? […]What has been said in your answers about […] 
employees is so true. […] 
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You know wouldn't it be great if the BOD and executives did put at 
least part of their earnings back in the company? Saying it could only 
be used for store salary. So we could better serve the our biggest asset, 
OUR CUSTOMERS. Can you imagine how that would impress the our 
customers and the outside world. I know that […] executives should be 
honest and straightforward with us this time. Tell us exactly what is 
going on and ASK FOR OUR HELP! Don't tell us all is well when it 
isn't! The unknown is the worst thing to deal with. 
17/2/02 by ur2blue at 06:31 
[Res. 7] 
 
I truly believe there at least several people "at the top" who care immensely 
about the company. By "at the top" I'm speaking of individuals who are in a 
position to make an impact, to actually succeed in this turn-around effort. I 
think it's better than 50-50. I can't be [too] sure it's not too late, but I have 
every reason to be hopeful and positive. I think if some of you were more 
acquainted with […] the character and integrity of these people, you would 
be encouraged. 
17/2/02 by XXXwidow at 13:55 
As a thread of messages, they collaboratively present particular ways of understanding 
the bankruptcy and sufferings attributable to it, such that the messages embody certain 
discourses representing collectively shared meanings among the participants. Stores and 
customers are what the Company is supposed to make the most of, since in the end the 
Company’s earnings must come from stores. Associates working on the ground (in 
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stores) know how to operate stores and to take care of customers properly. Management 
must listen to stories from stores rather than enforcing various programs in a top-down 
manner: failing to do so is having serious consequences, such as losing loyal customers 
and sales, wasting limited resources on unprofitable programs, cutting hours and 
salaries of the associates as makeshift measures that are considered to have caused the 
bankruptcy and necessitated the Company’s overall reorganization.  
It is useful for understanding sources of social orderliness embedded in mundane 
discursive practices to find that such utterances actually produced meanings that seemed 
to be shared by the participants in the Forum. However, the process by which certain 
collective meanings are generated from mundane discursive practices can be understood 
better, without discounting what each actor is actually doing, by closely examining the 
thread of messages as these that consist of mutually discrete utterances. 
First, the thread is initiated by a poster who appears anxious about the Company’s 
business continuity as indicated in the question: ‘Will we be here talking about [the 
Company] this time next year?’ In this opening post ([Post A]), the poster also asks if 
anybody has ever had ‘the feeling no one really cares how you feel or what you think?’ 
Since these questions do not seem to request respondents for specific information or 
solutions to particular problems, replies might not have to answer the questions in a 
manner that strictly follows the first poster’s line of inquiries (if at all). Hence, the 
replies shown above ([Res 1 to Res. 7]) also look like self-contained presentations of 
opinions by which the posters denote reality in particular ways while they appear to 
have been evoked by the opening post. In other words, while it appears that the posters 
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conversed with each other over the subject matters raised by the first poster, the 
messages did not really communicate with one another. 
For example, while most of them attended to the issue of the Company’s business 
continuity, their accounts regarding ‘care’, or some sense of the lack of it, vary. One of 
them discussed ‘care’ as the issue of whether or not the Company’s management cares 
for its employees ([Res. 3]), others see it as the issue of management’s negligence 
concerning fundamentals of store-level operations ([Res. 1 and 6]). Others see care in 
terms of relatively low loyalty and/or commitment of the top executives or management 
in general to the Company ([Res. 2 and 7]) or do not mention it at all ([Res. 4 and 5]). In 
other words, each message not only replied to the initial post but also can be understood 
as an attempt by each poster to understand better what s/he was encountering. It is 
possible for those who read these messages to take the information inscribed to be 
simple facts concerning some employees of a bankrupted company or socially accepted 
(or even objective and disinterested) meanings of such facts. Additionally, it appears 
that each of these messages is meaningful to each of the posters, thus certain meanings 
were created rather than these simply confirming how others denoted a reality that they 
assumed they were sharing. 
What deserves even more attention is the first poster’s response ([Post B]) to those 
messages seemingly responding to her initial post. While she appears content with these 
messages and refers to some of the accounts in affirmative terms, such as the 
importance of customer service ([Res. 2 and 6]), hardworking employees ([Res. 3]) 
facing the problems caused by serious understaffing ([Res. 5]), her utterance concluded 
by criticizing management’s dishonest manner in disclosing critical information, which 
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none of the other messages mentions. In other words, her second post ([Post B]) appears 
to add additional meanings to what she read in the preceding messages. More 
specifically, it says that ‘the store employees did not fail’, which can be related to 
‘associates […] perform at WORLD CLASS levels’ ([Res. 3]), and that ‘we could better 
serve the our [opt. sic.] biggest asset, OUR CUSTOMERS’ and the executives should 
‘ASK FOR OUR HELP!’ by reference to ‘Those of us in the stores understand all this 
(the fundamentals of retailing). The folks in Troy (headquarters) do not’ ([Res. 5]) and 
also to the statement that ‘[The Company] has a lot of loyal customers’ ([Res. 6]). The 
message also says that ‘executives did [not] know how much trouble we were in as a 
company’ by reference to others’ accounts, such as ‘is [there] anyone at the top that 
cares about the company, instead of themselves’ ([Res. 1]) and ‘how many "Honcho's" 
(headquarters’ staffs) actually go into stores’ ([Res. 2]). While clarifying that she also 
responded to the preceding messages ([Res. 1 to 6]), expressing gratitude that their 
accounts were of relevance for her, she selectively appropriated aspects of these others’ 
utterances in order to establish her own utterance in ways that appear coherent and 
consistent.  
In other words, this post ([Post B]) can be understood to produce a certain 
meaningfulness that is unique for the poster and such uniqueness appears to constitute 
her sense of relevance, supported by the substances appropriated from others’ messages 
and the ways of denotation that expressed her message as responding to preceding 
messages. Relevancy is actually not mere attributes of things, events, and phenomena to 
be apprehended from things-in-themselves (Weick 1987) but also potentiality resides in 
the denotation of that reality in particular ways that may or may not become relevant, 
depending on each reader’s sense of meaningfulness. It is important to understand how 
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the participants themselves became aware of such subtle uniqueness entailed in their 
utterances. If they were indifferent to such uniqueness, they would be satisfied with 
repetitions of reading and posting similar messages, something that it is relatively easy 
to doubt. Understanding better the process by which actors become aware of uniqueness 
enables a more nuanced understanding of the fundamental motivations of actors 
participating in mundane discursive practices. 
3.6 Awareness of the non-obvious relevance reflected in the ways of denotation 
Different ways of denotation tell us about the participants’ awareness of motivations for 
participating in the Forum. The ways of denoting reality are, put differently, their 
attitudes toward participating in the Forum. The ways of denotation are distinct from the 
substances of messages in that they are determined by assumptions about whom one is 
talking to or in what contexts oneself, and relevant others, are assumed to be operating.  
In my observation, the participants generally appreciated the Forum because they 
became aware that many associates were experiencing similar sentiments of uncertainty 
and anxiety. Hence, they could post messages assuming that they were talking to others 
who shared similar experiences and sentiments, such as frustration arising from day-to-
day experiences at their respective workplaces and anxieties about job security, as were 
observed in the example thread. At the same time, they appeared cognizant of the 
existence of people who might have a negative view of their words, if not the factual 
quality of the bankruptcy or of their experiences with it.  
The participants’ recognition of the existence of those who are potentially negative 
about the activities in the Forum was identified in the same example thread (Table 3.1). 
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For example, positive speculation on the future of the Company also reflected a positive 
attitude on the part of participants, which was consistently observed in the Forum. What 
is notable in respect of the positive attitude reflected in their massages is that the 
participants were managing tensions between the positives and the negatives. At least 
part of the reasons for their expressing positive attitudes is their awareness of the 
possibly negative consequences of making negative utterances. Therefore, it was 
observed that the posters stated, especially after criticizing management and/or the 
Company’s top executives, that ‘This is not being negative’ [Post A], ‘we cannot let that 
(the year full of problems) mire us in negativity’ [Res. 3] and ‘I'm trying not to dwell on 
the past but rather the future […] WE CANNOT KEEP MAKING THE MISTAKES 
THAT WE DID IN 2001!!!!!! Thanks for the vent.’ [Res. 6]. These postings reflect the 
posters’ awareness of the existence of those who cast negative images toward them 
and/or the Company.  
It is obvious for them that the global negative events (e.g. the bankruptcy, 
reorganization, etc.) were real, to the extent that they could talk about such global 
events, grounding them in their day-to-day experiences (e.g. suffering from lack of 
merchandise, reduced income, work overload, unrealized ideal customer services). 
However, criticizing the Company’s executives and management might possibly be 
seen by outsiders or the general public as just complaining about hardships, in varying 
degrees of severity, possibly experienced by employees in general. Thus, the 
participants’ negative comments on the Company’s management might possibly end up 
confirming or even exacerbating the Company’s negative image, as already cast by 
customers, media and the general public. The participants appeared sensitive to the 
negativity inevitably entailed in criticizing the Company’s management, while the 
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Forum was appreciated for its contributions chiefly in terms of their making sense of 
reality in a manner that maintains positive identities.  
What is to be noted with regard to ways of denoting reality is that these reflect an 
intricate management of positives and negatives; moreover, the ways of denotation are 
visible. The visibility of the ways of denotation is significant, especially when we think 
of the relative invisibility of each contributor’s subjective experiences, such as what and 
how they actually feel. It is apparent that utterances rarely represent reality in ways that 
everyone can accept that the denoted reality is real. Regardless of the extent to which 
we can accurately understand each other’s reality from words attributed to them, in 
practice we make assumptions about each other’s reality on the basis of what we can 
observe. Not only is what is observable ‘real’ but it also reflects processes by which 
actors make assumptions in order to denote their reality in particular ways.  
Processes of denotation are important particularly because we are predisposed to 
presume the existence of certain reasons behind others’ utterances or actions in general. 
What this means is that due to our presumption of reasons or motivations of actors for 
particular utterances and/or actions, such reasons and motivations are accepted without 
examining the processes by which such actors must have reached these assumptions. 
Among other things, in such processes whereby actors make assumptions, it is 
important to observe their different degrees of concern.  
The intricate management of positives and negatives observed in the example thread 
indicates the participants’ seriousness in terms of their intention to be seen in positive 
terms. Had they not been so serious about being positive, they could have focused only 
on management’s failure. Obviously, what is important is not what is good or bad either 
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in this specific case or in universal and general contexts so much as the fact that the 
participants appeared to be attempting to present themselves as positive to various 
others and, more importantly, such attempts were reflected in their ways of denoting 
reality. It is, therefore, even more important not to attribute the participants’ 
fundamental motivations for their participating in mundane discursive practices to their 
intention to be seen in ‘good’ terms, which can only be speculated. Instead, one should 
look even more closely at the processes by which they made assumptions in ways that 
reduced the anxiety and uncertainty arising from their day-to-day suffering, as well as 
the unforeseeability of the future, by making better sense of these uncertain events and 
presenting themselves to different others in positive terms. The anxiety and uncertainty 
are managed in the flow of time, rather than by prescribing particular diagnoses. 
3.7 Making assumptions and transitions in meaning: Imaginative creation 
In the context of the Forum, the majority of the participants appeared to be suffering 
from uncertainty and anxiety chiefly due to the bankruptcy and possible job losses. One 
cannot interpret the messages posted to the Forum as a means by which to obtain 
information with which to reduce uncertainty and anxiety, however. Uncertainty and 
anxiety are rather ambiguous feelings; moreover, talk in the Forum was unlikely to 
bring about substantial impacts on the Company’s policies and decisions. The 
meaningfulness of the messages should be understood to lie in the whole processes in 
which the participants read others’ messages and issued their messages concerning the 
bankruptcy and its impacts on their day-to-day operations. Put differently, the activities 
observed in the Forum might be undertaken in large part in anticipation of those 
postings making better sense of what they and other participants had been experiencing. 
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Hence, their activities in the Forum assume a relatively less specific desire for managing 
anxiety and uncertainty. 
What is key is that the participants did not appear so sure about what they wished to 
obtain through participation in the Forum. When going back to the initial post of the 
example thread ([Post A]), it was observed that while the poster appeared anxious about 
the Company’s business continuity, her anxieties did not seem to be exhausted by 
attributing it to the unclear future of the Company, as she also talked about her 
relatively vague sense of being neglected. What deserves attention is that, regardless of 
the ambiguity of her anxiety, she managed to issue her utterance as a practical 
accomplishment. In other words, she dealt with two distinct dimensions of ambiguity in 
her participation in the Forum: first, whether or not her anxiety is relevant as a subject 
matter to be discussed in the Forum and second, whether or not her ways of denotation 
will be accepted by other participants as being relevant, as observed in her saying that 
‘This is not being negative’. 
The relatively quick responses (6 responses within 75 minutes) from other posters, 
together with the substances of their messages, should assuage the first poster that her 
anxieties were actually relevant in the Forum. In addition, with these replies, she 
obtained not only information that supported her sense of relevancy but her anxieties 
were more or less clarified, as observed in her second post ([Post B]). Specifically, she 
seems to have attributed, if provisionally, her anxiety and uncertainty to management’s 
dishonest attitudes in terms of the disclosure of important information by asserting that 
‘The unknown is the worst thing to deal with’. It is, therefore, important to understand 
that mundane utterances not only transmit information but also induce imagination on 
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the side of hearers/readers about what is not necessarily inscribed in them. Without 
considering such a dynamic process involving each actor’s imagination, mundane 
discursive practices might be conceptualized as a fairly static image of synchronic 
exchange of information between actors. 
3.8 Applying the five criteria of relevance 
What the analysis thus far presented indicates is that the subject matters expressed in the 
example thread look similar and the ways of denoting reality appear to be converging 
but each of the messages appears to involve particular meaningfulness to each of the 
posters. The analysis especially draws our attention to the significance and the subtlety 
entailed in the ways of denoting reality that are visible but less obvious in respect of 
assumptions which actors are making, using their practical skills and knowledge to 
establish and maintain interactional relationships with others.  
One can infer that there are subtle relationships between converging discourses and 
relatively less obvious unique meaningfulness for each participant and between 
relatively obvious ways of denotation and relatively less obvious skills and knowledge 
with which to establish and maintain communicative relationships. Besides, since 
utterances were found not to be connected with one another intrinsically, either by 
meanings or by purposive motivations for communication, such implicit knowledge and 
skills cannot presume any linear linkage between actors’ desires and observable 
outcomes, such as the attempt to be positive and utterances that appear to concord with 
each other in respect of their attempts at positivity. Put differently, it is not possible to 
assume that utterances issued for the purpose of exchanging information with others 
will be automatically connected with other utterances.  
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Rather, actors with unique concerns and interests assess the relevancy of utterances in 
terms of three distinct dimensions: substance, ways of denotation and subjective 
meaningfulness. To the extent that they appear to communicate with each other these 
three-dimensional assessments of relevance constitute less obvious but recursively 
employed practices that produce relatively similar outcomes. The messages in the same 
example thread will be analyzed by applying the five criteria of relevance derived from 
Weick’s (1987) model of practices of theorizing organizational communication, which 
is capable of accounting for the non-obvious concerns, skills and knowledge of actors 
and the obvious substances and ways of denotation. Thus, the focus will be on relatively 
obvious similarities in substances and ways of denotation and less obvious unique 
meaningfulness for each participant, as well as the implicit skills and knowledge used in 
making assumptions to establish and maintain interactional relationships.  
Despite the substantive similarity regarding the positive but conditional speculation on 
the turnaround from the bankruptcy, the responding posts ([Res. 1 to 7]) also 
demonstrate the distinctiveness of each poster’s interests and concerns. Specifically, 
some variance was found in terms of what grounds and in what ways each respondent 
considered management was responsible for the problems experienced day by day. For 
instance, some considered the critical condition for successful turnaround from the 
bankruptcy to be ‘leadership’ ‘that cares about the company, instead of themselves’ 
([Res. 1]), ‘focus on customers and insuring they have positive experiences in stores’ 
([Res. 2]), or ‘to lower expenses and this should NOT be hours in the stores’ ([Res. 6]). 
Others grounded their positive speculations in what they perceived as beneficial 
changes since the bankruptcy, such as ‘many of Mark Schwartz's (a former executive) 
policies are starting to be reversed’ ([Res. 3]) and ‘the right decisions are now being 
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made’ ([Res. 4]). As such, while these posters appear to consider viable policies and 
decisions at the top to be necessary for successful turnaround from the bankruptcy, it is 
indicated that they perceived changes in the policies and the decisions differently. It is 
apparent that people who worked at different places were experiencing the bankruptcy 
and its impact on their day-to-day operations differently. The point is, thus, that there is 
uniqueness emerging from the backdrop of overall similarities. 
If we apply the transitions in meaning assumed in Weick’s (1987) model to this context, 
the redundancy of similar accounts contributes to making explicit shared aspects of the 
understandings of the bankruptcy. Then, against redundancy, each of the posters 
manages to establish non-redundant, thus unique understandings, for their self. Weick’s 
model, thus, leads us to consider that it is possible for any word to carry different 
meanings every time it is stated. Probably, repetitions of certain words and phrases may 
be understood also as rhetoric for emphasis or as a sign of consent to or acceptance of 
substances described in others’ messages. However, having observed in the example 
thread that even when the posters expressed concordance with specific accounts made in 
others’ messages, they managed to create their own accounts, the non-redundancy 
emerging from seemingly redundant accounts can be understood to be process by which 
each actor is creating relevance for her/himself by issuing an utterance that denotes 
reality in a more or less similar way.  
The similarities observed in the substances and the ways of denotation can also be 
explained better by applying the five criteria of relevance of Weick’s (1987) model: 
descriptive relevance, goal relevance, operational relevance, non-obviousness and 
timeliness. Specifically, the five criteria of relevance enable us to understand that the 
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similarities/dissimilarities both in the substances and in the ways of denotation are 
discerned synchronically, thus instantaneously, and created diachronically by putting 
substances and ways of denotation into the flow of time. More concretely, the 
participants assess relevance in terms of descriptive particulars and timeliness in situ, 
thus in reference to their concerns and interests at particular points in time and space. At 
the same time, they assess the relevance of utterances as readers/observers by imagining 
goal and operational relevance either as synchronic thus relatively consistent 
correspondence between particular attributes and the criteria of relevance or as 
particular sequential orders chiefly assessed by reference to operational relevance. Then, 
each sense of relevance, in terms of non-obviousness, should be emergent from 
relevance in terms of the other four criteria.  
Even though whether or not one may derive non-obvious relevance from other relatively 
obvious relevancies is not predictable, the point is the fact that one can imagine what is 
not obvious by reference to what is obvious. Hence, while certain principles or causal 
relations can be derived from certain patterns or recursively appearing events and 
phenomena as conventional scientific methods do with the logic of substitution, patterns 
and repetitions should also be understood as necessary resources for inducing actors’ 
renewed understandings of reality in ways that reveal their implicit and context-specific 
assumptions and principles. Meanings are thus all the time being renewed in mundane 
discursive practices as each actor makes judgments on those different relevancies. 
Altogether, the activities observed in the Forum are considered to entail processes by 
which meanings are determined diachronically, in the flow of time. The quasi-
conversations in the Forum continuously produced non-redundant understandings of 
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reality by the participants because of the simple fact that many participants could read 
one another’s reality by virtue of its being denoted in relatively similar ways, a critical 
point from which to explain how and by what people are motivated to talk and listen to 
others. When looking at mundane discursive practices as sources of social orderliness, 
they need to be analyzed not only as synchronic exchanges of information between 
actors but also as diachronic processes in which mutually independent acts of reading 
and speaking are being succeeded alternately.  
3.9 Importance and necessity to delve into the transitions in meaning in the flow of 
time 
The example thread ends with the last post [Res. 7] as no post followed. Although such 
an abrupt closing of a thread frequently occurred in the Forum, it is interesting that the 
posters did not continue to talk in order to reach consensus, especially when looking at 
the variances in the degrees of trust with which they render the Company’s management 
or executives and in their perceived changes after the bankruptcy. While it is not 
possible to know exactly why no further discussion was held, these posters must have at 
least been satisfied with having posted their messages in reply to the initial post and 
probably more or less satisfied with the ways by which they established the interactional 
relationship with each other. What is to be noted in respect of the latter is that none of 
the messages look irrelevant to the extent that their interactions appear to have 
concluded successfully without any open conflict (Goffman 1959/1990). Actually, the 
successful completion of interactions is in itself of no less significance for the 
participants’ wellbeing, considering the subtlety with which the participants threaded 
their skills and knowledge to establish and sustain interactions with others assessing the 
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multi-dimensional relevance. As was observed, relevance appears to be assessed not 
only in terms of the subject matters to be talked but also in terms of the ways of 
denoting reality. Besides, each actor has her/his own particular interests and concerns.  
What the analyses demonstrated is that the participants in the example thread, and 
probably in the Forum in general, appreciate the opportunities to read others’ denoted 
reality and to present each one’s understandings in ways that were relevant in terms of 
substance and context and by reference to expectations for the Forum of managing 
uncertainty and anxiety. However, what is to be emphasized most from the analyses 
conducted in this chapter and for the analyses in the subsequent chapters is the 
indeterminacy attaching to why the participants decided to participate in the Forum. 
Although the participants appear to behave in ways that satisfy certain interactional 
obligations, it is not possible to determine whether actors were satisfied with fulfilling 
these to conclude their participation in (quasi-)conversations successfully. Moreover, 
one does not know if their participation in particular interactional relationships satisfied 
their respective interests and concerns. Even if the former were the case, the participants 
would not have been indifferent to their interests and concerns. Rather, as the analyses 
indicated, they were engaged in subtle processes by which they assessed the relevance 
of utterances in terms of substance and context, creating meaningfulness by reference to 
their respective interests and concerns.  
In order to establish and maintain activities in the Forum, the participants appear to be 
practicing relatively implicit skills and knowledge. What is most obvious are 
similarities both in the substances of messages and in ways of denoting their reality. 
However, as was observed, it appears that behind such obvious similarities, something 
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non-obvious is created by the participants’ abilities not only to discern 
similarities/dissimilarities between two or more substances and ways of denoting reality 
but also their ability to obtain a sense of relevance in terms of non-obviousness being 
generated from experiencing similar, thus seemingly redundant, information.  
More importantly, the process by which an actor obtains the sense of relevance appears 
to implicate a normative quality: the participants appeared to be concerned with being 
good, even though it is not possible to determine the causal relation between a sense of 
morality and observable actions. In other words, according to the five criteria of 
relevance, although assessment of relevance inevitably implicates making a choice 
between good or bad, rather than seemingly disinterested relevance or irrelevance, it is 
not possible to determine what outcomes are likely to be generated as a result of which 
of the criteria of relevance will have been fulfilled. Assessment of relevance always 
involves both synchronic and diachronic assessment, meaning that relevance is 
continuously being renewed as assessment of relevance is successively practiced by 
many actors. As has been demonstrated above, meanings are always created 
diachronically through diegetic alternation of reading/observing and talking/acting. 
In the next chapter, therefore, by applying narrative frameworks systematically the 
transitions in meaning in the flow of time, the multiple dimension entailed in 
assessment of relevancy and the fundamental motivations that appear to involve choice 
between good and bad towards participating in mundane discursive practices will be 
related. As will be elaborated, what is key in application of narrative frameworks is their 
capacity to account for actors’ abilities to discern and create similarities/dissimilarities 
between a variety of things, actors, events, phenomena, abstract principles and 
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assumptions. These accounting capacities can be explained by Ricoeur’s (1984/1990) 
theory of emplotment comprised of three-fold mimesis. In his theory, mimesis is not 
simple mimicry but involves creative (re-)production of meanings, especially on the 
part of readers.  
Through analyses applying narrative frameworks the source of social orderliness 
entailed in mundane discursive practices will be investigated. The analysis will focus on 
how actors obtain a sense of non-obvious relevance that implicates a choice between 
good and bad. They will not do so in a way that sees normative quality as the 
fundamental source of social orderliness or collective actions. Instead, they see 
meanings to be always determined through diegetic successions between the acts of 
reading and uttering, which are always variably relevant and good to an actor at a 
particular point in time and space. The source of social orderliness or collective actions 
are always being produced in the flow of time, thus, should be conceived of and 
explained processually. As the analyses that applied Weick’s (1987) model 
demonstrated, what is critical is the moment at which actors find their specific but 
implicit theories to be revealed as they refer to others’ denotations of reality. Thus, if we 
can understand better the mechanisms by which actors’ understandings are being 
renewed through mundane discursive practices, processes of organizing, organizational 
changes and resistance to them are expected to be explained in ways that take into 
account each actor’s skills and knowledge enacted in mundane discursive practices. 
Imagination that creates meanings by making connections between discrete realities 
denoted in utterances is inherently orientated towards particular rules, even if such rules 
are not definitive. 
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CHAPTER 4 CAPTURING THE TRANSITIONS IN MEANING BY PLOT 
4.1 Three different connections 
In this chapter the focus continues to be placed on the transitions in meaning in the flow 
of time implicated in the five criteria of relevance of Weick’s (1987) model. However, 
in this chapter, what is to be highlighted is the subtle but important distinction between 
in situ and in retrospect with regard to sequential orders in which the transitions in 
meaning take place. Doing so overcomes the weakness of Weick’s model arising from 
the impression that relevance and the five criteria constitute synchronic causal logic. 
The adoption of Weick’s model aims to confirm, primarily, the fact that actors act not 
only based on reasons retrospectively constructed but also by creating a sense of 
relevance (typically non-obvious one out of obvious ones) without waiting for rational 
decisions. Thus, it is important to understand how and why actors’ ways of seeing 
reality are shifting in the course of their assessing relevance of reality in terms of 
descriptive, goal, operational relevance, timeliness and non-obviousness, such that they 
may become aware of their implicit and context-specific principles and assumptions and 
such awareness may or may not be reflected in their subsequent actions. 
As was presented in the previous chapters (Chapter 2 and 3), the assessment of 
relevance can be reduced to the issue of connection or connectedness that actors create 
with their imaginative capacities between discrete properties, entities, theories and other 
denoted reality in particular ways. There are two distinct connections: synchronic and 
diachronic. The synchronic connection refers to categories into which attributes 
apprehended from the thing-in-itself are to be classified. The diachronic connection 
refers to a particular sequential order consisting of particular things, actors, events, 
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phenomena, abstract principles and assumptions. Actors assess the relevance of a 
variety of encounters by making these two different kinds of connections and also by 
mediating them into meaningful wholes. 
The distinction of sequential orders or diachronic connections between in situ and in 
retrospect becomes significant in the process of mediating the two different kinds of 
connections. The mediation occurs only once thus every process of mediating the 
connections is unique. What is key is what this mediation accomplishes and how. 
Simply, each actor creates in situ a diachronic connection which is unique while 
diachronic connections contribute resources for assessment of relevance of similar or 
comparable events and phenomena. In other words, sequential orders are both created in 
situ and apprehended from already established categories. Hence, they contribute 
differently to assessment of relevance. Specifically, the in situ creation of sequential 
orders explains processes by which a sense of non-obviousness is obtained. The 
sequential orders imagined from relatively remote temporal distance allow actors to 
assess the operational relevance of reality denoted in utterances by explicating 
connections between concerned actors and entities.  
Special attention is paid to the differences in temporal experiences. Different from 
linear images of time, such as a continuum flowing from the past to the future via the 
present, an eternal succession of the present, and a flow the lengths of which can be 
measured by punctuating them with particular beginnings and ends, time is assumed to 
manifest itself in different temporal experiences of actors, which can be made explicit 
by closely examining processes entailed in the making of diachronic connections. 
According to Weick’s (1987) model, actors are capable of assessing relevance by 
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apprehending relevant properties that appear to be causally defined, by distinguishing 
contextually relevant ways of associating a variety of properties in particular sequential 
orders, and by creating a sense of relevance by mediating the synchronic causal 
contingencies and the diachronic sequential contingencies. Thus, it is assumed that 
different meanings should be made and experienced through these three different 
processes of assessing relevance.  
In the analyses that follow, meanings to be created by making particular sequential 
orders are differentiated between those in practice and those (re-)produced in retrospect. 
Meanings are (re-)produced as people practice skills and knowledge with which to make 
in situ diachronic connections as well as to apprehend particular sequential orders that 
can be found in particular semantic resources comprised chiefly of (but not limited to) 
linguistic properties, such as words, sentences, stories, theories and schema. Put 
differently, the sequential orders in the latter terms can be seen as already networked 
symbolic resources from which actors are capable of identifying particular attributes 
and classifying them into appropriate categories. In contrast, the diachronic connections 
which are to be created in situ concern practices or how ordinary actors are practicing 
ad-lib their implicit and context-specific principles and assumptions in sequencing 
things, events and phenomena into particular orders to create a sense of meaningfulness 
at a particular point in time and space. Therefore, those different meanings produced by 
sequential orders are experienced by actors with different temporality. 
Narrative frameworks were adopted in order to make explicit the different meanings of 
sequential orders in practice and in retrospective sensemaking (Weick, Sutcliffe and 
Obstfeld 2005). The analyses in this chapter exemplify the rules that configure texts, 
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which are entailed in actors’ practicing implicit and context-specific principles and 
assumptions with which to establish and maintain communicative relationships with 
others.  
Of narrative frameworks, Ricoeur’s (1984/1990) theory of emplotment that consists of 
three-fold mimesis and accounts for processes of semantic (re-)production in everyday 
practice of language use was drawn upon. As mimesis refers to imitation or mimicking 
of certain actions, his theory of emplotment concerns ways of understanding actions. 
Thus, texts are seen to instantiate in the form of words the fact that particular actions 
have been accomplished by particular actors in particular ways and with particular 
interests and concerns, if not represent the actions in themselves (Ricoeur 1973).  
Focusing on what mundane utterances as actions instantiated in words accomplish, the 
messages posted to the Forum were classified in terms of three distinct plots. The plots 
refer to particular ways of configuring texts to produce particular meanings. These three 
plots were named in accordance with the three different mimetic processes of Ricoeur’s 
theory of emplotment: ‘Identifying/classifying’ plot, ‘Acting’ plot and ‘Mediating’ plot 
respectively.  
These plots also represent respectively the different connections to be produced in 
actors’ assessing relevance of reality denoted in particular ways. ‘Identifying/classifying’ 
plot corresponds to the relevance to be assessed in terms of the synchronic connections 
or causal contingencies between particular attributes that can be apprehended so as to be 
categorized into either being relevant or irrelevant. ‘Acting’ plot refers to plots that 
define particular contexts by diachronic connections or particular sequential orders; thus, 
corresponds to the relevance emergent of actions that unfold in particular sequential 
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orders. ‘Mediating’ plot creates a sense of relevance at a particular point in time and 
space by establishing in situ diachronic connections taking into account both relevance 
in terms of synchronic timeless correspondence between properties and sequential 
orders of them. As the names of these three plots indicate, they represent particular 
actions (identifying/classifying, defining contexts/relationships, and mediating). In 
accordance with these different actions, the plots account for concerned actors and/or 
actants to whom these actions can be attributed. The analyses demonstrate that 
meanings produced by mundane utterances can be differentiated not only by different 
processes by which to make the three different connections but also by who does what 
with whom and for or against whom.  
After reviewing narrative frameworks that are applicable to processes of organizing and 
Ricoeur’s (1984/1990) theory of emplotment, the analysis of the messages posted to the 
Forum begins by elaborating the methods by which to identify these three distinct plots. 
The analysis decomposes actors’ capacities into those of identifying and classifying 
similarities/dissimilarities of a variety of attributes, those of defining and complying 
with particular contexts by sequencing events and phenomena in particular orders, and 
those of creating a sense of relevance by grasping and mediating things, actors, events, 
phenomena, abstract principles and assumptions into meaningful wholes. At the same 
time, however, it will demonstrate that these three different capacities are practiced in a 
single utterance. In other words, the three different plots co-exist in an utterance. 
Although it is ‘Mediating’ plot that creates in situ the sense of relevance, it obviously 
needs what is to be mediated, that is, meanings produced by ‘Identifying/classifying’ 
and ‘Acting’ plots. ‘Identifying/classifying’ and ‘Acting’ plots, in turn, deal with 
already networked symbolic resources, meaning that some mediation must precede 
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these plots. Thus, no meaning comes out of thin air. Meanings are produced through 
these three distinct and inter-related actions borne by each individual actor as 
represented by the three plots. 
It becomes impossible to presume the absolute foundation that defines self-other 
distinctions because each of these plots accomplishes particular actions (i.e., 
identifying/classifying, defining contexts, and mediating) and these actions are 
attributed to respective actors at particular points in time and space. An actor is better 
understood to consist of three different experiences/anticipations of coherence and 
consistency to be apprehended and created through the three distinct mimetic processes 
of emplotment. 
The lack of the absolute foundation of self-identity translates into the impossibility of 
attribution of the fundamental motivation for an action (i.e., posting messages to the 
Forum) to properties belonging exclusively to an individual actor. In a mundane 
utterance, we can read imaginary interactions as well as three distinct meanings. It is, 
thus, assumed that intricate transpositions between subjective ‘I’ and objective others is 
taking place within each individual actor. This, however, does not mean that 
interactions are only images produced and projected onto each one’s consciousness. On 
the contrary, the lack of the absolute foundation requires and enhances actual 
interactions with others. Put differently, each actor naturally requires certain feedbacks 
from others on her/his interpretation of reality, which is only hypothetical and 
inferential. 
The chapter, therefore, suggests that (1) while the in situ creation of meaningfulness is 
unique for an actor, the uniqueness is less obvious and rarely conceived of as a 
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constituent part of one’s consistent and coherent identity; (2) the in situ creation of 
meaningfulness enables actors to express even seemingly ineffable experiences because 
of the mutually related mimetic processes of emplotment, which draw on substantive 
and contextual relevancy. In the next section, narrative frameworks, which can be 
applied to analyses of processes of organizing, are reviewed and Ricoeur’s theory of 
emplotment and the triad of mimetic processes is elaborated. 
4.2 Narrative frameworks as tools for analyzing processes of organizing 
Narrative frameworks have been attracting scholars of management and organization 
studies as devices with which to make sense of a variety of organizational events and 
phenomena, from organizational change to identity work. Although narrative principally 
concerns stories, either verbal or written, narrative frameworks help us understand 
actions in a manner that provides information regarding how and why certain actions 
were undertaken by whom (Gubrium and Holstein 2009). Narrative frameworks have 
capacities to grasp together actions and meanings as well as heterogeneous substances, 
such as events, characters, goals, motivations, and circumstances. Hence, narrative 
studies have been providing inclusive and plausible accounts on a variety of 
organizational events and phenomena, from sensemaking, communication, learning and 
change, power and politics, to identity (Rhodes and Brown 2005). 
The seemingly elusive connection between actions and meanings which narrative 
frameworks are capable of accounting in a manner that relates one to the other will 
become more explicit when we relate this connection to the recently increasing interest 
in different temporalities (Schatzki 2006, Cunliffe, Luhman and Boje 2004), processes 
of organizing (Hernes 2008, Langley and Tsoukas 2010) and practices (Geiger 2009, 
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Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks and Yanow 2009) in comparison to conventional entity-
based views on organizations. While the latter provides us with maps for going about 
everyday life (Taylor and Van Every 2000, see also the ‘synoptic view’ in Tsoukas and 
Chia [2002]), maps cannot (and probably should not) describe how we move. We 
usually make sense of the map by imagining how we move. As the recourse to 
processes of organizing indicates, to understand organizational phenomena better and to 
increase practical relevance of research outcomes, it is important to know how these 
maps are made sense of by users as well as to improve their quality. With narrative 
frameworks, messy and often less visible processes by which lay actors make sense of a 
variety of events and phenomena can be translated into a more accessible form of 
narrative. Hence, narrative studies on organizational phenomena can better be 
understood as shifting their focus more onto processes in which meanings are to be 
produced and re-produced as members of organizations engage in everyday practices, 
rather than on meanings represented by stories as social products (Gubrium and 
Holstein 2009). Put differently, narrative frameworks are expected not only to offer a 
device for interpreting and representing observed events and phenomena but also to 
explain processes by which plots, scripts, or particular ways of sequencing actions are 
repetitively enacted to establish interaction order (Atkinson and Delamont 2005, Barley 
1986).  
4.3 Ricoeur’s model of emplotment 
Ricoeur’s theories (1984/1990,1991, 1973) explain processes of semantic (re-
)production in ways that relate narrative as a system of semantic (re-)production to the 
practical action arena by seeing texts as actions enunciated in words. Particularly, his 
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theory of emplotment indicates his emphasis on the act of configuration embedded in 
texts. 
The theory of emplotment consists of three-fold mimesis. As mimesis refers to 
mimicking or imitating actions, it presumes capacities on the part of those who see the 
actions to understand them. When imitating a certain action, it is supposed that an 
imitator not only manages to capture the exact copy image of it but also understands if 
the copy represents the original as precisely as possible. Simply, even the most precise 
copy possible is a creation of one who is mimicking. Mimicking is accompanied by 
understanding similarities/dissimilarities between the original and the copy. Mimesis 
presumes creation of meanings through interactions between actors and observers over 
meanings of actions.  
In the context of narratives, authors present texts intending to convey particular 
meanings, and readers intend to understand them. Understanding texts requires the 
capacity to mimic actions denoted in the texts by identifying and classifying 
similarities/dissimilarities between the original and the copy of it. Meanings can never 
be particular attributes or a priori defined qualities of something but are generated 
through interactions between authors and readers by means of texts.  
Despite this presumption of interactivity between authors and readers, to appreciate 
fully Ricoeur’s theory of emplotment, it is important to understand that texts in 
themselves, without any intervention from outside, such as reading and interpretation, 
involve three distinct mimetic processes. His theory of emplotment explains not only 
creative processes by which actors interact with each other by virtue of texts but also the 
potential embedded in texts, which enables continuous production of meanings. Texts 
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produce meanings because the three mimetic processes of emplotment are mutually 
referencing to each other within texts. The seemingly tautological mutual referencing 
between the three mimetic processes explains the two-sided effects of actions: traces left 
behind individual’s being that can be traced back by following rules of symbolic 
mediation and opening up the social organizing of meanings. Texts regarded as actions 
are not a metaphor in which actors are entangled with signs and symbols. Rather, they 
are empirical evidence that prove that actors are fated to act in a socially organized 
manner in creating reality, which is denoted by symbols and that leaves behind 
symbolic resources as denotations of reality, although the origins of symbolic resources 
may not be located there, as will be explained below (4.4). The following elaborates the 
three mimetic processes of emplotment embedded in texts. 
4.4 The three mimetic processes 
First, as mimesis presumes actors’ competence in identifying and classifying 
similarities/dissimilarities, texts consist of a variety of attributes to be apprehended. But, 
the seemingly simple apprehension of particular attributes is not enabled in ways that 
absolutely foundational identities of certain things waiting for being apprehended are 
established. In other words, a variety of properties comprising texts form networks. That 
we almost instantaneously distinguish one quality from other qualities demonstrates that 
there are already networked properties. We normally presuppose the existence of such 
networked properties to find or rather anticipate the existence of causal relationships 
between particular attributes as if such relationships manifested and continued to 
manifest themselves consistently to the degree that they were believed to transcend 
particular contexts.  
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Ricoeur (1984/1990) explains such networks as being comprised of actions that are 
connected with ‘who’, ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘with/against whom’. When observing 
actions, it is assumed that there must be particular actors who are responsible for the 
actions, including their relevant capacities, reason(s), goal(s) and means to achieve them, 
and concerned actors, including particular effects on them. However, the networks, as 
Ricoeur defines, are not what enables prediction of particular outcomes of particular 
actions without regard to contexts but what depends on each actor’s presuppositions 
which naturally involve different cultural backgrounds and different degrees of 
familiarity with particular areas of knowledge, including certain comparable categories 
and genres. These networked properties structurally enable mimicry in the sense of 
understanding similarities/dissimilarities between actions, which is, in practical 
encounters with texts, recognized as apprehending particular properties as if they were 
particular meanings of words and sentences in the texts. Because of the implicitly 
context-dependent nature of the networks of conceptualized actions, another mimetic 
process is called forth to account for texts’ configurations in terms of sequential order to 
produce meanings in accordance with particular contexts. 
Second, Ricoeur points out the significance of symbols that comprise texts. Symbols are 
understood processually. Symbols become symbols by mediating and being mediated 
by one another. The networked actions, explained as above, imply that symbols are 
comprised of already symbolized constituents. This second process of symbolic 
mediation explains how these constituents are related to one another in ways that define 
particular contexts and can be understood in particular contexts. In other words, 
symbols do not produce meanings simply by being symbols as networked signs but 
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define particular meanings by the ways in which these symbolized constituents are 
connected into irreversible sequential orders.  
In this making of the irreversible sequential orders comprised of the symbolized 
constituents, the implied rule-governed processes are of particular importance. Apart 
from cultural, historical and other experiential backgrounds, the rule here concerns more 
practical technical competencies. It is each actor who relates a variety of symbols to one 
another either as an author or as a reader. Without assuming particular technical 
competencies that can be shared between authors and readers, texts could not even be 
read nor be understood. Symbols, thus, embed immanent rules in them. These immanent 
rules are, however, to be continuously modified or renewed as actors interact by means 
of symbols. In the course of the actual application of such rules being modified/renewed, 
more appropriate rules than others naturally develop in particular contexts. Hence, rules 
that enable circulation of symbols in our daily lives involve prescriptive and even 
normative assessment while such prescriptions and norms are obviously context-
dependent. 
The significance of seeing texts as actions manifests itself again. If texts were seen to 
consist of inanimate symbols, as if they were mere instrument with which to signify 
something, the rules embedded in symbols that enable them to keep on circulating in 
everyday life would also be seen to be stationary instruments by means of which 
symbolic constituents are connected with one another. Similar to the first structurally 
enabled mimetic process, seeing symbols as mutually mediating and mediated processes 
does not provide any universally applicable rule of symbolic mediation. The fact that 
symbols embed in them certain practical rules enables actors to make assumptions 
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supported by a sense of relevance not only in terms of logical soundness of connections 
but also in terms of normative quality taking into account particular contexts. The 
symbolic mediation is mimetic in the sense that particular connections between symbols 
are likely to be reproduced repetitively in accordance with the immanent rules. 
Nonetheless, the whole process is only assumptive to the degree that some modification 
and renewal are expected. The rules immanent in the symbolic mediation as well as the 
first mimetic process are unable to guarantee instantiation of actions in the form of texts 
(or verbal narrative). The third mimetic process is called forth to let texts come into 
being by marking on them the once-occurring unique present which emerges through 
mimetic process of temporal experiences. 
Third, drawing upon Heidegger’s existential analysis of Being and Time, Ricoeur 
explains the temporal experiences embedded in texts in which past, present and future 
are merging into the present that occurs only once. Put differently, this third mimetic 
process concerns text’s being. With regard to being, there is no difference between texts 
and other material things in terms of competence in drawing attention to them. What is 
characteristic of texts are the mimetic processes embedded in texts that involve the 
aspect of inventive creation as it was presented above. This third mimetic process 
regarding the texts’ being or temporal experiences further clarifies the potential of texts 
that generate new meanings simply by being present, even before being read or 
interpreted. 
The mimesis in temporal experience is, simply put, creation of the present by 
mimicking an already elapsed past that can be grasped structurally and a future that the 
rules of symbolic mediation enable one to anticipate. What is key is the subtle but 
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distinctive meaning of the once-occurring and unique present or being of texts. The 
meaning produced by this temporal mimetic process prepares texts to be narrated. Since 
the once-occurring and unique present can only be made up from already elapsed past 
actions which can be approached with the assistance of conceptual networks and an 
anticipated future, which can be constructed with the conceptual networks of actions 
and the rules immanent in symbolic mediation, it is, as it were, negatively manifested by 
the past and the future. In other words, a text not only carries with it the limits of the 
descriptive capacity of language but also connotes resistance to being described. Thus, 
the meaning of texts’ being is sensitive to distinctions between temporal experiences, as 
Ricoeur suggests by using a rich variety of temporal adverbs and idioms involving time-
related words. However, time here is not a continuum in which past, present and future 
can be represented as different points. What the temporal mimetic process is sensitive 
about is purity in phenomenological temporality (Boje 2001) or simply one’s being. The 
once-occurring and unique present denotes the purest of phenomenological temporality.  
Even more important, however, is the implication of this subtle distinction between past, 
present and future for the practical action arena in which actors are rarely conscious of 
purity, in terms of temporal phenomenology, or their being. While texts are capable of 
referencing beyond something as it is, this capacity is not strength in terms of the 
extension of representative capacity but a weakness in discourse (Eco 1999). Insofar as 
texts possibly signify beyond denotation, denoted reality in texts may be fallible. The 
fallibility of texts or the weakness in discourse requires them to be narrated at a 
particular point in time, which is the only marker of one’s being.  
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This third mimetic process embedded in texts reminds us that texts are not instruments 
with which to convey particular information that is to be apprehended on the side of 
readers. Rather, texts had better be regarded as evidence of one’s being at a particular 
point in time and space. For instance, in the case in which one intentionally conceals 
particular information about reality, or simply, tells a lie, it is more important for 
readers to read what has made one denote reality in such a way by reference to literal 
meanings and contexts (see Gubrium 1988). As such, readers may be able to derive 
useful information from texts, despite the elusive factual quality, by imagining reality 
that must have urged authors to express the texts. In other words, by acknowledging the 
third mimetic processes embedded in texts, we are expected to communicate with others 
by means of texts by taking account of each other’s truths or faithfulness to truths at 
particular points in time and space. Texts have a capacity to mediate different actors not 
only by means of literal meanings and contextual relevance but also by allowing both an 
author and readers to project each one’s being at particular points in time and space. 
Regardless of the order presented above, these three distinct mimetic processes 
embedded in texts are nesting and nested by each other. The first mimetic process 
presumes the existence of reality already narrated and symbolically mediated. The 
second presumes conceptualized actions consisting of properties ready to be related to 
each other following the rules of symbolic mediation appropriate in particular contexts. 
The third actually mediates the structurally graspable conceptualized actions into 
particular sequential orders for the necessity of the author at a particular point in time 
and space. For Boje (2008, 2001), these mimetic processes can be seen to form a 
spiraling structure. However, the spiraling structure nests within it the same three 
mimetic processes interacting with one another. The structural, the symbolically 
87 
 
mediating and mediated, and the temporal mimetic processes are nesting and nested by 
one another either at the level of conceptual semantic network of actions, or at the level 
of symbolic mediation, or at the level of ongoing actions. Since observers’/readers’ 
perspectives are continuously shifting between and within these different levels, what is 
important is to understand that there are always three different meanings being produced 
and conveyed by texts in which actions are instantiated in words.  
Even more importantly, the nesting and nested structure represents the inevitable lack of 
symmetrical unity in either the structural conceptual networks of actions, the rules 
governing symbolic mediation, or the temporal experiences. Despite the lack of 
symmetrical unity, it enables actors to continue denoting reality in relevant ways in 
particular contexts. The lack of symmetrical unity explains that texts are always left 
open-ended and ready to create new meanings by interacting with other texts with 
respective horizons, which is called the intertextuality of texts (Barry, Carroll and 
Hansen 2006, O’Connor 1997). We had better accept a worldview that some structures 
or systems of (re-)production of meanings lacking absolute foundation can be created 
and sustained by one’s subtle but genuinely pure sense of necessity for marking her/his 
being at the present of present. In such systems of semantic (re-)production, each actor’s 
immediate concerns appear to be only subtly connoted in texts. Despite the subtlety, 
texts would not come into being without each actor’s immediate concerns with her/his 
being. What is taking place in the practical interactions between actors by means of the 
intertextuality is that each one makes inference about the existence of unity, which is 
correct in the sense that many things appear in a relatively stable manner; then, the unity 
is deduced from evidential resources which should by and large be drawn from events 
and phenomena already elapsed (Weick 1979).  
88 
 
With this nesting and nested structure comprised of three mimetic processes in mind, 
the method with which to identify the three distinct plots and to classify mundane 
utterances by these plots will be elaborated below. By applying the analytical 
framework comprised of three distinct processes of emplotment, actors’ implicit 
principles and assumptions, on which mundane discursive practices operate, can be 
made explicit. The following analyses demonstrate that in mundane discursive practices, 
actors’ principles and assumptions and the three mimetic processes embedded in texts 
collaboratively enable actors to make better sense of reality by obtaining better 
understandings of substantive attributes, contextually relevant ways of denoting reality, 
and subjective meaningfulness or a sense of non-obvious relevance.  
There appear to be particular rules that organize mundane discursive practices in 
particular ways. The rules are, however, not only imposed by the three mimetic 
processes embedded in texts but also enacted and renewed by actors’ capabilities to 
assess the relevance of reality denoted in texts in terms of substance, contexts and non-
obviousness. Ricoeur’s theory of emplotment points out that the symbolic mediation 
presumes a normative choice with regard to appropriate ways by which symbols 
mediate and are mediated by each other by means of irreversible sequential orders. 
Hence, mundane discursive practices are assumed to entail a source of certain norms 
with which participants comply. However, as has just been suggested, it is difficult to 
determine whether the source of such norms at the level of actual interactions between 
actors can be attributed to the mimetic processes embedded in texts, thus, involuntary 
compliance on the part of actors, or to actors’ capabilities to assess relevance, which 
involve their creative invention represented by the creation of a sense of relevance in 
terms of non-obviousness.  
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As will be presented below, the participants generally do not appear to care about their 
autonomy against the mimetic processes embedded in texts thanks to which they 
manage to instantiate their experiences in a rather repetitive fashion. They were, 
however, occasionally found to attempt to establish particular norms applicable to the 
Forum and their positive identities, which means that they could never be passive dupes 
of structuring properties prescribed by virtue of texts but rather active enactors of the 
triad of mimetic processes for their own ends. The empirical evidence, thus, points to 
the critical role borne by each one’s being which, though implicit, drives the processes 
of organizing their utterances in particular ways along the logic of the triad of mimetic 
processes. 
At the end of this chapter, therefore, it is hypothesized that the creative invention of a 
sense of non-obvious relevance is enabled by the combination of the triad of mimetic 
processes embedded in texts and actors’ capabilities to assess relevance. What is key in 
this hypothesis is not that the source of norms can be found either in the triadic mimeses 
of texts or in actors’ voluntary assessment of relevance. Instead, the key is the fact that 
messages that conveyed similar meanings in terms of substantive understandings of 
reality and ways of denoting such reality continued to be posted to the Forum because 
of the triad of mimetic processes. Put in another way, particular norms observed in the 
Forum are consequences emergent of the accumulated posts. On the other hand, norms 
can transcend particular contexts only if they are drawn upon as things, meaning that 
norms are not just about the contextual rules but they self-reinforce their power because 
people do not usually see the same or similar denotations to be processes from which 
anything new is emerging. But rather, people are willing to put weight on what they 
understand as things because of the simplicity or economy of intellectual labor. When 
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becoming (quasi-)things, norms are extremely difficult to divert people’s attributing 
reasons for particular actions to such (quasi-)things. We still need to understand better, 
in the actual interaction arena, the three different meanings of the three different 
understandings to be established through the triad of mimetic processes. 
Things and quasi-things are anticipated to manifest themselves in a stable manner, so 
that simple and instantaneous apprehension is enabled in an efficient and effective 
manner. However, the pursuit of seemingly universally applicable things and quasi-
things, thus, metaphor, concepts and paradigm, will sooner or later turn out to make us 
blind to the fact that their capacity to provide us with renewed understandings is 
diminishing, that repetitive deployment of the seemingly universal facts of things is 
segmenting extant institutions, and thus, we unknowingly self-impose prescriptions by 
virtue of apprehending things as they are seen to us (Czarniawska 1999).  
We all know that behavioral norms applicable to particular interactions can only 
become authentic in particular loci through particular practices. However, we rarely 
become aware that such local rules are still nested in another triad of mimetic processes, 
meaning that any local rule is necessarily affected by meanings and interpretations made 
and remade in seemingly indifferent dimensions in terms of space and time from 
particular loci.  
To understand better the three different meanings to be produced by three different plots 
is, thus, to attempt to recognize the role and the meaning of existence of each one’s 
being. By so doing, the triad of mimetic processes will help us understand how each 
one’s being ‘contributes strands to the larger tapestry’ (O’Connor 1997: 396) of reality 
constructed in organization or in society in general (Bruner 1986b). It will also enable 
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us to imagine clearly ‘a nexus of meaning and interpretation’ and its ‘indexicality’ in 
relation to ‘the power/rule constitution’ (Clegg 1989: 109). It will help us understand 
that our pursuit of universal categories/paradigms is significant not only in struggles for 
power ubiquitous in organizations but also for better understanding how the efforts to 
accumulate rigorous knowledge in logical scientific terms are important, despite the 
inevitably diminishing attractiveness and possible complete replacement of knowledge, 
such as in a paradigm shift (Kuhn 1962).  
People appropriate the simplest aspect of (quasi-)things without regard to their rigor 
only if they perceive the (quasi-)things as being relevant in metaphorical terms; such a 
sense of relevance about (quasi-)things exerts more power in such a way that can 
abruptly cancel out local rules along the meaning-interpretation nexus, rather than 
because of physical material attributes or the falsifiability of propositions about certain 
synchronic causal logic. These will be examined more systematically in the next chapter. 
Before delving into the connection between the micro processes of emplotment and the 
macro level issues concerning norms and power, the mimetic but inventive creation of 
meanings through the triadic processes of emplotment is elaborated. It begins by 
presenting a conceptual framework of the triad of mimetic processes, then methods to 
locate the three different plots in mundane utterances will follow. 
4.5 The three mimetic processes in mundane utterances 
Ricoeur’s theory of emplotment comprised of the triad of mimetic processes explains 
how texts come into being: mimesis enabled by conceptual network of actions, 
symbolic mediation and mediation of temporal experiences. By following these mimetic 
processes, mundane utterances can be interpreted in ways that take into account 
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prescriptive rules emanating from interactions between author, texts and readers. The 
nesting and nested structure of the triad of mimetic processes enables us to interpret 
mundane utterances in ways that account for how actors understand reality without 
absolutely foundational evidence, rule or principle and act in relatively similar ways 
without knowing in advance shared understandings or norms. 
For analytical convenience, in particular, in order to capture the transitions in meanings 
in the flow of time, each one’s experiences are divided into the realms of substances, 
practices, and self, in each of which the triad of the mimetic processes operates (see 
figure 4.1 below). It does so by assuming that the same triadic processes of emplotment 
should produce different meanings between when an actor is pondering their selfhood, 
when they try to apprehend particular attributes of events and phenomena, and interact 
with others. In the realm of substances, actors apprehend substantive attributes from a 
variety of encounters. In the realm of practices, actors identify contextually relevant 
ways of acting, and in the realm of self, they mediate the apprehended substantive 
attributes and the contextually relevant ways of acting, casting them into a meaningful 
whole to achieve a sense of non-obvious relevance.  
In other words, these realms respectively represent which of the three mimetic processes 
of emplotment plays the central role. In the realm of substance, actors make use of the 
conceptual network of actions to apprehend attributes and identities of a variety of 
things and quasi-things. In the realm of practice, actors define relationships with other 
actors with whom they interact by enacting a kind of syntagmatic rules according to 
which experiences are configured into particular sequential orders (e.g., ‘script’ in 
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Barley [1986]). In the realm of self, actors’ temporal experiences merge into the once-
occurring and unique present through the mimetic mediation of past and future.  
As such, the division of the realms of experience also represents three different kinds of 
understandings that actors obtain through mundane discursive practices: understandings 
of similarity/dissimilarity between substances denoted in utterances, which also enable 
actors to obtain better understandings by abstracting/generalizing through 
substitution/contrasting (Taylor and van Every 2000), understandings of contexts and 
relevancy of one’s actions and thoughts for different contexts, and a sense of subjective 
meaningfulness. These understandings involve ‘a routinized non-subjective way of 
understanding’ (Reckwitz 2002: 255) as well as rational cognitive ones. Non-subjective, 
not only because these understandings are achieved through methods that are only 
practically conscious but also because they are achieved through intricate imagination 
of a plurality of actions and the respective subjects. These different understandings can 
thus be attributed to different states of consciousness in the different realms of 
experience. 
The reason why the temporal mimetic process plays the central role in the realm of self 
and the intricate imagination of actions and relevant actors entailed in the temporal 
mimetic process deserve further elaboration. Referring back to the five criteria of 
relevance, relevance in terms of a sense of non-obviousness is emergent of redundancy 
of similar accounts. As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, it is liable to be hidden behind 
more obvious similarities in subject matters denoted and ways of denotation. The 
emergent and non-obvious sense of relevance can thus be considered to be as transient 
as the once-occurring and unique present which is beyond the mere chronological 
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dimension and the capacity of linguistic denotation but can be instantiated only by the 
act of narration (Ricoeur 1984/1990).  
What this existential intricacy of the sense of non-obvious relevance indicates is that 
actors experience a plurality of subjectivity between descriptions of events and 
phenomena already elapsed, anticipations of those yet to be materialized, and the act of 
narrating that mediates the past and the future. As such, the fact that a certain utterance 
is issued can be understood as evidence of the existence of a sense of meaningfulness 
felt by a certain actor at a certain point in time and space. However, the very experience 
of such a sense of meaningfulness cannot be enunciated in words. It remains only in 
each one’s memory. Utterances, thus, concern not only actors’ abilities to configure 
experiences in ways that make them intelligible in relation to other actors but also 
constitutive of elements of self. As will later be demonstrated, one’s self manifests itself 
when one’s ontological reality resists being expressed. Each one’s being is thus likened 
to time. One’s being at a particular point in time can be expressed just as the present of 
the present can be expressed as an excess or deficit of past and future in terms of 
phenomenological time. In terms of measurable chronological time, one’s being 
occupied, occupies and will occupy particular points in the chronological continuum, 
thus, it was, is and will be of positive ontological value. Both self and time are 
obviously present in this world but it is difficult to answer what they are (Ricoeur 
1984/1990).  
The nesting and nested structure comprised of the three mimetic processes in the three 
distinct areas of experiences is depicted in Figure 4.1 below. 




In this figure, the patterns (plain, grid and vertical stripe) are purposely assigned to the 
nodes and the circles in accordance with the triad of the mimetic processes. The plain, 
or absent, pattern represents the capacity to make assumptions about responses from 
others by denoting reality in particular sequential orders; the grid pattern represents 
competencies to understand networks of symbolic resources and the vertical stripe 
manifests itself as mediating between synchronically identifiable attributes and 
diachronically established sequential orders. 
The larger circles comprise a triad in which the Triad of Self functions as a mediator 
between the Triad of Practice and the Triad of Substance. These larger circles represent 
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processes by which different meanings are produced by denoting reality through the 
triadic processes of emplotment in accordance with different experiences and/or 
concerns with self, other actors, and (quasi-)things.  
The triad comprised of smaller nodes in each of the larger circles also represents the 
triadic logic of emplotment. Though labeled differently, these triads are operating on the 
same logic. The nodes filled with a grid pattern refer to relatively less context-
dependent ways of establishing understandings. The plain nodes represent the act of 
assuming others’ responses to denotations of reality in particular sequential orders. The 
nodes filled with vertical stripes are the mediating function between the apprehended 
substantive attributes and the contextually relevant ways of acting.  
Although the depiction of Figure 4.1 looks as if it represents synchronic connections 
between nodes and circles these connections are purposely made loose in order to 
represent the lack of symmetrical unity in the triadic logic of emplotment, which 
enables actors to obtain a sense of relevance without absolutely knowing foundational 
evidence, principle or rule. For instance, the triads consisting of the smaller nodes do 
not form a loop but are connected by mediating nodes (vertical stripe). Also, the links 
between smaller nodes and the larger circles do not represent connections between 
mutually independent entities but are part-whole relationships. For instance, the 
‘Others-for-me’ in the Triad of Self and the ‘Sequencing in orders’ in the Triad of 
Substance constitute the Triad of Practice. In the Triad of Self, an actor is establishing 
three different kinds of understandings through the triadic processes of emplotment: ‘I-
for-others’, ‘Others-for-me’, and ‘I-for-myself’. The ‘Others-for-me’ signifies 
assumptions as to whether or not others will agree the ways by which the actor wishes 
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others to understand her/his self (Nielsen 2002). Hence, the actor may or may not 
actually act but at least imagines her/his selfhood in the gaze of others and is likely to 
make assumptions about responses from such others. Further, such actor’s assumptions 
about her/his selfhood in front of others inadvertently commands actual specific others’ 
orientation to respond when presented in a plausible form. As such, even if one does not 
take actual action at all, it is difficult to deny all the implications for action arena (Triad 
of Practice) by confining one’s assumptions about her/his selfhood exclusively to the 
Triad of Self. 
The aspect of understanding that involves imaginary actions and others, which should 
command others’ orientation, applies also to the ‘Sequencing in orders’ in Triad of 
Substance. Whereas actors establish understandings of the world filled with a variety of 
things and quasi-things in Triad of Substance, they invoke not only pertinent ways of 
referencing the surroundings to meanings (denoted as the ‘Conceptual network of 
action’) but also contextual relevancy by imagining such identified meanings to be 
narrated as if they were rehearsed in front of certain audiences (‘Sequencing in orders’ 
in Figure 4.1). By so doing, the actors will obtain some sense of contextual relevancy 
regardless of whether or not they actually narrate it; this sense of contextual relevancy 
should play a critical role in one’s making decisions regarding whether or not to take 
particular actions. Also, since this aspect of understanding potentially orientates actual 
specific others toward their turns where they should also go through the triadic 
processes of emplotment, even only imaginary narration cannot completely be separated 
from Triad of Practice. 
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Now, we move on to Triad of Practice where actors are establishing their relationships 
with other actors. The reason why the ‘Participants’ here is plural, and thus understood 
to be collective, is because each participant’s ways of mediation are oriented towards 
consensual validation for the sake of satisfactory conclusion of their encounters 
(Goffman 1959/1990); thus, strict distinction among participants becomes less 
meaningful (Carlsen 2006). Let me elaborate this further.  
Carlsen (2006) states that ‘[w]hereas the diversity of human experiences may find 
moments of singular interpretations in the embodied person, no such locus of the 
embodied “I-for-itself” exists for organizations’ (133). In his words, ‘[t]he 
organizational “I” then may be considered a collectively achieved authoring function 
that may or may not be patterned or show repeatable features in some way’ (133, 
emphasis in original). As a matter of practical reality, a categorically definable ‘I’ is 
non-existent. A large part of our everyday actions is undertaken without asking who I 
am.  
While the quotes from Carlsen (2006) describe the ‘I’ as ‘a collectively achieved 
authoring function’, imagination about the collective achievement should be extended 
beyond actual interventions between different actors (in Figure 4.1, Triad of Practice). 
Collective achievement is taking place already in each individual actor (Triad of Self). 
Also, as he indicates, the achieved function had better not be limited to ‘authoring’ in 
the sense of writing stories, but should be understood to entail messy processes in which 
to define and re-define identities.  
Overall, in practical settings, it is more precise to conceive of actors as practicing three 
different perspectives through which consistent identities or certain patterns may or may 
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not be observed (Carlsen 2006). Hence, it is suggested that while actors may be very 
much concerned with consistency in their respective identities, they do not necessarily 
act for the consistency of their identities. Note, however, that this is not saying that the 
pursuit of consistent identity is not complete fantasy but that there always exist gaps 
between discursive consciousness and practical consciousness. These gaps can in part 
be explained in terms of temporality where consistency is always fabricated in 
retrospect (cf., Weick 1979), and in part be attributed to cognitive dissonance whereas 
actors are concerned principally with the contextual relevancy of their acts; they tend to 
believe they are acting in accord with a logic of rationality that operates in principle on 
timeless causal contingencies (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011).  
In Triad of Practice, ‘Information given’ refers to information which each actor assumes 
is purposely communicated to others by her/his actions and ‘Information given off’ 
signifies information emitted from one’s appearance. The appearance embodies the 
assumptions about responses from others to one’s purposely presenting information. 
Each actor knows that others can take advantage of her/his relative unawareness or the 
uncontrollable aspect of such information known as reflexive subjectivity (Burr 2009, 
Holmes 2010). Communication is, thus, only made possible by the ‘Participants’ who 
mediate between their own and their assumed counterparts’ responses in ways that 
consensually validate one in reference to the other (Goffman 1959/1990). This is why 
participants in certain communication generally appear as if they behave in accordance 
with particular norms or shared understandings (cf., Donnellon, Gray and Bougon 1986). 
However, it is uncertain if they may truly share certain norms as much as actors may 
pursue consistent identity. Everything is determined in reference to particular contexts 
through the nesting and nested structure of the triadic logic of emplotment. 
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4.6 A framework of analysis and the method to identify the plots 
A framework with which to analyze mundane utterances was developed based on the 
conceptual framework elaborated above. The analytical framework consists of three 
different plots: ‘Identifying/classifying’ plot, ‘Acting’ plot and ‘Mediating’ plot. These 
plots explain the processes of emplotment that configure texts to make experiences 
intelligible and communicable. Or, inversely, meaningful representations emerge with 
support of these plots as a kind of scripted way of non-conscious practicing of three 
different competencies in front of text or even seemingly non-linguistically-based signs, 
such as gestures or even material objects. The relationships between actors’ 
competencies and elements of the three plots are summarized in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 Plots, competencies and realms of experience 
Plot Competency Practice Substance Self 
‘Acting’ Putting understandings 



















‘Mediating’ Seeing encounters as if 
they were true without 
absolutely foundational 
evidence, rule or 
Others-for-me  I-for-others  I-for-myself 
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principle, by mediating 
substances and contexts 
Asking three simple questions can identify the plots: (1) what is the utterance saying or 
talking about, (2) for whom is it meaningful, and (3) to whom is it talking?  
Conventional content analysis and coding can be attempted chiefly to answer the 
question about the ‘what’ of utterances. However, as the first mimetic process of 
Ricoeur’s (1984/1990) theory of emplotment explains, those who confront texts are 
competent in understanding particular properties denoted in them in relation to other 
properties that comprise their respectively familiar conceptual networks of actions. 
More specifically, such conceptual networks of actions enable one to understand texts 
not only in terms of the ‘what’ of the first question but also in terms of ‘who’, ‘how’, 
‘why’, ‘with whom’ or ‘for/against whom’. In other words, by answering the first 
question those encountering textual data will be able to re-construct relevant actors’ 
experiences which involve contextual information as well as substantive information 
within the texts.  
The substantive information cannot be made sense of without referring to a variety of 
contextual information (Labianca, Gray and Brass 2000). However, the former, which is 
a constitutive element of relatively stable causal relations between properties, is 
significant in that it provides some generalized pictures or schema with certain degrees 
of abstraction. In other words, the answer to the ‘what’ helps readers/observers 
understand better what the text denotes by discovering categories and/or principles for 
categorization by identifying substitutable words and concepts. Information to be 
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obtained by answering this question, normally regarded as objective facts, is usually 
referred for validation to a variety of information surrounding texts known as contexts. 
Skipping the second question, answers to the third question will provide information on 
what ways the utterer understood and intended to define contexts. Utterances are always 
addressed to somebody, even if imaginary characters. Thus, audiences chosen by an 
utterer represents the utterer’s understandings of relationships with such audiences and 
vice versa. The understandings of the relationships with others are embodied in the 
ways of denotation (or outward appearance of the utterance). It is difficult in everyday 
life to imagine that an utterer acts or issues utterances in ways thought 
incomprehensible to the imagined audience. Even when an utterer intends to provoke 
her/his audience, s/he knows that her/his actions may be unacceptable or morally 
irrelevant so as to provoke the audience. In case an utterer inadvertently evokes rage 
among audiences, perhaps s/he just mistakenly assumed how audiences would 
understand these actions (Goffman 1959/1990). To whom an utterer intends to talk is 
inseparably related to the whole triad of mimetic processes but most significantly to that 
of the symbolic mediation that requires practical knowledge and skills to sequence a 
variety of properties into appropriate orders. More importantly however, in answering 
this question, utterers’ concerns are likely emerging as their preferred ways of defining 
relationships with others. Then, interpreters should be led to ask and answer the second 
question. 
Answering the second question may sometimes appear superfluous or tend to be 
conflated with answers to the other two questions. However, the method insists on 
dealing with this second question separately, primarily to avoid dichotomous 
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worldviews comprised of seemingly inherently substitutive binary opposites 
(Czarniawska 1999, Taylor and van Every 2000) but, more fundamentally, to enquire 
into processes by which recursive and orderly conducts are being generated through the 
triadic processes of emplotment, in particular, through mediating temporal experiences. 
In other words, researchers are encouraged to follow utterers’ reality denoted in their 
utterances not only in ways that apprehend substantive attributes and figure out contexts 
surrounding them but also in ways that examine what prompted and enabled the utterers 
to denote reality in particular ways based on the analysts’ respective senses of relevance.  
As Ricoeur’s theory of emplotment posits, actors’ competency to see a variety of 
encounters as if they are true without knowing any absolutely foundational evidence, 
rule or principle holds a critical stake in the process of semantic (re-)production. Also, 
as was presented in Chapter 3, actors are capable of creating a sense of non-obvious 
relevance out of more obvious (often redundant) information. Attempts to answer the 
question: for whom a certain utterance is meaningful evoke analysts’ imaginative 
capacity to establish their understandings through the triad of mimetic processes in 
ways that take into account the significance of often less visible concerns at the very 
moment of making an utterance, the beings of one’s self, other actors and things. The 
mediating function enacted by each actor is indispensable for the continuous, though 
unpredictable, processes of semantic (re-)production. 
The significance of the mediating function deserves further elaboration for better 
understanding how it happens and how it connects the micro level processes of 
emplotment, which in principle take place at the individual level, to macro issues, such 
as power and norms, which are of much relevance for management and organization 
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studies. First, the mediation occurs with one’s poetic move. As has been mentioned 
earlier, one experiences distinct subjectivity when apprehending certain attributes from 
particular things or quasi-things, when interacting with other actors, and when 
mediating the substantive and the contextual understandings. The first and the second 
subjectivity are largely dependent on already established conceptual networks of actions 
and syntagmatic rules for sequencing things into particular orders respectively. In 
contrast, the third, that is, the mediating subject, determines the appropriate way of 
mediating those relatively stable sources of meaning at the moment of mediation, or at 
the present of present. This is enabled by one’s imaginative capacity with which to see 
things at the very moment of the mediation. Simply, this involves an adventurous aspect, 
if in varying degrees (Eco 1999).  
Actors’ skills and knowledge with which to manage the uncertainty concerning the 
imaginative adventure will further be examined in the next chapter (Chapter 5) but for 
the moment it is important to know that the mediation is enabled only by one’s creating 
a horizon anew with particular extension in terms of substantive and contextual 
relevancy based on determination to transgress the horizons defined by the extant 
sources of meaning. Because this is a kind of poetic move, one experiences a sense that 
one’s self is purged (Ricoeur 1984/1990) or the purest phenomenological temporality. 
Second, therefore, even if the triad of mimetic processes takes place within an 
individual actor, s/he is allowed to denote reality in virtually unlimited ways, drawing 
on semantic resources regardless of the micro or the macro levels. As has just been 
indicated in actors’ management of the adventurous aspect of the poetic move, there 
must be rules to define appropriate horizons of denotation (also to be examined in 
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Chapter 5). The point I would like to make here is that when dealing with certain values, 
concepts or names that appear applicable in such a way that transcends multiple 
contexts, what happens is association of plots (Pentland and Feldman 2007) that appear 
to produce almost identical meaning, rather than substitution of such values, concepts or 
names. What this means, taken together with the first point, is that the transcendence of 
values, concepts or names is actually enabled by association between similar plots 
created by someone’s imaginative capacity, rather than substitution between meanings.  
This is important to note because when encountering such context-transcending values, 
concepts or names, how such transcendence occurred and segmented particular meaning 
is rarely paid attention to, as if it occurs metaphorically; even narrative scholars tend to 
conceptualize synchronic connections between multitudes of plots that produce almost 
identical meaning. As a result, those who are supposed to create their respectively 
unique plots to understand such values, concepts or names tend to be ignored. Such an 
inadvertent overlooking of those who create meaning through the triadic processes of 
emplotment blinds how the ‘power/rule constitution’ is negotiated and materialized 
through the ‘meaning/interpretation nexus’ (Clegg 1989). Every plot is unique and any 
meaning is produced through emplotment by certain actors’ poetic move, that are 
enabled by substantive and contextual understandings along the lines of the nesting and 
nested triad of mimetic processes.  
This is typically important for researchers who adopt narrative frameworks because 
seeing particular plots as substitutable for each other is actually the researchers’ 
enactment of imagination used to connect actually independent unique plots in 
accordance with their own interests and concerns. This is, therefore, not to say that 
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different plots do not produce substitutable, thus generalizable, meaning but that any 
meaning is without exception negotiated and fixed through time in particular contexts 
and between different actors. The issue of making connections between plots will be 
discussed later in this thesis by relating it to the issues regarding how to utilize narrative 
frameworks, typically plot, for theorizing processes of organizing (Czarniawska 1999), 
including implications for ethical practicing of theorizing. What is critical here is the 
fact that different plots can be connected only by the readers’/analysts’ imagination in 
accordance with their own concerns and interests; thus, connections between plots are 
never synchronic or linear. More importantly, recursive occurrence of similar plots 
should be distinguished from recursion in the mathematical logic of the term. Otherwise, 
the critical and indispensable poetic move and how it is enacted will be neglected and 
consequently often-important counterpoints in processes of organizing and change will 
be overlooked. 
As such, the three simple questions guide readers/analysts through the triad of mimetic 
processes embedded in texts and enacted by actors. Obviously, how many times they go 
around the hermeneutic circle depends on a variety of factors but most significantly 
depends on readers’/analysts’ interests and concerns. Elaborated as above, analyses of a 
collection of messages posted to the case online forum can be initiated only by analysts’ 
assumptions that these messages should be of relevance for the analysts’ interests and 
concerns. Hence, the arbitrariness of one’s interpretation is not at all a problem, or 
rather should be encouraged. This is simply because the clearer one is about one’s 
investigative concerns, the more rounds of the hermeneutic circle one is likely to engage 
in. What is important is always not how analysts’ interpretation can be precise in terms 
of representations of objective facts, attributable to an analysts’ focus on ‘what’ is 
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denoted within texts. Rather, they should focus on how to account for utterers’ skills 
and knowledge that prompt and enable them to denote their reality in particular ways. 
Texts are usually interpreted in ways that reveal the utterers’ implicit and context-
specific principles and assumptions.  
The triad of mimetic processes thus not only concerns research subjects’ ways of 
plotting their reality but also concerns how to plot analysts’ interpretations and 
eventually their writing. Hence, it will help researchers, in the first place, to understand 
processes of sensemaking by which actors plot a variety of substances, including 
relevant actors’ identities and roles, in particular contexts at particular points in time and 
space. Typically, the triad of mimetic processes makes explicit the one who is supposed 
to accomplish the plotting. Secondly, the triad of mimetic processes offers researchers a 
method which helps identify and propose better plot(s) which should, in a way, be 
continuous from the research subjects’ emplotment, taking advantage of, rather than 
being confused with, the nesting and nested structure constituted by the triad of mimetic 
processes. 
The following is one such plot which I produced to exemplify competencies of the 
research subjects (the participants in the case online forum) in plotting their reality, 
accomplishments (three different kinds of understandings), and most importantly, the 
multiplicity of horizons along which their experiences and anticipations are given 
particular extension. The multiplicity of horizons that stretch in the realms of substance, 
practice and self (Figure 4.1), and that can be identified through the analyses of the 
research subjects’ utterances, represents the multiple dimensions of their experiences 
with material reality, a variety of others and selfhood.  
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At the end of the identification of the three plots, the multiplicity of horizons suggests 
that the issue of power inherent in organizations is managed in and between discourses 
but in ways that understand the meaning and interpretation, which define power 
relations in such discourses, to be closely related to material reality not only through 
language use but also through each one’s concerns with a variety of things and actors, 
including one’s self. By so doing, the chapter (or my plot) suggests the possibility of 
analyzing processes of organizing in ways that mimic the triad of mimetic processes 
underlying research subjects’ sensemaking by taking advantage of the nesting and 
nested structure constituted by the different triads of mimetic processes.  
Though it seems complicating, each triad maintains a consistent structure, which 
consists of the common elements known as the constitutive elements of plot: act, actors, 
scene, purpose and agency (Czarniawska 1999, Tsoukas and Hatch 2001), so that it is 
possible to compare, combine or replace one plot with other plots (Czarniawska 1999). 
By taking advantage of the associability and the substitutability of plot, events and 
phenomena across different levels of analysis, such as individual, group and 
organization, and micro and macro, can be accounted for in ways that examine possible 
connections between mundane utterances, which are each plotted along the triad of 
mimetic processes, thus, comprised of the common constitutive elements. Typically, the 
often observed transcending values, laws and concepts circulating in organizations 
through power (and resistance to it) by means of discourse can be traced along the 
nesting and nested structure of the triad of mimetic processes. 
4.7 Identifying the plots 
4.7.1 The nesting and nested plots in utterances 
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Before looking at the three distinct plots one by one, the following analysis confirms 
that these plots can be identified in any utterance by asking the three simple questions as 
was explained above. In order to demonstrate the ambivalence between the participants’ 
relative appreciation of the Forum and less specific motivations and expectations for it, 
several utterances were chosen as examples. The point is the fact that the Forum was 
chosen by relatively similar people on the basis of similar sentiments and enabled them 
to post messages. Regardless of the less specific purposes, such as information seeking, 
release of tension and frustration, or caring for others, the Forum enabled them to decide 
to speak after reading others’ messages. It demonstrates that the triad of mimetic 
processes is nesting and nested to provide both the participants and the analyst with 
practical understandings of reality denoted in utterances. 
The participants frequently mention that they spent some time just reading others’ 
messages before starting posting. The reasons why they decided to post were positive 
feelings about what others were saying. Some of the examples are: (1) ‘I like the 
[Forum] because it’s pulling together that’s going to get us thru this mess’ (doc29441, 
on February 3, 2002); (2) ‘[…] I have become comfortable with what all the associates 
who come here have to say.’ (ewkt3, on February 6, 2002); (3) ‘[…], I was so excited to 
find others dealing with the same frustrations that I had daily.’ (crazykm2001, on 
March 22, 2002); and (4) ‘I am very impressed with this “lounge” board, as I have read 
so much positive responses, and honest questions and answers. This turned out to be too 
long, sorry, but just wanted to say, we will survive!’ (becki1950, on Mar 7, 2002).  
Based on these excerpts, it is assumed that as they read messages posted to the Forum, 
they enjoyed issuing messages that affirmed what others said. As the examples above 
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indicate, what each participant was affirmative about is not very specific. Nonetheless, 
it is possible at least to speculate that the participants in the case online forum must 
have understood something (‘Identifying/classifying’) through reading others’ posts 
before issuing their utterances in ways that were meaningful to them (‘Mediating’). It is 
the rule rather than the exception that we are not very certain about whether or not our 
understandings are objectively valid and/or generalizable so as to be applied to less 
familiar contexts. Probably because of such uncertainty, it is observed that their 
messages involve the aspect of ‘Acting’ plot which represents the utterers’ wishing 
others to understand the messages as affirmation about what others said in the Forum, 
irrespective of the different degrees of expectation of actual responses. As such, those 
excerpts contain the three different kinds of understandings indicated in the conceptual 
framework. In accordance with the method, the three simple questions enable 
systematic analyses of them. The analysis begins by identifying to whom those 
messages were addressed. 
All of the examples above, (1) – (4), were addressed to fellow associates. Then, we can 
find that all of these messages wished fellow associates to understand the messages to 
be conveying positivity to them. In other words, as the posters made assumptions about 
their audiences and unwittingly commanded evaluation from such audiences, those 
messages came to define the immediate context of communication in which the posters 
rendered psychological support for fellow associates. 
Then, what did they understand? As has been mentioned above, in those excerpts what 
the posters were affirmative about is not very specific. But, it can be inferred that what 
they understood by reading others’ messages is mostly about subjective experiences in 
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their respective workplaces, characterized by such words with negative connotation as 
‘mess’ in (1) and ‘the same frustrations that I had daily’ in (3). Their negative 
experiences can also be inferred from the posters’ appreciation for ‘positive responses, 
and honest questions and answers’ in (4) because there would have been no reason for 
appreciating such positive attitudes unless they assumed that they shared negative 
experiences. 
Subjective experiences as a substance of understanding make it relatively easy to 
identify bearer(s) of such experiences or actor(s) to whom such substances of 
understanding can be attributed. In this case, it is fellow associates who suffered from 
negative experiences. Putting this substance (negative subjective experiences) in a way 
that clarifies the actors and the actions they accomplished, the associates experienced 
negative subjective experiences. This simple sentence induces us to pursue additional 
information, such as causes and possible consequences of negative experiences, their 
identities and how negative their experiences might be. The information obtained by 
readers’/interpreters’ inference may further locate other relevant actors and contextual 
information. Thus, it is confirmed that identifying and classifying substantive 
information by answering what utterances talked about is enabled by the nesting and 
nested structure of the triad of mimetic processes, particularly the structurally enabled 
mimetic processes by certain conceptual networks of actions and actors who were 
familiar with it. 
The most significant function of substantive understanding is to provide a better sense 
of reality. Understanding by substitution establishes particular reversible connections 
between different substances and (quasi-)substances, which distil timelessly contingent 
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causal relations. In other words, the ‘identifying/classifying’ plot can be understood as 
processes by which actors obtain schemas, maps or general concepts with which to 
comprehend a variety of things, events and phenomena in a less context-dependent 
manner. As such, it is also possible for readers/interpreters to understand that the 
substances of understanding are necessarily abstracted to the extent that the processes 
by which to assign more or less generalized meanings are truncated, or rather, 
contracted, in the example excerpts. As the example excerpts showed, it was not 
necessary for the utterers to elaborate their own experiences, nor to clarify in what ways 
their experiences might be similar (or identical) to others’ experiences insofar as they 
could put each other’s experiences onto their respective schema of ‘similar negative 
experiences’. Obviously, such contraction of denotation depends on contexts as well as 
on the utterers’ needs for the generality of substantive understandings. Thus, the 
processes of semantic production of substantive meanings involve the utterers’ 
consideration for intelligibility and communicability (the aspect of ‘Acting’ plot). 
Moreover, the communicative consideration of the utterers telling each other that they 
share almost identical experiences is not just about accumulating mutually coherent 
facts (or interpretation about the facts); rather, it points to the fact that one can observe 
the utterers collectively authoring narrative that construct a plausible version of their 
reality, at least within the Forum (Carlsen 2006, da Cunha and Orlikowski 2008). It also 
represents each utterer coming up with a unique subjective meaningfulness. Simply, it 
would be nonsense only to repeat the same words without any meaningfulness to each 
utterer as to the subject. It is, therefore, understood that in the act of making utterances, 
the utterers transcribed their experiences onto what they read, even though such 
transcription was rarely observed directly. Put differently, they share an imaginative 
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capacity to see others’ denotation as if as true as their own by mediating the substantive 
understandings that categorize their experiences into ‘similar negative experiences’ and 
contextual understandings which, despite the relative ambiguity, meant that similar 
negative experiences could be presented in a manner that is plausible and acceptable to 
their assumed audiences (‘fellow associates’). This is an aspect of ‘Mediating’ plot. 
As another aspect of the ‘Mediating’ plot, the subjective meaningfulness of utterances 
also tells us who were concerned with the ‘negative experiences’. This seems 
superfluous because, in this specific example, we have already known that there would 
be no other significant actors concerned than the employees working with the same 
bankrupted company. However, in the processes of semantic (re-)production comprised 
of the triad of mimetic processes, one establishes substantive understandings, one makes 
assumptions about contextually relevant ways of denoting reality, and one creates 
meaningfulness, all distinguished from one another and all are necessary, as was 
elaborated earlier. Especially, without locating the last one, interpretive and social 
constructive views on reality would suffer from the ontological problem.  
People interpret reality for the sake of their own selves at the moment of interpreting, 
regardless of whether or not they are conscious of the act of interpreting. Interpretation 
of reality can thus be equated to self-interpretation; it can be done in many ways. This 
means that no interpretation is initiated without pursuing ‘good’ interpretation but that 
every interpretation cannot be ‘good’. Interpretation demands public criteria to be 
accepted as good interpretation. The key is awareness of the limits of interpretation. We 
all know that one day we will die. We have learnt since birth from nature and from other 
(mostly elder) people that we are living surrounded by a variety of rules from which 
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phenomena with particular regularity emanate. We are the ones who set limits of 
interpretation by knowing limited extensions of reality comprised of a variety of 
material objects rather than by knowing limits set by the absolute essence of nature. 
However, such limits are by no means informed by a natural law of science; thus, 
negotiations with others are the norm. 
It is, therefore, important to follow the processes of semantic (re-)production comprised 
of the triad of mimetic processes in a way that does not exclude the concern with things, 
other actors and self by identifying actors for whom a certain utterance is meaningful. In 
the example excerpts, the fact that the posters understood others’ frustrating subjective 
experiences and positive attitudes in front of such negative experiences simply 
demonstrates who they are as fellow associates or those willing to be empathetic with 
the associates. What is to be noted is that the identification of for whom an utterance is 
meaningful indicates that acquiring their respective subjective meaningfulness both 
clarified the identity of the posters and blurred boundaries between them. In other words, 
each of the posters must have created a sense of meaningfulness unique for her/him but, 
in so doing, identified her/him with a collective category (‘fellow associates suffering 
from similar negative experiences’), either consciously or non-consciously. What this 
means is that although we are rarely concerned with our being, by interpreting 
utterances along the triad of mimetic processes, being manifests itself in an indefinite 
number of possible denotations of reality, which involve one’s substantive and 
contextual understandings and descriptions concerning one’s identity, rather than as any 
specific attribute, role or character. More importantly, being at a particular point in time 
and space also manifests itself by showing its transiency, as is demonstrated in the 
example of the merger of self-identity into collective identity.  
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Overall, the messages are not representations of what the participants must have 
understood but are alibis in the sense that we can read backward their denotations in 
ways that relate indefinitely possible meanings to their most immediate and 
fundamental concerns with things, other actors and self prompting them to post 
messages. Their ways of denoting reality are emergent but follow the triad of mimetic 
processes (e.g., behavioral grammar: Iedema [2007], or particular ways of sequencing 
events and phenomena into particular orders). The three distinct plots: 
‘Identifying/classifying’, ‘Acting’ and ‘Mediating’ plots, are nesting and nested by one 
another to produce and reproduce meanings through the innumerably possible ways of 
plotting reality. The table below illustrates the meanings produced by plots nesting, and 
being nested, by one another. 
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4.7.2 ‘Identifying/Classifying’ Plot: Substantive understanding  
In the table above, although the essence contains three different kinds of understandings 
and relevant actors identified through the triad of mimetic processes, the results of the 
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analysis are presented by classifying them into themes that are almost identical to the 
substantive understanding, for the sake of presentational convenience. By so doing, the 
table illustrates that plots always produce the three different meanings. The themes also 
demonstrate that it is possible for the triad of mimetic processes to frame messages in 
the same way as conventional coding by focusing on substantive information. The 
following explains what the three different plots ‘Identifying/classifying’, ‘Acting’ and 
‘Mediating’ mean, providing each message with particular extension of denotation by 
producing the three different meanings. 
Under ‘Identifying/classifying’ plot, the themes: ‘Competency’, ‘Commitment/ Loyalty’, 
‘the Management as villain’, and ‘Stereotype of retail workers’, can be understood as 
what the participants understood about facts, attributes or other seemingly objective (or 
at least indisputable) qualities. At the same time, as has been analyzed earlier, meanings 
produced by ‘Acting’ and ‘Mediating’ plots can also be identified, which are shown in 
the columns named ‘Subjective meaningfulness’ and ‘Embodied assumptions’ 
respectively.  
As for ’Subjective meaningfulness’, as the excerpts in the table show, when talking 
about their competencies (the theme: ‘Competency’), the posters are considered to 
obtain a sense of self-efficacy. In the case of the messages categorized under the theme: 
‘Commitment/loyalty’, the posters are supposed to be confirming that they have been 
trying to be disinterested in their private concerns relative to the fulfillment of their 
professional obligations by showing their commitment and/or loyalty. When criticizing 
management as villain, the posters at least temporarily succeeded in distancing 
themselves from the failure of the Company. When complaining about negative 
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stereotypical images unduly cast towards retail workers, the posters appeared to be 
feeling uneasy regarding gaps between such negative images and what they have been 
experiencing as insiders of a bankrupted company.  
With regard to the meaning produced by ‘Acting’ plot, that is, ‘Embodied assumptions’, 
although the participants’ utterances did not completely represent their experiences or 
understandings, the fact that they posted messages inevitably commands responses from 
their assumed audiences (‘fellow associates’). In other words, the messages categorized 
into these themes wish fellow associates to read them as those which intended to 
encourage fellow associates during the difficult times. In consequence, the messages 
convey that the posters must have established their understanding of contextual 
relevancy in terms of acceptability from their assumed audience (fellow associates).  
By examining ‘Identifying/classifying’ plots, we will be able to find that identification 
of things or substantive attributes of them is not similar to registering data into memory 
in such a way that computers process data. Rather, identification of even relatively 
stable attributes, which are in practice apprehended almost instantaneously, is produced 
according to the logic of the triad of mimetic processes. Moreover, 
‘Identifying/classifying’ plots tell us that identification of particular substantive 
attributes ensues classifying such attributes into particular categories to provide actors 
with renewed understandings through abstraction and generalization, if to varying 
degrees. Apprehending attributes of things and quasi-things is, thus, one of the effects 
of de-contextualization. By understanding the effect of de-contextualization along the 
triad of mimetic processes, it will become manifest that abstraction and de-
contextualization involve evaluative preferences (Ricoeur 1990/1992) of those who 
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apprehend because it tells us that there always exists someone who mediates substantive 
and contextual information in ways that obtain a sense of meaningfulness at particular 
points in time and space. Fidelity, loyalty and even moral correctness are already 
implicated in the moments of ‘Identifying/classifying’. As such, the triad of mimetic 
processes provides mundane utterances with particular extension that enables analyses 
of who identified what, for what purposes, how and with/against whom. Of these, the 
most critical aspect indicated by the moment of ‘Identifying/classifying’ is that the 
thing-like names, concepts or models can cover all the processes by which to produce 
them. The significance of this aspect will become clearer if understood together with the 
repetitive nature of the syntagmatic mimesis to be identified by analyzing the moment 
of ‘Acting’ of the triad of mimetic processes. 
4.7.3 ‘Acting’ Plot: Defining operational and contextual relevance 
The themes: ‘Caring fellow associates’, ‘Informing reality’ and ‘Simple rejoinders’ in 
Table 4.2 were also derived from the participants’ substantive understandings in 
accordance with the framework of the triad of mimetic processes. As so named, these 
themes refer to what the participants intended to accomplish by posting messages; thus, 
the acting aspect of the mimetic processes (‘Acting’ plot) plays the central role in 
semantic production. As was explained earlier, this aspect of emplotment can be 
identified by style or the ways of denotation, which depends on to whom the messages 
were addressed. What makes the styles or the ways of denotation characteristic of the 
messages classified into these themes is the effect of defining the immediate context of 
communication in the Forum. Thus, the messages categorized into the theme: ‘Caring 
for fellow associates’ appeared to have established norms by mutually adopting 
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contextually relevant ways of denotation, such as politeness, tolerance with negative 
words and/or attitudes. As for those categorized into the theme: ‘Informing reality’, they 
appeared to emphasize disinterestedness, positive attitudes towards difficult situations 
rather than just complaining about them, or simply objectivity and neutrality. The 
differences between these themes can simply be attributed to the different addressees. 
While the messages under ‘Caring for fellow associates’ were mostly addressed to 
fellow associates, those under ‘Informing reality’ occasionally talked to or rather 
debated with those who held critical views on either the Forum, or the employees, or the 
Company. 
By looking at the other two aspects of emplotment we will be able to understand how 
the triad of mimetic processes as an analytic framework enables analysis of particular 
extension of mundane utterances from the relatively simple syntagmatic rules to much 
broader contexts. Specifically, the ‘Acting’ aspect of emplotment in principle explains 
syntagmatic rules with which to materialize denotation of reality in contextually 
relevant ways, simply by observing and mostly mimicking others’ denotation. Hence, it 
tells little about contexts without being supported by the contents of ‘Acting’ that are 
the effects of ‘Identifying/classifying’ emplotment. For instance, the messages classified 
into the theme: ‘Caring fellow associates’, which were literally meant to convey 
encouragement to fellow associates, explicated suffering and negative experiences of 
fellow associates, such that we understand the participants collectively established a 
‘support group’ in the Forum. They are, in other words, supposed to have obtained a 
sense of belongingness to the same community of frontline employees of a bankrupted 
company, or a sense of involvement in the same or similar problematic situations by 
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posting messages which showed psychological support of each other, which is the 
aspect of ‘Mediating’ emplotment.  
The messages under ‘Informing reality’ appeared to have different meaningfulness for 
the participants from the case of ‘Caring for fellow associates’, in which frontline 
employees made assumptions that they mutually needed to support each other 
psychologically. While those making assumptions about others as sharing supposedly 
similar experiences and sentiments were less likely to suffer from conflicts between 
possibly discordant assumptions, some of the messages under ‘Informing reality’, which 
were addressed to critics of the Forum or the employees or the Company, presumed 
confrontation with people who were unsympathetic to the activities in the Forum and/or 
to the employees and the Company. In order to counter such negative opinions and 
responses, such messages attempted to justify the activities in the Forum by presenting 
objective and ‘real’ information (e.g., specific problems in the stores and their historical 
development, strengths and weaknesses of the Company, etc.). By so doing, the 
participants appeared to have managed to moderate dissatisfaction with dominant 
(mostly either managerial or negative) narratives subscribed or sometimes fabricated by 
people who were unfamiliar with the store operations, such as the general public, media, 
the majority of customers and even management of the Company.  
Because of this diversity of actors and accordingly diverse interests and concerns, such 
examples relatively clearly demonstrated that the triad of mimetic processes not only 
produces the three different meanings but also enables actors to denote reality without 
confirming their respective assumptions about possible responses from others, which 
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should in consequence define the immediate context of interactions with others. For 
instance, 
‘If you had been reading this forum for any amount of time, you will 
see that there is constant dialogue about how to improve things at 
store level. We don’t try to paint a rosy picture. […] He (the founder 
of the Forum)’s not asking us to paint a rosy picture, just trying to 
let the rest of the world know what is going on in the stores and 
maybe solve some problems.’ (8/2/2002 at 01:53PM by XX4361nj) 
 
‘Right now they (fellow associates) need to VENT, CRY, and be 
able to tell their stories! […] Right now we are supporting each 
other and learning. We might be the next to go (if further more 
stores need to be closed).’ (2/4/2002 at 04:24PM by ur2blue, All 
emphases are mine.) 
Both of these excerpts were addressed to those who were critical of the activities taking 
place in the Forum. The critics saw the participants as disgruntled employees 
continually making complaints. Hence, these messages were primarily meant to justify 
activities in the Forum against such criticisms.  
By interpreting these messages following the triad of mimetic processes, it is found that 
the posters must have established their respective understandings of substances (e.g., the 
fact that the participants have been experiencing frustrations, committed employees 
trying to improve situations within their capacities, and justifiable reasons for making 
complaints in the Forum), subjective meaningfulness with regard to these substances 
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(e.g., effects of releasing tension and venting frustration on the part of the employees of 
the Company who share similar sentiments of anxiety and uncertainty), and contextual 
relevancy taking into account the existence of both supporters and opponents to the 
Forum (e.g., confirming objectives and values of the Forum where expressing negative 
feelings may be tolerated, if not uncritically forgiven).  
As observed in those excerpts, both of the posters managed to denote reality by 
employing a multiplicity of plot lines to repudiate criticisms of their activities in the 
Forum. Specifically, they managed to denote reality in ways that informed reality in the 
stores and, at the same time, cared for fellow associates. The point here is that both of 
the posters appear to have made assumptions only about relevance for the fellow 
associates. It is interesting because both of the messages were addressed to the critics. 
Put differently, the posters assumed that the relevancy of their denotation of reality 
should be validated by fellow associates rather than by their intended addressees. What 
is important, therefore, is the fact that they were able to post messages rather than 
whether or not the assumptions held about the substantive relevancy of their messages 
could be validated. While this may sound fairly trivial, it is important fully to 
understand the skills and knowledge enacted in mundane discursive practices along the 
triad of mimetic processes. The triad of mimetic processes enables actors to act before 
coming up with absolute evidence, rules and principles that ensure relevance of their 
actions. The conventional entity-based or linear ways of establishing causal relations 
between actors, their intentions, motivations, actions, and effects are established in 
retrospect, observing accumulated actions assumptively undertaken. These examples, 
therefore, indicate that the definition of contexts proceeds totally on the basis of each 
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one’s assumptions, rather than each message directly defining a certain context in a 
particular way. 
As has repeatedly been stated, the triad of mimetic processes is nesting and nested by 
each other. Even if the ‘Acting’ plot plays the central role, mainly to define immediate 
contexts of communication, it involves a kind of poetic move guided by particular 
interests and concerns while referring also to substantive and contextual information. 
This poetic move serves to facilitate actors’ creating contextually relevant ways of 
denotation by pursuing consensual validation with regard to each other’s assumptions 
about each other’s preferred ways of defining the contexts. In this respect, the fact that 
utterers can assume the existence of audiences whom the utterers assume are able to 
establish consensus, with regard to preferred ways of defining immediate contexts of 
interaction, is critical. What is more, the assumptions pursuing consensual validation 
with others with respect to the immediate contexts of the interactions provides extension 
in terms of morality, which is negotiable with others rather than definitive, as is the case 
with the ‘Identifying/classifying’ aspect of emplotment. The triad of mimetic processes 
as an analytical frame makes visible actors’ making sense of reality by pursuing not 
only the substantive validity of their actions and assumed consequences but also the 
possibilities of their denotation to be validated consensually by other actors. This is one 
of the strengths of the triad of mimetic processes. It guides us through all the 
possibilities that actors may pursue for their interpretation of reality. Specifically, while 
we already know that meaning is determined not only by substantive qualities but also 
by contextual appropriateness, the triad of mimetic processes enables analyses of how 
such relational and contextual meaning and interpretation can be brought about in 
accordance with actors’ different interests and concerns at particular points in time and 
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space. This ability to make it easy to follow ever-changing perspectives of actors will 
become more explicit by closely examining the aspect of ‘Mediating’ emplotment.  
4.7.4 ‘Mediating’ Plot: Obtaining a sense of non-obvious relevance 
We now move on to ‘Mediating’ plot to see how it establishes subjective 
meaningfulness or a sense of non-obvious relevance. As the table above shows (Table 
4.2), the messages that expressed more explicitly the utterers’ establishment of identity 
in positive ways and their struggles with coming up with appropriate ways of denoting 
reality were classified into ‘Mediating’ plot in order to exemplify the transposition of 
the subject, even at the individual level. While the previous analysis of the ‘Acting’ plot 
emphasized the actions as effects of assumptions made between different actors that 
their preferred ways of defining the contexts of the interactions can be validated 
consensually, ‘Positive identity’ and ‘Antenarrative’ demonstrate that each individual 
actor experiences her/his subjectivity in three distinct ways.  
As has already been mentioned, the triad of mimetic processes consists of three distinct 
moments, rather than a series of events. Hence, before the occurrence of these moments, 
things or thing-like substances remain un-segmented in a certain continuum, similar to a 
flow or stream of which particular directions guide segmentation in particular ways 
(Eco 1999). The fact that we have perceived some sense means that the moments of 
mimesis took place and segmented some grains in the continuum in particular ways. For 
instance, the ‘Identifying/classifying’ plot provides us with substantive meaning based 
on certain conceptual networks of actions but what actually happens is that the ‘Acting’ 
plot provides contextually relevant ways of segmenting such grains; the ‘Mediating’ 
plot determines the substantive meaning based on subjective meaningfulness at a 
130 
 
particular point in time and space. The triad of mimetic processes is nesting and nested 
by one another; at the individual level, an actor experiences these three distinct 
subjectivities even though s/he becomes conscious of that in reference mostly to either 
substances or other actors. Nonetheless, the most critical moment is obviously that of 
mediation at which heterogeneous properties are grasped together into a meaningful 
whole. 
Before the moment of uttering, a would-be utterer is allowed to appropriate properties 
from reality denoted by other actors, such as experiences, opinions, ways of reasoning 
and denotation, for the purpose of obtaining subjective meaningfulness of experiences 
exclusively on the part of the would-be utterer or reader. However, when it comes to the 
moment of uttering and beyond, one needs to ask others for permission for making 
assumptions because one can never be certain about how such others will understand 
one’s utterances. This is why simple rejoinders and messages stating that the 
participants spent some time just reading others’ messages were posted frequently, as 
analyzed earlier in 4.7.1. It is not an easy task to make utterances even in such 
asynchronous and anonymous (or pseudonymous) environments as the Forum (Stommel 
and Koole 2010) chiefly because we are inevitably concerned about intelligibility of 
what we have understood in awareness of the others’ gaze. Moreover, we can never be 
certain about others’ actual responses (Goffman 1959/1990). Each of us knows that we 
are in an asymmetrical relationship in interactions with others. 
Despite (or probably because of) such highly uncertain conditions, the triad of mimetic 
processes explains, by the lack of symmetrical unity between the three distinct moments 
of emplotment, that mundane discursive practices proceed without absolutely 
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foundational evidence, rule or principle. Connections between these moments are 
asymmetrical not only because each of these moments can occur at any time in an 
unpredictable manner but also because once the moment of mediating occurs, precisely 
speaking, the mediated substantive and contextual meanings are, if minimally, renewed 
and the past meanings never reappear, if distinction of meanings between the old and 
the new is virtually meaningless. Always, some decision point in the triad of mimetic 
processes determines similarity/dissimilarity. Although these processes take place at the 
individual level, the relationality with other actors/actants is intrinsically assumed. 
Hence, the often-simple distinction between similarities/dissimilarities is actually 
intricately social and negotiable. 
The messages categorized into the theme ‘Positive identity’ are characterized by the 
relatively explicit transposition of the subject. As already indicated in the preceding 
analyses of ‘Identifying/classifying’ and ‘Acting’ plots, since these plots each involve 
the moment of ‘Mediating’ emplotment, some intricate transpositions of the subject 
were observed. Hence, according to Table 4.2, the processes by which actors established 
their positive identity can be understood as the mediation between those substances (e.g., 
‘Competency’, ‘Loyalty/commitment’, ‘Management as villain’ and ‘Stereotype of 
retail workers’) and contextual understandings (e.g., ‘Caring for fellow associates’ and 
‘Informing reality’). What is typical of this category is the intricate distinction between 
sameness (collective identity) and distinctiveness of each actor (individual unique 
identity), as presented earlier. Thus, the participants are considered to be experiencing 
three distinct types of subjectivity: that in relation to substances, to other actors who are 
capable of responding to their denotations, and to themselves. 
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Another example that exemplifies the transpositions of the subjects is ‘Antenarrative’ as 
shown below: 
I’ve been sitting here trying to find the perfect words to express my feelings […] 
and I am at a loss to truly articulate them. I LOVE this company but I hate the 
direction we have gone this past year, […], countless associates and peers who 
did not survive the misdirection and now the probality [probability] of nearly 300 
store teams losing their jobs tommorrow [tomorrow]. […] I have watched you 
accomplish the impossible without the proper tools. The 1000 piece warehouses 
that have gotten unloaded without the proper help. [...] The phone calls that 
“company’s coming [for an inspection]”, the cries of “we’ll never be ready” and 
how proud we were when we got a good visit. [...] The Friday morning Bingos. 
[...] we got abused for being out of ad merchandise, smiled and went about our 
day. […] I apologize for my rambling and I knew that my words could not do 
justice to my experience and my feelings for our associates. Show your pride, 
hold your head high and realize that YOU did not fail. (9/3/2002 at 05:25AM by 
wuzsickoXXXX2002, all emphases are mine.) 
In this excerpt, the poster employed several measures with which to define relationship 
with other participants (the ‘Acting’ aspect). However, expressed in the beginning of the 
excerpt is the poster’s difficulty to ‘articulate’ his ‘feelings’ by means of which the 
poster asked readers to understand his words to be just incomplete as no one’s 
experiences could translate into words. This is Boje’s (2001) antenarrative, which refers 
to stories yet to be told and/or experiences that resist being told. Especially, the 
antenarrative in the latter terms deserves attention.  
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Although stories yet to be told tend to be related to power variably distributed in 
organizations (Rhodes 2001), actors are often faced with a conundrum as to whether or 
not to express what they have in mind (Boje 2001). This is simply because each 
person’s experiences are unique and similar. The uniqueness of experiences invites 
problems of the asymmetrical relationship between the variety of language and that of 
referents (Tsoukas 1991). Also, we can refer to one of the attributes of narratives that 
exclude what is not told by telling particular stories in particular ways (Czarniawska 
1999). We cannot tell everything if we want to convey meaningful narrative. The more 
strongly one is prompted to express personal experiences, the more likely one has to 
struggle with a dilemma with regard to a sense of reality between what is experienced 
and what one may be able to instantiate in words. Hence, the poster clearly stated that 
his ‘words could not do justice to’ his feelings for fellow associates. This part is also 
understood as antenarrative. These antenarratives appear to define his message as that 
which conveys strong support to and empathy with fellow associates in an intricate 
manner to the extent that the poster wished his assumed audiences (fellow associates) to 
tolerate possible negative effects of his putting their experiences into his words. Hence, 
it is found that these antenarratives involve the poster’s concerns with the subtlety 
between similarity and distinctiveness of each other’s experiences. In expressing such 
concerns, he predicated his concerns on both his and others’ experiences (the aspect of 
‘Mediating’ plot). 
The triad of mimetic processes further explains the skills and knowledge as well as 
attributes embedded in antenarrative. While it exemplifies the intricacy of the processes 
by which the poster’s concerns were expressed by imagining the similarity and the 
uniqueness of each other’s experiences, the post also included the rather detailed 
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episodic descriptions concerning reality in the stores (the aspect of 
‘Identifying/classifying’ emplotment). These episodes demonstrate the overlapping of 
reality of different actors. Since such an overlap of different reality is a mere product of 
imagination of the poster, it does not denote the reality of the world either he or his 
assumed audiences belong to. What is important about this plurality of reality is, thus, 
that it is the poster’s being (or concerns) made pluralized, rather than either his or any 
other’s reality. Put differently, such imagination about the plurality of reality is better 
understood as the poster’s self-interpretation of his being in such multiple ways. 
Therefore, in addition to the capacity of capturing the moment of texts’ coming into 
being represented by authors’ struggles with narration, antenarrative enables us to 
understand that the plurality of meaning does not mean the mere co-existence of many 
meanings but that each such meaning is produced by one’s concerns with the being of 
things, other actors and one’s self (here, distinction between different actors/actants is of 
little meaningfulness for the poster, because those different actors/actants were drawn 
upon primarily for denoting the poster’s being at the moment of posting the message). 
Even if one imagines a variety of others, such is in principle done for the sake of one’s 
own sense of appropriateness in terms of substantive aspects of reality, contexts or 
one’s unique being at a particular point in time and space. Antenarrative offers a 
renewed understanding about how it is difficult for one to express one’s true being in 
this world. More importantly, it offers a means to read utterances as utterers’ truths 
most of which are rather cruelly silenced.  
Each of us knows that s/he is as a single and unique being. However, when it comes to 
perceiving, recognizing and understanding one has no other means than expressing it 
while struggling with similar, thus to a certain degree generalizable, resources for 
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representation and the limited extension of the generalization as being resisted by a 
sense of uniqueness. In addition, as the symbolic mediation of the mimetic process 
embedded in texts indicates, each of us necessarily confronts different intentionality or 
agencies between her/him, others and texts. In other words, it is unclear whether an 
actor expresses her/his being because s/he so wishes, or whether s/he responds 
voluntarily or involuntarily to others’ or texts’ intentionality implied in reality denoted 
in particular ways.  
Utterances are not mere denotations of reality that are made to make utterers’ reality 
intelligible to assumed audiences. Instead, utterances are understood to be expressing 
one’s being in many different ways by invoking different agencies bestowed on words 
to speak for one’s being. Substances denoted in words speak for substantive relevance 
by virtue of synchronic connections between particular properties and attributes, ways 
of denotation or diachronic connections/sequential orders consisting of heterogeneous 
properties for contextual relevance and the act of denotation (narration) for one’s sense 
of non-obvious subjective meaningfulness by marking one’s being at the moment of 
denotation.  
That making utterances is expressing one’s being suggests a critical character of actors’ 
skills and knowledge with which to manage the plurality of reality. Since one’s being 
cannot be referred to by any synchronically substitutable signifier, metaphor or ways of 
denotation, it has to be devised with particular horizons with particular 
phenomenological temporality in addition to particular beginnings and endings which 
denote mere sequences of actions, events and phenomena. Hence, if the plurality of 
reality is denoted by predicating it on particular sense of being, as is the case with the 
136 
 
example message, a multiplicity of horizons exist which, in part, overlap each other and 
intersect at particular points in time and space. Even if there are actors who belong to 
the same world in physical terms and interact with each other, they can only 
communicate with each other by means of the reality they denoted, which may in part 
overlap and may share particular spaces and moments. Interactions are thus dependent 
on each other’s imagination, and the ‘Mediating’ moment of emplotment is capable of 
providing virtually infinite extension of denotation in terms of generality, specificity 
and creativity. Nevertheless, it is inevitably constrained by substantive and contextual 
relevancy. So, as we know, the majority of people do not speak in everyday life as if 
they were poets.  
Although we are aware of the importance of everyday practices and skills and 
knowledge entailed in them, we are still not very clear about what they are. It should not, 
however, be seen as a bad story which is subject to persistent ambiguity. Rather, it may 
possibly be unhealthy to believe (or deceive ourselves) to comprehend such a self-
interpreting system of our everyday knowledge that keeps on being innovated by 
creating and taking advantage of the asymmetrical relationship between three different 
perspectives. Thus, what is important is to know how we are moving around the 
different realms of experiences (substances, practices and self in Figure 4.1) by 
appropriating different areas of knowledge (i.e., logical science, metaphor, narrative, 
and practical syntagmatic knowledge). The triad of mimetic processes serves to inform 
us typically of the hindsight of relatively visible connections we ourselves construct to 
go about everyday life. 
4.8 Searching for patterned disposition (the limits of interpretation) 
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The triad of mimetic processes enables us to act without knowing any absolute 
foundation of reality. At the individual level, denotations of reality are assumed to 
inflate by appropriating relevant properties and ways of denoting, creating non-obvious 
relevance by imagination. It can further be assumed that in interactions between two or 
more actors, each one’s denotations, which are in theory predisposed to inflate, must be 
converging in particular ways known as symbolic convergence (cf., Brown and 
Humphreys 2006). Otherwise, no one cares what limitation is imposed from material 
reality on virtually infinite possible interpretations, which is not likely. The question to 
be answered in the next chapter should, thus, be whether or not we can find certain 
patterned dispositions in the ways by which actors collectively perform deduction from 
each other’s inflating denotations? If it is the case, we would be able to explain 
processes of organizing on the basis of such patterned dispositions, which are acted out 
by actors without presuming the existence of particular source of social orderliness. 
Each actor acts by following her/his principles and assumptions along the triad of 
mimetic processes, assumed to be renewed continually as they take particular actions. 
Despite such continual renewal, is there any rule or collective preference in actors’ 
setting limits on each other’s interpretation? 
For such possibly shared ways of interpreting reality among actors, Ricoeur’s 
(1984/1990) theory of emplotment suggests the fundamentally rule-governed character 
of symbolic mediation and the familiarity with particular conceptual networks of actions, 
both of which are context-dependent but in tandem provide a sense of reality by 
bringing about ‘actuality and integration’ (56) to denoted reality in particular ways. 
There might be no universally applicable rule. Nonetheless, the analyses in this chapter 
implied two important characteristics pertaining to the triad of mimetic processes and 
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the three different realms of experiences: substances, practices and self, in respect of the 
possible constraining forces bringing about symbolic convergence between innumerable 
denotations.  
First, in spite of all the mediating processes, certain thing-like attributes 
(substantiveness) that can be classified into particular categories susceptible to the 
making of synchronic timelessly contingent causal connections, can be attributed to 
virtually anything, regardless of material objects or abstract concepts, insofar as they are 
recognized by actors. Therefore, despite the seemingly flexible choices in sequencing 
heterogeneous properties into particular orders, ways of denoting reality or certain 
contextually relevant syntagmatic rules are by and large determined by synchronically 
identifiable connections or patterns comprised of (quasi-)things. In other words, ways of 
denoting reality (syntagmatic rules) are more often than not mimicked, and as a result, 
they tend to converge within particular contexts. 
Second, another implication is the effect of mediating the substantive and the contextual 
understandings that enable us to see things, other actors and self as something with 
particular lengths, durations of time, histories, or horizons, rather than as a collection of 
discrete snapshots of events and phenomena. What this indicates is that our mundane 
experiences should be saturated with a virtually indefinite number of discourses in the 
sense that anything can or ought to be understood in relation to other properties with 
particular temporal extensions.  
These implications, together with the analysis in Chapter 3 of the participants’ 
assessment of the five different relevancies indicate that the key to identify particular 
dispositions acted out by each individual actor without absolutely foundational evidence, 
139 
 
rules or principles should be to understand how the triad of mimetic processes makes 
connections between heterogeneous properties with particular sequential orders, even in 
apprehending attributes of things and quasi-things. Put differently, actors are capable of 
acting on a hypothetical and inferential basis by utilizing their capacities to make sense 
of reality by means of story fragments, continua or anything of particular extension 
delineated by certain irreversible sequential orders as well as synchronically discernible 
patterns comprised of heterogeneous properties.  
Despite the seemingly metaphysical or semiotic processes of making connections, it 
should be emphasized that the triad of mimetic processes is not about semantics or 
narrowly defined semiotics that is confined within the realm of language or signs but 
about practices in which each of us can take actions, believing that doing so is doing 
good in terms of both substantive and contextual relevance, without absolutely any 
foundational proof, rule or principle. While it is assumed that actors interpret reality 
differently in terms of the limits of interpretation between experiences with things, other 
actors, and self, the limits of interpretation, which are supposed to culminate in 
particular dispositions, never assume unlimited extensions for anything, including 
human beings.  
The key is the relative invisibility of each one’s being or the ‘Mediating’ plot. As the 
analyses in this chapter exemplified, the ‘Mediating’ plot is a sphere in which each actor 
experiences three distinct kinds of subjectivity: in relation to external objects; in relation 
to actors who are capable of responding, and in relation to one’s self. Considering the 
complexity of processes entailed in the seemingly simple and mundane act of making 
utterances, it is unlikely that each one manages to establish identity thereby invoking 
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exclusively one’s faculty of reasoning. Rather, one should draw attention to one’s being 
in the first place. Once made aware of one’s being, each actor starts exploring 
appropriate resources. Put differently, subjectivity or the awareness of one’s being is 
best understood as evoked involuntarily. More critically, only by so understanding, will 
it become manifest that the limits of interpretation, which appear to be at each one’s 
imaginary-based discretion, are actually imposed by material reality or nature. The 
reason why our mundane experiences need to be managed by means of certain 
symbolically mediated media, meaning and interpretation is simply because none of us 
knows the definitive boundaries, if any, between nature and nurture, innate 
predispositions and acquired dispositions, or involuntary subjugation to natural laws and 
voluntary intervention.  
In Ricoeur’s (1990/1992) terms, our voluntary intention is ‘for happiness’ (120, fn. 5) in 
the sense that without exception we pursue the maximum extension of interpretations of 
reality and contextual relevance by virtue of consensual validation with other actors, 
both of which involve evaluative preferences and, by implication, moral appropriateness. 
By taking into account the receptivity of voluntary intention involving the desire for 
absolute freedom and voluntary sanctions, mundane utterances can be seen to dispose of 
utterers’ struggles with defining their relationships with material reality by necessarily 
invoking intersubjective checks with other actors. In order to discover certain rules or 
patterns in such dispositions, the concept of ‘ethics as practice’, which sees ethics as a 
form of practice (Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes 2007), is of particular relevance. 
Simply, morality and ethics can and ought to be understood as practices rather than as 
metaphysical concepts (see also Kornberger and Brown 2007). 
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To do so, taking into account the issue of power is important. As has been pointed out, 
actors make sense of reality by virtue of diachronic as well as synchronic connections 
constituted by heterogeneous properties. As the triad of mimetic processes explains, 
these different types of connections are mediated into particular meaningful wholes, 
which are devised with particular temporal extensions as well as 
spatial/geometric/structural configurations. By introducing power into such a spatio-
temporal paradigm, everything of relevance for power, from material obstacles, to 
disciplinary practices, to desire for authorities, to resistance to them, and to concerned 
agents and agencies, can be understood to be circulating in a ‘chaotic soup of bits and 
pieces of story fragments’ (Boje 2001: 18), rather than independent entities or 
constructs. In other words, as those properties relevant to power indicate, ethics as 
practice can better be understood as a power/rule constitution (Clegg 1989) in which 
interpretation of many actors about innumerable story fragments, rather than 
independent properties or concepts, is supposed to dispose of their struggles for 
fulfillment of their intention for happiness. Particular rules or patterns of dispositions in 
mundane discursive practices can thus be identified by assuming these to be emerging 
from each actor’s desires for the maximum extension of interpretation and voluntary 
constriction on them. Moreover, the power/rule constitution operating on the meaning-
interpretation nexus (ibid) serves to make visible how the extension of mundane 
utterances denoted through the individual level micro processes of emplotment can 
expand in terms of generality and is constrained by globally dominant discourses and/or 
locally pertinent institutions, including habits and routines.  
In the next chapter, two episodes observed in the Forum will be analyzed with the 
framework consisting of one’s intention for happiness as the nature of one’s being or 
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the ‘Mediating’ plot and the power/norm constitution as the means by which one 
pursues happiness: one is about certain observable norms established in the Forum and 
the other is about a certain practical proposal to develop a database for improvement of 
the Company’s management, which failed to materialize. The analyses will lead us to 
re-think what it means to say that mundane discursive practices are a constitutive part of 
processes of organizing. It will become manifest that it is indeed important for 
practicing ethics to know better how we move around the three different realms of 
experiences with the three different areas of skills and knowledge along the logic of the 
triad of mimetic processes. 
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CHAPTER 5  
POWER/RULE CONSTITUTION IN MEANING/INTERPRETATION NEXUS  
5.1 Plot and metaphor in management and organization studies 
Since Morgan (1986) an abundance of metaphor is available in management and 
organization studies. Metaphor substitutes a word that has meaning pertinent to a 
particular thing, event or phenomenon with another word that has a different meaning 
deemed relevant to the same thing, event or phenomenon. The reason why such a 
simple substitution between words offers us better understandings about things, events 
and phenomena is because the fact that a word can substitute for the other word 
provides us with senses of both specificity and generality about those referents. The 
pursuit of universal law or laws applicable to particular specific contexts in 
conventional scientific terms by falsifying irrelevant events and phenomena is a 
systematic way of applying this logic of substitution. 
What is characteristic about metaphor in management and organization studies is that 
the substantive objects (a variety of referents of metaphors) mostly involve sets of 
processes by which particular events and phenomena came about. This is why stories 
became metaphors frequently employed to theorize organizational events and 
phenomena. Stories are good at presenting particular sets of processes or procedures by 
which particular phenomena unfold in particular orders. In addition, they can provide 
contexts by putting things, events and phenomena in particular sequential orders. 
Moreover, theories that do not explain such processes’ unfolding are of only minimal 
relevance for practices in organizations and management. 
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It is, thus, clear that metaphor requires stories that provide particular sequential orders 
and contexts. As Ricoeur (1984/1990) explains, metaphor and narrative in tandem 
constitute processes of semantic (re)production. Back in Chapter 2, Weick’s (1987) 
model of theorizing organizational communication, which concerns the practical 
relevance of theories of organizational communication, can also be understood to 
consist of the combination between metaphor and narrative. As I pointed out in the 
beginning of Chapter 4, the five criteria of relevance contain both the substitutive logic 
and the logic pertinent to narrative. If one focuses on relationships between those 
criteria of descriptive, goal and operational relevance, timeliness and non-obviousness, 
and properties of theories, models or other forms of denotation, Weick’s model may 
facilitate understandings of particular events and phenomena in ways that validate 
relevant properties of the theories and models or falsify irrelevant ones to shape a kind 
of noiseless core components, rules and principles.  
If one follows Weick’s model processually in accordance with his narrative, one might 
be able to understand how theories, models or other denotation of reality becomes 
relevant by reference to those five criteria. Specifically, descriptive relevance and 
timeliness provide contextual information at particular points in time and space, 
operational relevance maps out institutional landscape, including concerned parties and 
their (in)capacities and together these support assessment of goal relevance of theories, 
models or other forms of denotation. By examining these four different aspects, one is 
likely to understand the events and phenomena in ways that reveal implicit and context-
specific assumptions and principles; thus, one can experience a sense of non-
obviousness of the theories in parallel to one’s implicit and context-specific 
assumptions and principles. One of the strengths of narrative approaches to theorizing 
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processes of organizing resides in this revealing moment, especially in respect of the 
practical relevance of theories. In other words, stories are best understood not only as 
metaphors of organizational events and phenomena, including actors’ denotation about 
organizational reality, but also as device with which to grasp a set of procedures in a 
processual manner that evokes actors’ imagination about similarities/dissimilarities 
between the stories and the processes/procedures they are experiencing. 
The problem concerning the relevance of theories developed by studies on organizing is 
probably about how they can plot organizational events and phenomena taking into 
account the characteristics of metaphor, narrative and the combination between them. 
Organizational actors do not author narrative in proper literary terms but they make 
sense of reality utilizing both metaphorical and narrative means to understand a variety 
of encounters better. For theories to become relevant, Weick’s (1987) model seems to 
suggest the importance of researchers’ taking account of the existence of organizational 
actors’ assumptions and principles, even if they are implicit and context-specific. 
Czarniawska (1999) proposes protoplot as a kind of meta-theoretical framework with 
which to capture organizational stories that are plotted by a variety of organizational 
actors. Implied by both is the existence of the different protagonist positions 
(practitioners and theorists) in theories with which to explain organizational events and 
phenomena (see also Pentland 1999, Tsoukas and Hatch 2001). 
Another characteristic aspect of theorizing management and organization practices that 
may need to be considered is writing or how to present theories as constitutive part of 
theories. As van Maanen’s (1988) seminal work represents, the issue of how to write 
and its theoretical significance applies to management and organization studies. The 
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triad of mimetic processes depicts the situation typical of the social research contexts as 
the nesting and nested structure constituted by different protagonists and their respective 
narratives derived from a certain common reality. In conventional science, the 
distinction between researchers/observers and their research subjects is so obvious that 
few pay attention to the intricacy entailed in the relationships between 
researchers/observers and their research subjects. Even those who adopt an 
interpretative approach to social reality often presuppose such a distinction as definitive. 
Of course, researchers and their research subjects are both ontologically and socially 
distinct. However, when it comes to interpretation of reality, researchers must be as 
sensitive as possible about the nature of the subjects and the condition in which one 
finds them. This is because interpretative researchers observe reality through their 
interpretation of their research subjects’ interpretation (see also Giddens 1984). 
Such a situation is actually not limited to social research contexts. Each of us interprets 
others’ interpretation but we rarely think so. Rather, we think we see facts about others. 
In interpretative research, such assumptions significantly skew reality unknowingly. 
Ignoring the fact that researchers interpret others’ interpretation is to ignore such others’ 
mundane skills and methods with which they make sense of reality. Such ignorance or 
contraction of others’ skills and knowledge of interpreting reality is, however, part of 
the innate and immutable nature of human beings who expand the reach of their 
imagination by continuously creating new metaphors. Put differently, even stories 
whose key part is events and phenomena sequenced into particular orders can be 
appropriated rather flexibly for making better sense of reality by deducing a myriad of 
stories to obtain more general rules and principles. 
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Obviously, something is missing or inadvertently discarded from what we normally 
observe. As was briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, the triad of mimetic processes is 
capable of making it visible. The realm of substance denotes the world of metaphor; the 
realm of practice denotes the world of narrative; what tends to be overlooked is the 
realm of self. In research contexts, researchers normally pursue identifying 
similarities/dissimilarities in their data sets then classifying them into particular 
categories, such that they may be able to get better understandings out of data. The same 
applies to studies on organizing, adopting narrative or other discursive approaches. 
However, typically for studies that deal with stories as data, one of the main purposes is 
to understand research subjects’ ways of making sense of reality inscribed in stories 
(Gubrium and Holstein 2009), or of reality through interpretation of research subjects 
(Pentland 1999). Notwithstanding, even if stories are seen to represent particular sets of 
procedures of research subjects’ interpretation, they are fairly easily bundled up and 
categorized into particular meaning without regard to how each such story came about.  
Without reducing massive data in one way or another, we will not obtain any renewed 
understanding. The point I am making is the ignorance of the processes by which such 
reduction of data is implemented and the consequences of such ignorance. The 
consequences are, fairly counter-intuitively, the scant existence of the sense of 
engagement on the side of researchers. What we are observing in scientific research in 
general is fairly cruel reproduction of the extant power relations putting researchers on 
the top without their so knowing, in a familiar ‘power/rule constitution’ along the 
‘meaning-interpretation nexus’ (Clegg 1989). Those who are capable of exerting more 
power discipline particular communities of interpretation, without which any metaphor 
is impossible. More seriously, metaphor produced chiefly by the more powerful for 
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their communities with the support of their stories prescribes the ways people outside 
the communities make sense of reality without accounting for how the metaphor came 
about. 
Why and how is such a situation sustained? Is it caused by researchers’ lack of sense of 
engagement? Are researchers not victims of much broader discourses, such as those of 
the capitalist economy or outcome-based evaluations of academic research? I do not 
intend to drag my research into such relatively easily accessible antagonistic stories 
between the powerful and the innocent. The issue needs to be examined more 
scientifically. Simply, we need to know how metaphor is being created with the support 
of narrative. The point is the asymmetrical relationship between actor/author and 
observer/reader.  
The asymmetrical relationship between actor/author and observer/reader refers to the 
impossibility for the former to control how the latter understand the former’s 
actions/denotations of reality. As Goffman (1959/1990) elaborated, one can only 
assume how others would understand one’s actions. However careful one may be about 
one’s appearances, others can take advantage of information that is inevitably given off 
from one’s actions. Similarly, narrative theory explains that once presented, texts can be 
read by readers in many ways while an author and readers are supposed to subscribe to 
certain common rules in syntactic, semantic, pragmatic or cultural terms (Ricoeur 
1984/1990). The asymmetrical relationship, therefore, explains that two distinct 
meanings are supposed to be generated between an author and readers. Besides, the 
asymmetrical relationship indicates that certain collective reality shared between 
different actors is constructed by each actor’s imaginatively assuming each other’s ways 
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of understanding reality and by such assumptions’ being checked through alternate 
successions between acting/authoring and observing/reading. 
Nonetheless, since one normally acts both as actor/author and as observer/reader, it is 
difficult for one to notice the subtle differences between meanings one produces as an 
author and as a reader. Moreover, such relative unawareness of the subtly different 
meanings produced by an author and a reader arises from each one’s innate moral 
concerns. We tend to believe that we ought to attempt, chiefly with the faculty of 
reasoning, to take the positions of others imaginatively, such that each one’s view of 
interactions with others is liable to assume symmetrical reciprocation, with less regard 
to the gaps which are filled by readers’ imagination. In short, we tend to overestimate 
each other’s moral obligations because of our innate orientation towards being good 
rather than bad. A simple fact is that, in practical interactions between different actors, 
no one can prescribe particular ways of understanding one’s actions/denotations of 
reality. Even more important is that social orderliness or particular patterns in collective 
actions emanate from the asymmetrical relationship between actor/author and 
observer/reader. It is, thus, critical in analyzing mundane discursive practices to 
exemplify the asymmetrically succeeding utterances and reading of them. 
In order to capture and analyze the subtle but inevitable iterations between 
acting/authoring and observing/reading that enable mundane interactions, a metaphor is 
invoked. The metaphor is the triad of mimetic processes depicted in Figure 4.1 in 
Chapter 4 that includes the realm of experience with self. The metaphor emphasizes that 
even if there is no such foundational thing as self, each of us keeps on moving forward 
(never backward) in terms of chronological time without wondering who I am or what 
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my self is. The metaphor clearly shows the route each of us is following. Based on that 
figure, I put ‘intention for happiness’ on the position that denotes the mediating function 
in the triad of mimetic processes; ‘power’ as the arrow linking ‘intention for happiness’ 
to ‘substantive understandings’ and ‘norm’ as the arrow between ‘intention for 
happiness’ and ‘contextual understandings’ (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Triadic metaphor consisting of ‘intention for happiness’, ‘power’ and 
‘norm’ 
 
Two episodes in the case online forum (the Forum) were analyzed by applying this 
framework. The analyses demonstrate the interrelation between metaphorical and 
narrative understandings and the power/rule constitution along the triad of mimetic 
processes, through which the limits of actors’ interpretation in regard to their intention 
for happiness are determined. As will be elaborated below, the triad of mimetic 
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processes plays out a critical role in interactions between two or more actors as well as 
at the individual level. As was presented in Chapter 4, the triad of mimetic processes 
enables an actor to act without any absolutely foundational evidence, rule or principle 
by hypothetically establishing interpretation about reality. That each individual actor 
acts without knowing any absolutely foundational evidence, rule or principle means that 
the limits of interpretation are always determined by those who see interpretation that 
has been presented by others hypothetically. Moreover, such hypothetically presented 
interpretation denotes reality along the triad of mimetic processes, meaning that one 
both pursues the maximum extension of interpretation by means of metaphorical 
reasoning and voluntarily constricts it by seeking for consensual validation with others 
over one’s denotation. Hence, the hypothetically established denotation does not 
represent what one’s intention for happiness (or being) is as precisely as possible. In 
other words, no such denotation can hold anyone accountable for denoted reality. At the 
end of this chapter, it is clarified why and how it is important to understand precisely 
the triad of mimetic processes in analyzing organizational events and phenomena. 
Ethics can only be practiced rather than validated by showing either sincerity for one’s 
intention for happiness, or unfalsifiable truth, or considerateness for others’ happiness. 
Practicing ethics is possible only by knowing as precisely as possible how each one is 
making sense of reality. 
5.2 Happiness and the power/rule constitution 
5.2.1 Being and intention for happiness 
Intention for happiness refers to one’s most immediate desire. Power denotes the 
expansive aspect of desire. Norm denotes the constricting aspect of desire. All of these 
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are metaphors with which to understand better what one’s being is, which holds a key to 
all the semantic production along the triad of mimetic processes. More specifically, 
one’s most immediate desire or ‘intention for happiness’ mediates substances and 
contexts by taking advantage of the asymmetrical relationship that is inevitably created 
in interactions between two or more actors. The metaphor, consisting of ‘intention for 
happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’, can explain being in a variety of ways (Eco 1999) by 
taking into account one’s crude and immediate desire, which is evoked receptively than 
proactively (Ricoeur 1990/1992). 
Since these desires are crude and immediate in everyday practical settings, one rarely 
establishes them discursively. For human beings, crude and immediate desire causes a 
rather perplexing problem. Probably, many people may agree that the desire of human 
beings is for survival or needs for subsistence (e.g., Maslow’s hierarchy of needs). 
However, this is not as straightforward as might be thought. With regard to survival, 
species other than human beings do not have desire but are just born and die in their 
own ways. Probably, some may object that dogs and cats have an intention for survival. 
I will not deny this. The lack of desire of any other species than human beings for 
survival is actually the lack of volitional interpretation, specifically through language. 
No sooner has one said ‘desire’ than it starts resisting one or threatening one with such a 
word as ‘(un)fulfillment’. The same applies to survival and needs for subsistence. The 
former immediately starts by asking with what means, with what capacities and 
competencies, can it be secured and the latter would ask how much of what for how 
long, all of which are not simple questions to answer. 
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As was mentioned, one rarely establishes desire discursively. Therefore, this is not a 
problem of language but a problem of human intellectual faculties, involving the 
perceptive and cognitive systems. It may sound contradictory to what I have just said 
that human beings’ desire is desire for interpretation with language. What I mean by 
desire for interpretation with language is that language is a consequence of innate and 
immutable desire and resistance to it, which the anticipation of the next moment(s) 
forces us to manage by interpreting a variety of encounters and surroundings. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, human beings anticipate, meaning that they know there 
will come the next moment(s), rather than this present moment being the end of their 
lives. Human beings’ immediate and crude desire is receptively evoked by the innate 
and immutable faculty of anticipating.  
What this receptivity of desire means is that there exists no such thing as the absolute 
foundation of self which tends to be seen as the bearer of one’s desire, motivation, 
personality or identity. Self is in a sense a metaphor created for the sake of denotation 
such that one can set the beginning of her/his stories. It never represents the origin of 
consciousness or the mind or one’s pursuit thereof. Therefore, both self and being are 
genuinely flatus vocis (Eco 1999). This is why it is not feasible to talk of the issues 
concerning the power/rule constitution in ways that pursue any absolute target of 
attribution with regard to either source of power or bearers of responsibility; hence, I 
invoke the metaphor consisting of ‘intention for happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’ as a 
tentative target of attribution. Moreover, ‘intention for happiness’ that mediates 
substantive and contextual meanings by means of ‘power’ and ‘norm’ denotes processes 
by which one sets the limits of interpretation by just paying attention to being or self 
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that is actually forced to be said in the course or as a result of the innate and immutable 
thus receptively evoked pursuit of happiness. 
‘Power’ and ‘norm’ cannot be separated from each other. They are two sides of the 
same coin. While ‘power’ pursues by means of metaphorical understanding the 
maximum extension of one’s interpretation about happiness, ‘norm’ constricts it by 
means of contextual relevance assessed in relation to other actors. The triad of mimetic 
processes nests and is nested by both metaphorical expansion and contextual 
constriction. Stories that ‘power’ nests in it seek to confine interpretation within 
contexts as they define, and thus self-fulfill. In contrast, within ‘norm’ as contextual 
constriction on interpretation, the metaphorical expansion nested in it further constricts 
interpretation by means of the globally accepted ways of interpreting such metaphorical 
understandings. Both ‘power’ and ‘norm’ are predisposed to segment particular ways of 
interpretation by reinforcing each other (the metaphorical expansion to expand 
‘disciplinary matrices’ and the contextual constriction to be furthered by constricting 
‘disciplinary practices’ [Clegg 1989]).  
Considering the ubiquity of power and norm in organizations and the multiplicity of 
variance in actors’ interests, concerns, competencies and capabilities, what is happening 
in organization through the power/rule constitution along the meaning-interpretation 
nexus needs to be revisited more seriously. Specifically, the totalizing effects of the 
power/rule constitution on each individual actor are far more severe than one may 
expect, given certain degrees of freedom in respect of each one’s pursuit of better 
interpretation of happiness in the interpretive or discursive spaces.  
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Accordingly, the ubiquitously observed resistance to power needs to be re-interpreted. 
As some previous studies exemplified, resistance is often observed to appropriate 
meaning and interpretation from within the same power/norm framework (Brown and 
Humphreys 2006, da Cunha and Orlikowski 2007). Such intricate processes entailed in 
the phenomenon of resistance can be interpreted with the framework consisting of 
‘intention for happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’, not as effects of language but as 
processes by which each one’s intention for happiness is being pursued in ways that 
fulfill both the metaphorically expansive and the contextually constricting interpretation 
of happiness.  
The re-interpretation in this way suggests, on the one hand, that each one’s being can be 
silenced fairly cruelly in the sense that the sources of power and norm cannot be 
attributed to any one particular actor or entity. On the other hand, when the same could-
be silenced being is observed to be expressed in one way or another, it is possible from 
such events and phenomena observable in data to account for the mechanisms by which 
the power/rule constitution operates along the meaning-interpretation nexus. Utterances 
as particular denotations of reality are, in other words, to be seen as certain patterned 
dispositions which actors act out based on their respectively obtained sense of relevance, 
rather than being mere effects of language.  
Accounting for the mechanisms by which the power/rule constitution operates along the 
meaning-interpretation nexus from particular denotations of reality seems to be of 
critical importance for theorizing better organizing. It is so in the sense that different 
actors, including analysts/observers, might be able to come up with practically relevant 
assumptions and principles with which to explain reality denoted in mundane utterances 
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by accounting for processes by which each one obtains a sense of relevance, rather than 
by attributing the denoted reality to anyone’s reasons or purposes. The sense of 
relevance that drives the power/rule constitution and that is obtained along the triadic 
processes as are depicted as the metaphor comprised of ‘intention for happiness’, 
‘power’ and ‘norm’ entails sources of social orderliness; or, in other words each one’s 
orientation towards being good in terms of precise understandings of matters/substances, 
in relation to other actors (contextual relevance), and/or in pursuit of one’s 
evaluative/moral appropriateness. 
In order to make explicit the sources of social orderliness embedded in the metaphor 
comprised of ‘intention for happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’, the triadic processes of 
interpreting reality will be put into interactions between two or more actors by drawing 
upon the concept of ‘ethics as practice’ (Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes 2007). One’s 
pursuit of appropriate interpretation of happiness by means of ‘power’ and ‘norm’ is 
actually a practice of ethics in which two or more actors each imaginatively construct 
reality by interpreting each other’s denotations of reality. The different relevancies that 
are obtained through the triadic processes are indeed the key criteria for ethics in 
everyday practices.  
What is to be noted is, however, the fact that presentation and interpretation of reality 
occur in an alternate and diegetic manner. Ethics is being practiced in ways that each 
one allows others to understand/interpret one’s denotation of reality in their own ways, 
such that interactions/conversations are kept going, rather than constrained. Mundane 
practices are ethical to the extent that diverse realities of as many actors as possible are 
made observable. It is assumed that practically relevant explanations about reality are 
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likely to be obtained by enriching conversations/interactions between actors who each 
are oriented towards being good, and by accounting for processes in which each one 
reads one’s evaluative/moral sentiments into others’ denotation of reality. 
5.2.2 Conceptualizing the triad of mimetic processes as a practice of ethics 
The metaphor comprised of ‘intention for happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’, which 
operates on the logic of the triad of mimetic processes, can be translated into an 
analytical framework with which to analyze mundane discursive practices as a sphere in 
which ethics play out through the practical judgments of actors on a variety of 
structuring properties, including their own and others’ capacities to appropriate such 
structuring properties. Understanding the power/rule constitution along the meaning-
interpretation nexus by incorporating the concept of ethics as practice is important, first 
and foremost, for explicating the linkages between the triad of mimetic processes, which 
is in principle about interpretation thus easily misunderstood as effects of language, and 
material reality which is to be made sense of by interpretation along the triad of mimetic 
processes. Interpretation is social practice that involves ‘bodily patterns, routinized 
mental activities – forms of understanding, know-how (here including grammar and 
pragmatic rules of use), and motivation – and above all, objects (from sounds to 
computers) that are linked to each other’ (Reckwitz 2002: 255). 
According to the concept of ethics as practice, ethics is a form of practice (Clegg et al. 
2007), and practice does not provide any universally applicable meaning whether it is 
ethical and normative or referential and descriptive (Bourdieu 1990). Subscribing firmly 
to the relational contextuality of practice, it would become theoretically impossible to 
assume, as given, any abstract concept the ontological predicate of which is yet to be 
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located, such as the human mind. This is because assuming so violates the relational 
contextuality of meanings in the realm of social practices. What the mind denotes varies 
from one actor to another at different points in time and space. Put simply, the human 
mind also needs to be understood as cumulative consequences of acting: no action, no 
human mind. As has been presented, the triad of mimetic processes is thus suitable for 
operationalizing the concept of ethics as practice. It does not assume the existence of the 
mind, self, being, or any abstract concept as an entity with fixed identity. Rather, it 
enables analysis of the intricate processes by which actors make sense of reality in 
accordance with substantive and contextual relevance and create a sense of relevance at 
a particular point in time and space by mediating these different relevancies. 
In addition to the ability to account for practices without presuming any foundational 
evidence, rule or principle, the analytical framework based on the triadic metaphor has 
its strength in the involvement of actors’ capacity to take advantage of the asymmetrical 
relationships that are inevitably created as two or more actors interact. As has already 
been explained in the previous section (5.2.1), communication or interactions between 
two or more actors are enabled by each one’s imaginatively reconstructing reality, 
including concerned actors’ intentions and goals, by reference to other’s denotations of 
reality or actions. Thus, actions or denotations of reality are not necessarily made in 
order to represent reality as precisely as possible. The triadic metaphor, thus, does not 
explain how each actor denotes her/his ontological reality as precisely as possible but 
rather why and how s/he is urged to denote it even if s/he knows that s/he cannot say 
everything about her/his ontological reality. 
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It is, therefore, important to understand why and how interpretation of reality cannot 
deal directly with ontological reality at a particular point in time and space; despite this, 
how and why can we manage reality with each other’s denotation of reality? The weak 
teleology of the act of denoting reality is the key. The weak teleology refers to the 
virtual impossibility for an utterer to hold her/himself accountable for her/his own 
utterances. First, whether or not one proceeds to denoting reality is a chance event, thus, 
cannot be predicted, even if one’s ‘intention for happiness’ motivates one towards 
denoting reality by means of ‘power’ and ‘norm’. Second, since an utterer is supposed 
to make assumptions about how her/his ideas, feelings or subjective reality can be 
presented to others before uttering, it is difficult to determine whether an utterer utters 
her/his words according to her/his motivations, reasons and goals or assumed audiences 
allow or ask her/him to utter them in such a way that is logically coherent, plausible or 
acceptable (see also Chapter 4). Third, the blurred boundaries in terms of the 
accountability for each one’s utterances indicates that while particular rules to which 
actors collectively subscribe are necessary for them to issue utterances, compliance with 
such rules does not, as given, guarantee any common understanding of reality shared 
between actors. Rather, regardless of words expressed in utterances, it is each actor, as a 
reader, who makes judgments on relevance of each other’s reality. Fourth, the 
seemingly irresponsible act of denoting a reality that one does not hold oneself 
accountable for one’s denotations enables these to retain linkages with the material 
world. They are less contaminated or rather less over-purified by utterers’ reasons and 
purposes. It is always audiences/readers who hear/read others’ utterances as if they were 
issued with particular motivations, intentions and/or goals.  
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Overall, the weak teleology of the act of denoting reality enables checks on denoted 
reality by reference to a sense of appropriateness of each reader in terms of her/his 
ontological reality. Such checks are intersubjective in that one cannot directly see one’s 
own act of denoting reality but can only know some aspects of it from others’ responses. 
Besides, the intersubjective checks not only associate mutually independent denotation 
of reality with one another but also culminate in particular rules or patterns of 
denotation based on each one’s skills and knowledge to (re)construct reality 
imaginatively by reference to others’ denotation of reality. 
A critical feature that we tend to overlook is the significance of turns we make and take 
(Boden 1994). Actors are engaged with mutually independent activities. The triad of 
mimetic processes and its nesting and nested structure explain that the processes of 
organizing are not self-contained continuous processes but are punctuated by turns in 
which each one imaginatively constructs continuous processes by mediating the 
substantive and the contextual understandings into meaningful wholes. In other words, 
there are no such continuous processes of organizing. When we believe we are 
observing processes of organizing, we are actually mediating mutually independent 
processes into meaningful wholes, taking into account the substances denoted in and the 
contexts connoted by observed events and phenomena. Reality is captured as if it were a 
series of snapshots of events and phenomena while it is actually constructed in a 
diegetic manner (Cunliffe, Luhman and Boje 2004).  
Figure 5.2 below illustrates diegetic processes of organizing between two actors (Actor 
A and Actor B) by which social practices, meanings/interpretation, and self are given 
shape. T1 to T4 denotes turns taken by the actors at different points in time, where each 
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actor engages with the triadic processes comprised of Actor (mediating function), S 
(substantive understanding), and F (Form: embodied assumptions about responses from 
others). The triadic processes may take place either in the realm of Practice, Substance 
or Self as shown in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 and the site may be different between these 
actors, or between the turns they take. Specifically, while the Actor A in the turn T1 
may be interested in presenting herself in front of Actor B, Actor B in turn T2 may wish 
to figure out what is going on, to ponder about her selfhood, or to come up with 
appropriate responses to Actor A. Hence, these actors are only loosely coupled with 
their respective substantive understandings and each other’s embodied assumptions 
about each other’s responses. This looseness, in turn, suggests that interactions are 
possible irrespective of geographical or historical proximity between actors. 




Since every turn brings about changes, albeit that they may be trivial, S (T1) to S (T4) 
and F (T1) to F (T4) are all different between the actors and also between the turns. 
They are, however, overlapping because we rarely invent meanings of substances and 
forms of presentation from scratch; thus, these may or may not constitute diegeses 
depending on whether or not actors taking subsequent turns imaginatively associate the 
preceding turn(s) with one another when finding them to be of relevance at particular 
points in time and space. When we recognize some collective actions and/or shared 
values between two or more actors, we are looking at these forms (F [T1] to F [T4]) and 
substantive meanings (S [T1] to S [T4]) by grouping them, with our capacity of 
imagination, mostly being unaware of their diegetic accumulation.  
Each of the turns in Figure 5.2 denotes the triad of mimetic processes by which three 
different meanings are produced and reality plotted by each individual actor. As was 
mentioned in Chapter 4, every plot is unique. Thus, even if one observes similar or 
mostly identical plots to recur and either produce similar substantive meanings or to 
present similar ways of denotation, we should not ignore the existence of one who 
mediates such similar substances or ways of denotation into particular meaningful 
wholes in ways that are deemed appropriate to one at a particular point in time and 
space. As has been presented thus far, utterances are not issued aiming at denoting 
reality as precisely as possible. Rather, they are consequences of one’s enacting the triad 
of mimetic processes, which enables one to present hypotheses largely grounded in 
what others might agree about reality, both in terms of substance and context. It is, 
however, important to understand that despite such reliance on what and how others 
might see reality, making utterances is motivated, even if the teleology is weak, by each 
one’s ‘intention for happiness’ or awareness of one’s being in particular surroundings.  
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Accordingly, ethics as practice can be understood in a triadic manner. Remember that 
communication or interactions between two or more actors are enabled by each one’s 
imaginative reconstruction of reality by reference to others’ actions or denotations of 
reality. In so doing, each one refers to the substantive aspects of reality and varying 
contexts, and mediates these into particular meaningful wholes. We each pursue the 
maximum extension of our interpretation of reality and voluntarily constrict it by 
pursuing consensual validation with others. In addition, each person is supposed to 
experience a sense of evaluative appropriateness at a particular point in time and space 
even if it is rarely established discursively. Furthermore, those triadic ways of making 
sense of reality are practiced in interaction settings. Ethics being practiced can be seen 
as a more subtly nuanced reciprocation of mutual obligations.  
The ethics that each actor as an utterer is practicing is about how one accounts for one’s 
truth in ways that induce readers’ engaged ways of reading it. This seemingly self-
interested attitude towards one’s utterances is actually considerateness to others because 
reading others’ (utterers’) truths enrich readers’ ways of constructing reality (see also 
Chapter 4). In other words, the act of issuing an utterance is full of the utterer’s sense of 
moral correctness in relation to other actors, rather than self-interested desire for 
satisfying her/his ‘intention for happiness’. Social reality is thus managed through each 
believing that their denotation of reality is true to the extent that it contributes to 
enriching others’ ways of (re)constructing reality on an assumption that they could see 
one’s denotation to be relevant to the extent that their truths could be read into it.  
In turn, what readers do is to reconstruct reality. Why do readers need to reconstruct 
reality for whom? Simply, readers are commanded to do so for better understanding 
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readers’ own reality by reference to others’ denoted reality. Since readers reconstruct 
reality by reading their realities into reality that is denoted by others, readers are 
commanded to read, precisely speaking, by words, rather than by utterers. In other 
words, from the moment of uttering and onward, an utterer entrusts words for speaking 
her/his truth in ways that command others to read her/his truth. The act of issuing 
utterances, rather than the contents of utterances, is ethical because utterers accept 
others’ reading uttered words in their own ways, such that readers are expected to 
denote subsequently their realities in ways that induce their audiences’ engaged reading. 
This chain of telling truth, not respective actors’ truths, can be understood as parrhesia 
(Foucault 1999). The key is not whether or not a certain chain of utterances is true or 
ethical but to understand that utterances are checked intersubjectively while each one’s 
interpretation is inevitably affected by the fact that one normally acts as both an utterer 
and a reader: rational readers who, if in varying ways, assume one another’s rationality 
rarely think of the impossibility of imposing such rational assumptions on their 
audiences when they act as utterers.  
By applying the triad of mimetic processes and the alternate and diegetic successions 
between reading and uttering, it becomes manifest that ethics as practice is structured by 
a norm of answerability in Bakhtin’s terms (1993, also Burr 2009, Holmes 2010, 
Nielsen 2002). Honesty or sincerity, either to one’s immediate feelings or denotation is 
indeed illusion or, at best, retrospectively fabricated reasons for actions because one can 
only know of aspects of one’s own act of uttering from others’ responses that one 
cannot control. It is impossible to fulfill moral obligations for one’s act of uttering no 
matter how rationally one may believe oneself to be acting. Positive ethical quality 
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embedded in mundane discursive practices resides in utterers’ (and accordingly 
readers’) readiness for any unintended consequences.  
Considering such an intricate relationship between readers and authors that define ethics 
as is practiced through the alternate successions between reading and uttering, the 
power of words that can be understood in a triadic manner is typically significant in 
terms of the mediating function. As quasi-substances or resources, words enable actors 
to obtain, if temporarily, a sense of permanence by defining the world with mutually 
non-contradictory identities. A simple fact that one manages to denote reality in a 
certain way is evidence that one exercised power, even if inadvertently, by freezing time 
to derive certain laws or principles that can be valid regardless of temporal 
contingencies. At the same time, however, one must have pursued contextual relevance 
of one’s denotation, meaning that words enable one to imagine one’s denotation in the 
flow of time by their being associated into particular sequential orders. As such, words 
provide contextual information with the surplus of denotation provided by particular 
ways of denotation or appearances/styles. As the surplus of denotation indicates, words 
enunciated in particular ways are capable of commanding others’ reading, and it is 
readers who interpret substantive and contextual information by reading their 
experiences, including sense of evaluative/moral appropriateness, into the enunciated 
words. Thus, words actually mediate authors and readers by providing a kind of open 
space in which respective experiences are projected including a sense of 
evaluative/moral appropriateness. As was indicated by the parrhesiastic chain of the 
acts of telling truth and the norm of answerability that guide ethics as practice, those 
distinct agencies that words bestow need to be appreciated in order to understand ethics 
as practice by examining mundane discursive practices. 
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By appreciating those agencies of words in a triadic manner, words can be analyzed as 
both quasi-substances and stories. The mediating function of words exemplifies, 
according to the triadic processes, how mundane discursive practices define and 
redefine relationships by allowing actors to make use of the distinct predispositions 
between utterances as things (‘power’) and those as stories (‘norm’) in terms of 
orientations for deducing the manifold of possible interpretation about reality. The 
former is more oriented toward generality and universality; the latter toward successful 
completion of interactions with others. To obtain a sense of universality and generality, 
what is important is to find out substitutable things, events, phenomena, qualities and 
words regardless of varying contexts. In contrast, to conclude interactions with others 
successfully, one usually needs to rely on richer descriptions chiefly with words, i.e., 
stories. Hence, it is important to see utterances (as data) to enfold the triad of mimetic 
processes in a nesting and nested manner. Utterances are not mere effects of language 
but particular dispositions acted out by particular actors who establish actionable 
hypotheses along the triad of mimetic processes.  
By dealing with text data as both quasi-substances (synchrony) and stories or story 
fragments (diachrony), power relations that are embedded in discourses can be 
identified and analyzed in a systematic manner. The former enables analysis of extant 
power structures by means of actors’ usages of words whose meanings have broader 
extensions, thus, interpretation of which are relatively stable between different actors. 
The latter is only possible by analysts’ identifying proper protagonist(s) of data who 
associate(s) heterogeneous properties into particular meaningful wholes. This seemingly 
arbitrary imagination of analysts is actually critical to address the irremediable power 
imbalances not only because it engages analysts with their subjects’ reality but also 
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because it offers the subjects possible alternative ways of reconstructing their realities. 
Since power imbalances are irremediable, it is more important to appreciate them than 
to pretend they were solvable problems.  
To appreciate such insoluble problems as power imbalances is, nonetheless, neither 
better nor worse than to identify and solve many other solvable problems. It is about 
confronting difficult moral choices, which conventional science or even ordinary people 
appear to presume in positive terms, thus, rarely tackle. As has been suggested above 
and will be substantiated below, people are concerned with evaluative/moral 
appropriateness, regardless of whether they focus more on relationships with substances 
or with other actors (contexts). Exercising power in pursuit of a sense of permanence is 
no less ethical than voluntarily constraining oneself and/or others for consensual 
validation. As the alternate successions between reading and uttering explain, 
denotation of reality or actions in general are read by readers in ways that read readers’ 
experiences into them. Confronting difficult moral choices is, thus, not becoming 
reflective of and accounting for one’s evaluative/moral appropriateness, which is 
virtually impossible, but rather offering each other opportunities to read and possibly 
express something about one’s experiences in some ways based on one’s 
evaluative/moral sentiments.  
The following analyses will present (1) how to deal with text data as both synchrony 
and diachrony and its applicability to mundane discursive practices and effectiveness in 
examination of the power/rule constitution along the meaning-interpretation nexus; (2) 
the significance of the empowering capacity of reading in ways that imaginatively 
nurture, rather than eliminate, ambiguity and uncertainty, which inevitably lie behind 
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each mundane examination of evaluative/moral appropriateness; and (3) how analysts 
can confront such difficult moral choices as power imbalances to increase the practical 
relevance of theories produced through analyses of organizations. It is necessary to pay 
attention to each one’s mundane evaluative/moral sentiments. However, it is more 
important to deal with them as they are practiced in interactions between two or more 
actors. Since power is exercised by everyone, the problems of irremediable power 
imbalances do not concern a variety of resources and endowments that will never be 
distributed evenly or even in a fair manner but concern varying degrees of thickness in 
experiences of power, experiences that are diluted if we invoke the conventional 
scientific methods for causations. Social analyses that interpret others’ interpretation 
need to prepare alternative ways of contributing to both social welfare and individual 
wellbeing, rather than solving particular problems, by orienting them to more difficult 
or virtually unresolvable questions, such as which society is fairer, how a more 
equitable society can be materialized, or how moral one can or ought to be? 
5.3 Plot and metaphor: two stories 
5.3.1 A patterned disposition: Practicing ethics 
As presented in Chapter 4, it was observed in the Forum that the participants attempted 
to establish their positive identity through participation. Since it was positive, the 
messages carried the participants’ evaluative preferences and/or normative 
appropriateness. The contexts to which such evaluative preferences and normative 
appropriateness can be applied are at times empirically confined to the Forum and, at 
other times are outside the Forum, i.e., the participants’ real world workplaces and 
general environment surrounding the Company. Such positive identity by reference to 
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the different contexts was established through the messages posted to the Forum 
(although such reading is mine).  
The following analyses explicate how I read the messages as observable dispositions 
that the participants acted out to establish positive identity and particular norms 
established through participation in the Forum. Specifically, the presentation of the data 
focuses on the participants’ substantive and contextual understandings generated from 
each going through the triad of mimetic processes. Underlying these observable 
dispositions is each participant’s attempt to make sense of reality, in principle, by means 
of metaphorical understandings of things, events and phenomena. Hence, even if the 
participants appeared to be collectively concerned with other participants (caring for 
fellow associates) and/or themselves (their own identity), their denotation of reality was 
in principle stabilizing substantive understandings of their negative experiences arising 
from the bankruptcy. In other words, the messages were issued when the participants 
found things, events and phenomena problematic, including subjective mental 
experiences and some other stories denoted in the messages, by means of which each 
one could make better sense of reality by identifying similarity/dissimilarity and, thus, a 
certain degree of generality.  
Despite the significance of metaphor or substitutable stories, the participants also paid 
attention to whom they were talking to, primarily for concluding interactions with 
others satisfactorily (see also Chapter 3). Out of concerns with successful interactions 
with others emerge norms that were in principle applicable to the Forum. The norms so 
established could, however, be utilized for appealing to the positive identity toward 
people outside the Forum and/or the Company. As such, the participants’ 
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understandings of reality in terms of substance and context appear to be related to each 
other and it is difficult to separate them. These two distinct kinds of understandings nest 
and are nested by each other. The analyses that follow exemplify such ways in which 
the triad of mimetic processes nest and are nested by one another in observable norms. 
By so doing, they aim to show (1) how each actor is practicing ethics by mediating 
substantive coherence and contextual appropriateness and, (2) how analysts can read 
processes by which certain norms are emerging by understanding that the utterances 
they observe are dispositions acted out by their research subjects along the triad of 
mimetic processes. What is to be noted is that the triad of mimetic processes, 
metaphorically denoted as ‘intention for happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’, helps analysts 
supplement information that is not present by that which is presented to them.  
The presentation begins with the participants’ emotional states, especially excitement in 
terms of both delight and resentment, as one of the patterned dispositions, which the 
participants thought similar to others’ experiences and thus somehow generalizable. The 
participants’ emotional states were chosen for analysis because sensemaking is 
supposed to be motivated by emotions as well as by rational goal-seeking motivations 
(Fineman 1996, Hatch 1997, Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005). It is also assumed 
that the emotional aspects found in the participants’ disposition tell us more vividly 
about the participants’ desire to manage their anxieties arising from the bankruptcy and 
the subsequent reorganization. In other words, showing particular emotional 
dispositions involves the participants’ evaluative preferences and normative 
appropriateness. Specifically, in the Forum, excitement in terms of delight appeared to 
overweigh that in terms of resentment. 
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For instance, by remembering past memories with the Company, contrasting them with 
the ongoing hardships, the participants appeared somewhat joyful and became even 
positive as shown in the conversation in the table below. They appeared somewhat 
cheerful about past memories in which they had to engage in absurdly overwhelming 
workloads chiefly attributable to the technologies available then that are, no doubt, 
outdated in the present context. Following the first poster who remembered that ‘We 
had to price all ad items’ without ‘use[ing] UPC
1
 codes’, the next one said that ‘yeah 
we USED to have FUN!’, and the third one even went on to state that ‘It was a good 
time, the store was well run, I'm glad I worked there It was good training’. 
Table 5.1 Appreciation of the past experiences 
Oh my gosh! Forgot about pin ticketing! […] How they used to build up on that pin 
ticket! We had to price all ad items. Imagine doing that now! There have been a lot of 
improvements over the years. We didn't even use UPC codes! (14/2/2002 at 03:20PM by 
buick15) 
I remember those things, […] yeah we USED to have FUN! (14/2/2002 at 
03:22PM by km21881) 
It was a good time, the store was well run, I'm glad I worked there It was good 
training. (14/2/2002 at 04:48PM by belaire17) 
In expressing their happiness by remembering the past, some effects on a more 
substantive aspect, such as their positive identity, also appear to be involved. The 
messages above indicate that the posters appreciate their experiences as frontline retail 
                                                 
1
 Universal Product Code 
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workers with the Company, as implied especially in the third one. Also the third 
comment appears to show the poster’s emotional attachment to and appreciation for the 
Company’s ways of management in the past that he believed made competent retail 
workers as implied in the last sentence: ‘It was good training’. Hence, in addition to 
somehow venting frustration by talking about something cheerful, all of the posters 
appeared to assume that they shared memories and the present frustration with one 
another. The example above thus connotes the posters’ evaluative appropriateness based 
on the substantive understandings about their respective past experiences as well as 
denoting their emotional states positively. 
As such, the evaluative preferences or normative appropriateness with regard to the 
presentation of their emotional states appeared to influence the participants’ rational 
judgments on substantive issues. Specifically, excitement in either positive or negative 
terms carry the participants’ respectively established assumptions about both 
substantive and contextual understandings; when such assumptions were considered to 
be corroborated through activities in the Forum, such as reading others’ messages or 
receiving responses more or less directly addressed to one’s preceding messages, further 
excitement in positive terms was presented. In this way, emotional dispositions and 
rational judgments in tandem constituted a particular normative appropriateness in the 
Forum. 
The interrelation between the substantive and the contextual understandings in respect 
of the establishment of particular norms is important because it represents actors’ 
competences in making sense of reality not only by establishing the substantive and the 
contextual understandings of reality but also by taking into consideration normative 
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appropriateness. The significance of the normative consideration becomes more explicit 
when they presented their resentment, thus negative emotional dispositions. 
Table 5.2 Examples of emotional dispositions 
Our customers will never understand the obstacles that we have faced over the years as 
we tried to deliver the best possible shopping experience to them without the proper 
tools, […]. It is our senior management's responsibility to address the needs of our 
stores and how we can best serve our customers. […] we MUST stop treating our 
associates as an expense and realize that they are an ASSET. […] I apologize for my 
sarcasm, it is how I translate my passion for this company and the anger that I feel as I 
watch our executives destroy us from within. […] 
10/3/2002, at 10:03PM, by wuzsickoXXXXX2002 
Three Cheers! 
Right On! You have said it all. 
10/03/02, at 10:26PM, by inforapenny1 
Thank you, wuz. You hit the nail right on the head. 
[…] Thanks. 
10/3/2002, at 10:18PM, by crazyXX2001 
So please I ask of you (a poster who seemed to be a customer pointing out some 
problems in his shopping experiences at one of the stores of the Company) to think of 
all the reasons that something might not being done and not always assume that we are 
lazy and careless and don't want to do things the correct way. 
10/3/2002, at 03:39PM, by purple_unicorn_4 
I agree totally. […] We can't run on smiles and sorry's for long! 
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11/3/2002, at 00:23AM, by tiletessie 
The examples of emotional dispositions shown in Table 5.2 illustrate more explicitly 
than the previous examples that these posters are carrying substantive assumptions 
about experiences sharable with each other, even in the short affirmative rejoinders. 
Those rejoinders showed that the posters happened to come across messages that they 
believed confirmed in the affirmative their assumptions about the negative experiences 
with customers that they thought was caused by the ways by which the Company was 
managed. As for the first quasi-conversation, the initial post elaborated the situation 
where ‘associates [were treated] as an expense’ while they ‘tried to deliver the best 
possible shopping experience to them (customers) without the proper tools’. This 
poster’s ‘passion for this company and the anger that I feel as I watch our executives 
destroy us from within’ appeared to corroborate the subsequent posters’ emotional states 
as well as their substantive understandings about the ways in which the Company had 
been managed in the recent past. 
As for the second quasi-conversation, the second poster’s rejoinder to the initial poster’s 
plea for ‘not always assum[ing] that we are lazy and careless and don't want to do 
things the correct way’ indicates that they shared the sentiments that customers or the 
general public might project negative images toward them and/or the Company without 
knowing ‘all the reasons that something might not being done’ nor the employees’ 
‘run[ning] on smiles’ to deliver appropriate customer service. These posters thus 
mutually enabled each other to denote the negative emotional states grounded in their 
substantive understandings that store-level employees committed themselves to 
delivering best customer services. As such, substantive assumptions held by the posters, 
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which are in principle outcomes of mutually independent actors’ attempts at making 
sense of reality, were confirmed mutually and such confirmation, at the same time, even 
allowed them to present negative emotional dispositions.  
As observed in the two quasi-conversations, their assumptions about ethical judgments 
are again nesting and nested by one another. Specifically, since the posters were 
unlikely to doubt if their affirmation of others’ reality might be wrongly assumed, or in 
some cases, they might understand that they were rendering each other psychological 
support, their beliefs that they must be doing something good to each other appeared to 
be reinforcing. As such, the posters’ substantive and contextual understandings are 
interrelated to each other, with particular normative appropriateness established in ways 
that each reinforced the other’s sense of evaluative appropriateness in terms of the 
substantive understandings (similar thus generalizable experiences and the ways of 
making sense of substantive aspects of reality) and the contextual relevancy represented 
by their showing considerateness to each other. 
Notwithstanding the examples in which the participants’ beliefs in normative 
appropriateness appeared to be reinforcing by means of the mutually confirmed 
substantive understandings of reality, with regard to the relationships with customers or 
the general public, the participants’ considerations for expressing emotional states 
appeared intricate. In the Forum, a variety of episodes with customers in which the 
posters seemed to be frustrated chiefly by the customers’ insensitive behaviors was 
presented, such as coughing in the cashier’s face, their ways of handing money at the 
check-out register, requests for re-counting after the completion of check-out, messing 
up shopping bags instead of having them packed by the cashier, and so on. While 
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sometimes showing resentment directly about such experiences with customers as 
presented in the previous examples, the participants in the Forum also occasionally 
made fun of these behaviors by customers rather satirically. It seems that the customer 
relations are filled with tensions possibly caused by the closeness of retail workers to 
their customers. Jobs in retailing, at least at its front stage, are visible to customers 
because going shopping is almost an essential part of everyone’s daily life. Hence, the 
participants as retail workers appeared sensible about their customers as people who 
could relatively easily make assumptions about retail workers (as was shown in the 
examples above) as well as being the primary source of income for the industry. Hence, 
one of the participants said that: 
‘My pet peeve is the inability to provide the personal attention every customer 
wants, expects, needs and deserves when they walk through the doors of our store’ 
(7/2/2002 at 04:28AM by yardngardn), and, another stated that: 
‘We have to take a lot from the customers on a daily basis, for things that we can't 
control. We are the ones who have to deal with that angry customer on a daily 
basis. […] We have had to fight stereotypes of retail employees for a long time. 
[The Company]'s image is not real positive right now, and we as employees don't 
want to be associated with low lifes who just want to cause trouble’ (8/2/2002 by 
XX4361nj). 
As such, the participants who were confronted by anxiety and uncertainty methodically 
attempted to strike the balance between generalizable substantive understandings of 
their day-to-day experiences and appropriate ways of denoting their reality by paying 
attention even to those who might not share their sentiments, experiences and, in 
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general, reality of the Company, such as customers and the general public. It is apparent 
that the existence of interlocutors that the participants assumed could share each other’s 
experiences made it easier for them to manage to denote reality and post messages to 
the Forum. Nonetheless, what is more important is the ways in which the participants 
paid attention to both the substantive and the contextual issues by reading others’ 
messages. In other words, they never uncritically intended to expand their interpretation 
of reality only based on their individually established assumptions about the 
substitutability of each other’s similar experiences but often each voluntarily constricted 
their interpretation, which were disposed to be expanding, by reference to what other 
participants said. Their assumptions were checked intersubjectively, meaning that they 
each were practicing ethics. 
The next example shows that the participants became concerned about possible 
disruptions to their communications because of the inevitably negative influences of 
presenting their non-positive experiences. In the Forum, negative messages were not 
rejected simply because of the negativity but generally accepted as a measure through 
which to vent their frustrations. However, the participants occasionally became aware 
that exchanges of negative messages could potentially turn out to be ‘insults and petty 
vituperations’ (5/2/2002 by Englishteacher33). In other words, the participants each 
managed to understand reality in ways that were preferable to them and that insured 
appropriateness of their ways of presenting experiences that they believed were true, 
chiefly by reading others’ messages. To confirm such diegetic ways of establishing 
particular norms as well as making sense of substantive aspects of reality, a thread of 
messages will be presented below. 
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Table 5.3 Ethics being practiced 
From: thill68 
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2002 15:05:40 
Subject: HR 
I am going to vent a little here. 
I don't get what the animosity is about toward the HR in the stores. Everyone keeps 
saying that the HR managers do not get "down and dirty" with associates on the floor. 
[…] I know that I was hired for my HR education and experience. To be perfectly 
honest, my retail experience is limited. […] I don't see HR professionals or office 
workers going out on the factory floors. I don't see how this is any different. 
 From: moviestuff69 
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 15:18:16 
Our HR does work at the service desk, checkout and layaway, but she bitches 
about it all the time. We were told that with the "layoffs" everyone would have to 
pitch in and help. She had no HR experience or training when she took the 
position. She was hired from within. […] I believe that a very important 
prerequisite for the Human Resources position is to be "human". […]  
I don't know any of you here on this board, so I wouldn't want anyone to take this 
personally, as I am glad to FINALLY have an outlet for some of my frustrations, 
[…] I'm a little tired of people thinking an office position is any better than any 
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other position. We are told daily that […] we work for [the Company]. There is 
no I in teamwork! WHEW! Sorry for that outburst, I feel a little better now. 
  From: cust_rulz 
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 15:56:51 
No one is saying the[y’re] any better than anyone. Just stating that there is 
a lot that goes on behind the scenes. […] That’s […] because it's a lot of 
confidential things they don't want everybody involved in. 
  From: elwhoppo99 
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 16:15:50 
Unfortunately, the statement about not working for one department is sort'a 
true, […]. I hear your frustrations though and that’s a major part of what’s 
wrong with the way [the Company] have been run in the past. 1 person 
doing the work of 2 or 3, for 1 person’s wage. […] Bare Bones Staffing! 
Whatever the ramifications are for the current situation, it is still somewhat 
confined to those above store […]. If [the Company] is to recover, the 
"Employee Relations" issues must be addressed. […] it is worth hanging in 
there to see if any of it is going to be Employee Oriented. […]. I loved my 
job at [the Company], […] (Happy Employee = Happy Customer). That is 
and should be the (New) "Bottom Line"!! 
   From: inquizitiv2002 
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2002 19:07:10 
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Outbursts happen...better here than at work. It's easy to make assumptions 
about each other since we do know one another. But it would be unwise for 
anyone to assume that because we complain on the board, we do nothing 
but complain at work. On the contrary, sometimes after spending the day 
doing precisely what we are all encouraging each other to do - sometimes 
in the face of incredible negativity, hostility or seemingly insurmountable 
demands - we need to be able to relax our smile-stiffened faces, exhale and 
get it out of our systems. That is sometimes what enables us to stay strong 
for others being weak when we're alone. Point in case-I had a wee bit of a 
rough day myself today. Can you tell? My turn to say I'm sorry. 
  From: inforapenny1 
Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2002 12:56:33 
We have had some excellent HR people in the past though that worked 
everywhere within the store as well as doing their own job and doing it 
well! 
I like that...There is no I in teamwork. :) 
  From: jarmccoy1970 
Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2002 12:46:09  
I agree. […] I am in management but let me just say, if a team is behind, I 
grab a stack and pitch in. It does me no good to know people are behind (If 
they are). It does me good to know I helped where I could and everybody 
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The thread starts with a complaint from the point of view of Human Relations’ (HR) 
position regarding criticisms of HR or other office positions that are frequently posted 
to the Forum. Despite the varying concerns and interests among these posters, one of 
the themes running through this thread is that there should be ethical behavior reaching 
out, supporting others, regardless of formally assigned obligations.  
In addition to this central ethical theme, what deserves attention is their considerateness 
for the possible influences of their words on others in the Forum. As a matter of normal 
practices in communication, it can be said that each one of these posters were fulfilling, 
either consciously or only practically consciously, requirements and obligations to 
define and actualize their interactions with others in order to conclude them 
satisfactorily, just as conversation analysts would explain. Besides such fulfillment of 
communicative obligations, in part due to the nature of the theme running through this 
thread, they demonstrated additional sensibility to the influences of their words on 
others by reference to more substantive issues in their respective ways. The third one 
attributed the general indifference of employees at the office positions to ‘a lot of 
confidential things they don't want everybody involved in’ especially before announcing 
the company-wide reorganization, the fourth one related it to ‘[the lack of] employee 
oriented’ HR policies. The sixth one appeared to be trying to moderate negative 
comments on HR and/or office people by saying that they used to have ‘some excellent 
HR people in the past’, and the last one presented his personal value as one who was ‘in 
management’ that would not allow him ‘[not] to [extend assistance while] know[ing] 
people are behind [the schedule of their duties]’. 




The second post demonstrates that the poster paid attention carefully to the possible 
negative impacts that his words would bring about because he knew he was venting 
frustration and his words were specifically addressed to a certain category of people 
(HR and/or office positions). On the one hand, the poster expressed his gratitude for the 
Forum for it giving him a place to vent his frustration. In his words, ‘I am glad to 
FINALLY have an outlet for some of my frustrations’. This means that for him the 
Forum was the place where he could speak out what he thought he could not say in 
other places. On the other hand, he did not appear to believe that even in the Forum 
expressing his personal negative feelings was anything permissible without paying 
attention to the influences of his words on others as indicated in his excuses (‘Sorry for 
that outburst, I feel a little better now’). He also stated that ‘I don't know any of you 
here on this board, so I wouldn't want anyone to take this (his complaint about the 
attitudes of those who held office positions) personally’. The post appears to indicate 
that (1) the poster considered that the Forum was beneficial for it allowed him to be 
more honest in his emotional outbursts, especially negative ones; thus, (2) he 
understood that the Forum would have to be managed carefully for it to be sustained. 
In turn, the fifth poster (inquizitiv2002) talked almost exclusively about attitudes or 
norms to be subscribed to if they wanted to vent frustrations in the Forum. Starting with 
her acceptance for the second poster’s excuse for venting frustration (‘Outbursts 
happen...better here than at work’), the post posited in what ways she considered the 
participants were supposed to talk in the Forum. Noteworthy in this post is the co-
existence of assumptions regarding both interactional obligations and the substantive 
issues concerning real world experiences.  
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The former concerns how the participants in the Forum mostly inadvertently made 
assumptions about their interlocutors. Since the majority of the participants were from 
the same company and experiencing more or less similar situations at their respective 
workplaces, it is possible for them to believe that they could relatively easily establish 
shared understandings through the communications in the Forum despite the fact that 
they did not know each other face-to-face. This non-conscious practice of assuming that 
others should be someone they mutually knew was considered to enhance their 
discursive interactions since they did not have to worry about possible 
misinterpretations about each other’s utterances.  
In the case of this example, the poster appeared to have become aware of the risk 
entailed in the assumption-laden communications, most likely reminded by the second 
poster’s ways of discursively defining his words and possible influences for other 
participants. Specifically, her caution, ‘to make assumptions about each other’, appears 
to indicate that communications, especially in such anonymous (or pseudonymous) 
contexts as the Forum, inevitably require carefulness about each participant’s 
imagination, ways of reasoning, analogy, and so forth, for them to be concluded without 
unnecessary conflicts. In other words, she seemed to have understood that the relatively 
similar experiences or other background factors supposedly shared among the 
participants in the Forum would not automatically translate into mutual understandings. 
Rather, too much reliance on such assumptions that were made less carefully might 
invite conflicts; thus, making the Forum an unattractive place. The manner in which she 
justified on what grounds the participants, including herself, were supposed to be 
allowed to express their negative emotional outbursts seems to reflect her carefulness in 
this respect.  
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Despite such carefulness with regard to assumptions, it is more interesting to see that 
she herself left some assumptions unchecked about some substantive issues, such as the 
‘negativity’ or ‘hostility’ she perceived directed at her and her colleagues from 
customers or the general public; what the participants were really doing in the Forum 
(‘encouraging each other’); acceptance of her ideas that venting frustrations were 
supposed to be allowed if not too negative; having a place and people where and by 
whom such outpourings could be heard was supposed to ‘enable[s] us to stay strong’. 
In other words, the poster managed to issue the message without having confirmed 
whether or not other participants, customers or the general public, could validate these 
substantive assumptions. 
As we have already seen, the other posters appearing in this thread demonstrated 
varying interests in the substantive issues (the value of working beyond the formal 
boundaries of assignments and HR and/or office staffs’ indifference). Despite such 
variance, the substantive understandings appeared to be treated as being substitutable 
with each other less critically or left undebated so that these could be sequenced into 
stories in accordance with the posters’ respective sense of contextual relevancy. Thus, 
as the fifth post aptly represents, the example thread as a whole indicates that the posters 
rather independently made assumptions about both the substantive and the contextual 
relevance in ways that appropriate rather arbitrarily what others said. Hence, in this 
example, it seems that the posters’ attention to contextual relevance with regard to the 
ways of communicating with each other in the Forum was relatively smoothly 
materialized by dealing with stories or snippets of stories (others’ messages) 
interchangeably between substantive elements constituting stories and the context-
defining devices. As a result, those messages that denoted reality independently appear 
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to have culminated in particular collective norms in the Forum. In other words, it 
appeared as if they could establish norm and subscribe to them collectively by 
independently reading others’ denotation as being appropriate in terms of both 
substantive and contextual understandings.  
Indeed, the diegetic relationship between posting and reading cannot be overemphasized. 
As we have seen, the posters demonstrated their ethical concerns as well as substantive 
and contextual relevancy. The co-existence of multiple dimensions of one’s sense of 
evaluative appropriateness and the flexibly interchangeable treatments of others’ words 
as substances and as a context-defining device seem to indicate that the poster’s 
intentions for ethical conduct should be nothing like a synchronic application of 
particular criteria of ethicality to the two different kinds of understandings between 
substances and contexts. Rather, it is speculated that the posters each assumed a kind of 
unity read into others’ messages. Such an assumption about the existence of certain 
unity remains unchecked unless they become aware of some implications for material 
reality alerted by their respective sense, which is unlikely to be predictable in any 
systematic way. For instance, although the fifth poster became aware of some of the 
assumptions that she and the other participants made, other assumptions remained 
unchecked. Despite the incompleteness with regard to her ethical considerations, 
especially in relation to customers and the general public, she managed to post the 
message. Thus, the poster’s awareness of some assumptions observed in her message 
cannot explain why she proceeded to act (post messages), attributing it to her ethical 
considerations. Even if she was understood to intend to maintain the Forum as a kind of 
‘discursive refuge’, the message cannot be seen as a representational device with which 
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to put her reality into words. One’s reality may or may not be read by others in ways 
that one wishes. 
The messages are actually not representation of the participants’ reality even if it must 
have motivated them to post messages. No one can be sure whether a post was 
motivated by compassion for fellow associates, or by one who wished to mark 
awareness of the present by the act of issuing messages for existential reasons (see 
‘antenarrative’ in Chapter 4). It is speculated that the posters managed to post messages 
as far as they could establish hypothetical inference about one’s reality by reference to 
others’ messages. In so doing, one attempts to apprehend substantive aspects of reality, 
such as utterers’ states of mind, identity, competencies and purposes, and to obtain 
contextual information, such as where and to whom they are going to talk, and other 
possible audiences. By mediating these in reference to one’s own sense of 
appropriateness, one will be able to establish some story-like wholes. Even if only 
hypothetical, as far as such wholes appear to be meaningful to the extent that they form 
a unity adequately, one can any time act out one’s hypotheses.  
Considering the unpredictability of when and why one proceeds to act and the 
significance of the hypothetical unity, it is speculated that the substantive 
understandings (things or quasi-things) matter. Substantive understandings provide 
actors with substantive resources without which one cannot author a story. These 
understandings are rather arbitrarily appropriated, as observed in the examples above. 
Moreover, one tends to ascribe one’s faithfulness to one’s substantive understandings. 
Although such faithfulness is less obvious in the examples above, the participants who 
were observed to be establishing their positive identity demonstrated more vividly how 
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the participants’ sense of evaluative appropriateness projected their substantive 
understandings as significant in establishing the hypothetical unity, as below. 
As already presented in the previous chapter, the participants in the Forum identified 
themselves as competent retail workers through participation in the Forum. For instance, 
some participants stated that they ‘[…] kn[e]w first hand what many of the problems 
are’ (8/2/2002 by XX4361nj). Others did so by contrasting their commitment to and 
knowledgeability of retailing with management’s indifference as below.  
We're merchants. We sell stuff. Sales are what produce the profits, not some 
"slash and burn" executive. It's really very simple....put stuff on the shelves, 
have enough employees to keep it stocked, face it, find it, and ring it up. Keep 
the aisles uncluttered, the floor swept, and all the lights burning to create a 
pleasant appearance and the people will come, buy, and make everybody happy. 
Those of us in the stores understand all this. The folks in [the HQ] do not and 
that's why we're in the fix we're in. […] (17/2/2002 at 05:46AM by ecc1521) 
I loved my job at [the Company], it didn't pay worth a crap, but my areas of 
responsibility were always in the best of condition, (A personal goal). […] But, 
the "Koonta Kinta" Management techniques, made it just about the most 
demoralizing job I have ever had in my life. (24/1/2002 at 00:15AM by 
elwhoppo99) 
Both of these excerpts exemplify the gap between what the participants as committed 
and competent retail workers believed they ought to do for the Company’s benefits and 
what the Company’s management had been doing. More specifically, these posts 
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illustrate that the denoted substantive understandings of the posters, together with their 
sense of moral correctness, distanced the posters from the Company’s failure. The first 
poster’s substantive understandings appear, even to those who are not very familiar with 
retailing, difficult to be denied, such as ‘Sales are what produce the profits’ and ‘to 
create a pleasant appearance and the people will come, buy, and make everybody 
happy’. The second one expressed clearly his sense of moral correctness by stating that 
‘I loved my job at [the Company], it didn't pay worth a crap, but my areas of 
responsibility were always in the best of condition’. By so doing, these appear to have 
succeeded in justifying themselves not only toward management but also toward those 
outside the Company, such as customers or the general public.  
What is to be noted is the entwinement of the multiple different meanings that are 
required for the posters’ establishing their positive identity: substantive, contextual and 
moral appropriateness. When applying the metaphor consisting of ‘intention for 
happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’, their desire for the maximum extension of 
interpretation about reality surrounding the bankruptcy (‘intention for happiness’) was 
materialized by denoting substantive aspects of reality (‘power’) in ways that were 
plausible not only to the fellow associates who were supposed to be sharing similar 
experiences and sentiments but also to customers and the general public (‘norm’). 
Among these different meanings entailed in the posters’ identity construction, 
substantive aspects of reality denoted in the messages deserve attention because they 
explain how power is exercised along the meaning-interpretation nexus. Even if the 
posters were powerless relative to management, they were involved in maintenance of 
such a power relation in the Company simply by denoting reality with words whose 
extensions could transcend the Forum. In other words, the triadic model comprised of 
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‘intention for happiness’, ‘power’ and ‘norm’ reveals that power is being exercised by 
everyone by denoting reality, typically the substantive aspects of it.  
As has been illustrated, the posters needed to obtain senses of appropriateness in both 
substantive and moral terms in order to identify them as competent and committed retail 
employees. To do so, the posters generalized their knowledgeability/competency as 
retail workers. While the second poster more explicitly appealed his fulfilling moral 
obligations in terms of both commitment to his vocation and loyalty to the Company, 
the generalized features of retailing in the first excerpt also indicates the poster’s pursuit 
of moral appropriateness. Generalized accounts are possible only by assuming that they 
are not only plausible but also acceptable, thus, pertinent to the moral concerns of 
generalized others. Taking into consideration the triadic processes of sensemaking in 
which one refers to both substantive and contextual aspects of reality and mediates these 
into certain meaningful wholes, any single word is supposed to be deployed by 
reference not only to definitive dictionary meanings but also to contextual and moral 
appropriateness. In other words, reality cannot be denoted in ways that are relevant to 
broader audiences without exercising ‘power’ while constricting it in one way or 
another. Thus, power can be defined as abstraction or generalization of reality; and 
configuration and re-figuration of power relations are understood to be practiced 
through and analyzed by the simple fact that reality has been denoted in certain ways. 
What is to be noted in such a way of understanding and analyzing power relations are 
the alternate and diegetic successions between reading and authoring as were explained 
in 5.2.2. Because of the processes of communication/interaction that are punctuated by 
turns, once denoted, words need to be understood to exert three different kinds of 
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agency: denoting/identifying, commanding others to read and offering spaces for 
mediation. In other words, the fact that one can generalize reality in particular ways 
does not mean that one can expect even those who see such denotation to be relevant to 
the extent that they share understandings of the denoted reality only because of its 
generality. This subtle difference over meanings of the same words is critical to 
understand how the powerful and the powerless are being defined along the meaning-
interpretation nexus. 
As has just been stated, everyone exerts power simply by denoting reality in certain 
ways. Hence, power in itself has no such force or direction (vector) as physics defines. 
Rather, power is about one’s abilities to denote reality in particular ways, typically 
generalizing substantive aspects of reality. Power relations are defined and redefined 
through the alternate and diegetic successions between presenting and interpreting 
reality in the form of actions/denotations of reality. The negotiations over 
meanings/interpretation of particular actions/denotations of reality proceed 
asymmetrically. Thus, the fact that an actor manages to denote reality by generalizing 
some aspects of it with a certain word allows many others to construct and reconstruct 
their realities. In other words, a certain term that is of a broader extension provides 
concerned actors with a kind of open space in which they each construct respective 
realities. In practical organization settings, actors with variable endowments are 
interacting with each other in hierarchically stratified structures in which material and 
institutional resources are unevenly distributed. The open space provided by certain 
general terms tends to reflect different actors’ different endowments and extant 
institutions/structures; thus, ‘power’ exercised by the less powerful has only limited 
effects on a variety of inherent imbalances. Because of the limited effects on the 
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inherent power imbalances, it is important to imagine different actors’ different interests 
and concerns behind certain generalized reality, rather than to be merely satisfied with 
apprehending certain socially meaningful constructs, such as the participants’ positive 
identity, nor to expect them to redefine extant power relations in any radical way.  
Imagining the existence of different actors’ different interests and concerns behind 
reality generalized in particular ways is important because generalized reality allows 
people with variable endowments, typically those better endowed, to read their 
respective interests and concerns into it by taking advantage of the broader extension of 
the denotation. As such, innate imbalances between actors persist rather than being 
negotiated in ways that reduce gaps between the powerful and the powerless. This is so 
because people generally prefer tidy and organized reality to divergent and 
unpredictable ones. What happens is that as actors interact with each other, despite the 
variably endowed resources and competencies among actors, everyone appears to be 
orientated towards reducing the varieties of words and ways of presenting them, as the 
posters of the excerpts managed to establish their positive identity together with moral 
appropriateness that could appeal even to the general public. Despite the seemingly 
positive effects of their making sense of the difficult situations, they reflexively 
segmented the extant power relations because of the generalized competencies and 
moral appropriateness they denoted. More seriously, the posters who were considered to 
be vulnerable to the bankruptcy and the subsequent reorganization appeared to be 
ignorant of their possibly having generalized realities of even more vulnerable others.  
Although such inadvertent ignorance of the existence of more vulnerable others than the 
posters is nothing to be blamed for, it is important to acknowledge that words which are 
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of broader extensions not only allow the more powerful to take advantage of them but 
also exclude those who cannot manage to read their reality into even such general terms. 
The power of words is, thus, significant not because they enable emancipation through 
negotiations but because words create a kind of open space in which one can pursue 
one’s evaluative/moral appropriateness by reading one’s reality, both the substantive 
aspects and contexts, into them. As the innate imbalances are hardly easily changeable 
and people generally pursue coherent and consistent reality along the rational scientific 
logic, including the unwavering moralistic model of ethics, even fairer, if not purely 
equal, society cannot materialize only by pointing out the excluding nature of the 
substitutive or rational scientific logic. Rather, it is important to know better how we 
can utilize the open spaces that words create. 
In reading each one’s reality into certain words, one is making judgments on one’s 
evaluative/moral appropriateness. In so doing, one’s self-identity is being constructed. 
More critical, however, is that making evaluative/moral judgments is the only 
opportunity to confront difficult or rather insolvable questions, such as in what society 
one is willing to live, what types of person one wishes to become, and what happiness is 
to whom. Pondering about such heavily philosophical questions is practically unfeasible 
even for those better endowed. Thus, ethics as practice should be understood as 
enabling others to project their experiences onto the open spaces created by words, 
rather than critical reflection on one’s deeds, thoughts or feelings. 
Remember that the ethics underlying our mundane interactions with others are being 
practiced asymmetrically: any action is subject to others’ reading in their own ways, 
chiefly mediated by words. However, since ordinary human imaginative capacities are 
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usually guided by their innate orientation towards being good, rather than bad, they do 
not stop pursuing being good by rationally imagining the symmetrical reciprocation 
between one and others. The faculty of reasoning is thus predisposed to expand virtually 
infinitely, which is nothing to be constricted. What is important is, rather, to subscribe 
more strictly to ethics as practice or the ethics that keeps conversations going through 
the asymmetrical successions between acting/authoring and observing/reading.  
Since interactions/communications between two or more actors proceed in an alternate 
and diegetic manner between reading and authoring, and whether or not an actor 
proceeds to the act of uttering/authoring cannot be predicted, what is accounted for is 
readers’ imaginative reconstruction of reality; even more importantly, how such 
imaginative interpretation of reality of others can be legitimated, if not validated, needs 
to be examined. Over-purifying with the faculty of reasoning is not a good strategy not 
only because denotations of reality become less and less grounded in material reality but 
also because our ways of denoting reality become less and less diverse in terms of both 
contents and styles. The diversity of possible alternative ways of denoting reality is 
considered to be better not only because innovative/creative inventions with regard to 
establishment of particular rules and principles along which to manage complex social 
reality can be expected but also because one’s experiences of power that are fated to be 
diluted through the dominant rational scientific discourse will be enriched with the 
diversified ways of denoting reality, even if extant power relations might not radically 
be redefined.  
To maintain and hopefully increase the diversity of possible alternative ways of 
denoting reality, concrete procedures along which to read actions/denotation of reality 
194 
 
need to be exemplified. The next section presents an episode derived from the Forum as 
follows: (1) To illustrate the episode, concerning a failed attempt to develop a database 
that was meant to solve a variety of store-level problems, in ways that elucidate 
meaningfulness of the episode from the point of view of a researcher (me), that is, the 
triadic manner of entwinement of different evaluative/moral concerns that accompany 
the concerns with substantive and contextual relevancies; and (2) To demonstrate that 
the triad of mimetic processes is common logic that underlies mundane discursive 
practices, thus, is shared between different actors. It will do so by elaborating the 
entwinement of those different evaluative/moral concerns and the concerns with 
substantive and contextual aspects of reality by applying the framework of the alternate 
and diegetic successions between reading and authoring (Figure 5.2), in which each 
actor’s ‘intention for happiness’ is pursued by means of ‘power’ and ‘norm’. The 
analysis exemplifies the necessities and expected effects of encouraging analysts to 
create, by their imagination, as diverse alternative plots as possible. It also shows an 
alternative way of understanding the legitimacy of such seemingly groundless and 
arbitrary imagination of external observers as mediators of the irremediable power 
imbalances.  
5.3.2 Another patterned disposition: Struggles with difficult moral choices 
In the Forum, there is an episode that demonstrates that the participants attempted to 
make use of the Forum to solve practical problems they were encountering in their 
workplaces. In other words, the active participants in this episode intended, at least 
when they took part in it, to define the Forum as a place where their communications 
should be re-defining their day-to-day material settings in ways that would bring about 
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improvement to their day-to-day operations. Therefore, this episode offers an example 
about how the participants managed the different contexts between the Forum and their 
real world workplaces, and how the messages posted on the Forum reflected their ways 
of managing reality across these different contexts. 
The episode started with a proposal to establish a database that should be able to feature, 
as easily as possible, problems to be addressed for improvement of the performance of 
the Company and employees’ suggestions to solve such problems. The idea was, 
according to the proponent, ‘to generate a list of ideas sorted by how good people think 
they [the listed ideas] are. Hopefully, this list would be useful to management’. The idea 
was welcomed by another participant (bcrose1) who worked at the headquarters of the 
Company stating that ‘I love the database! It saves me a lot of time especially by 
prioritizing the issues. […] I’ve been promoting a system that takes in problems such as 
the ones in the database, assigns them to the proper corporate entities, then tracks and 
reports the progress of each issue until resolved’. This indicates that the poster 
(bcrose1) was actually making efforts at his workplace (a department at the 
headquarters in charge of training, according to him) to introduce and establish a new 
system that ‘can solve store problems faster and more effectively than ever before’.  
Notwithstanding, after a few posts trying to solve one of the prevailing problems at the 
store level, that is, inventory imbalances, between posters from different stores, the 
proponent of the database later evaluated that the project ‘hasn’t been very successful’. 
He appeared realistic enough to admit that ‘the idea of individual […] stores listing 
what they have in excess and what they need and then trading between themselves to 
correct the inventory imbalances is too ambitious’. This indicates that despite the good 
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idea, it turned out that the project required a good deal of work outside the Forum. To 
actualize the expected outcomes, the proponent of the project needed to provide rather 
detailed specifics, such as, how to input data, expected qualities of data (e.g., efficiency, 
feasibility), how to deal with user IDs, and different capacities to edit/modify data. Such 
specifications necessarily conveyed information that commanded readers’ 
understandings in a way that should make them follow his messages, as if an instruction 
manual. In other words, the proponent’s messages regarding the project were likely to 
be read as intending to command others’ actions at their respective workplaces, which 
require re-figurations, if marginal, of their material settings. As the actions that bcrose1 
undertook at his workplace illustrate, responding to messages that can be understood to 
be commanding re-figuration of readers’ respective material settings is almost the same 
as committing to actual actions which not all of the participants who might see the idea 
of the database favorably could or ought to undertake at their workplaces because of 
varying positions and locations among them.  
In fact, despite the fewer numbers of postings in regard to this project, it was later found 
that many participants appreciated the idea, such as, ‘how helpful it would be [for 
management] to actually listen to the store level employees’, ‘It does sound like a good 
idea to open up respectful communication between the stores and [the headquarters]’, 
and ‘I know for a fact that you (bcrose1) have done so much for the associates and I’m 
sure it is appreciated, even for all that you have done that they [management] are not 
aware of.’ Ironically though, these appreciations for bcrose1’s efforts to translate the 
proposed database into a formalized system which was aimed to facilitate 
communications between stores and the headquarters regarding the store-level problems 
were expressed when he reported to the Forum his demotion and going out of the 
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Company after ‘new organization was announced’ at his department. Hence, these 
appreciations were expressed primarily to encourage him since he was planning to leave 
the Company, seeking a better position outside the Company. What is important, 
however, is not the irony the episode presented but the ways in which facts, events, and 
the participants’ subjective experiences were provided sequential order by their 
messages, to the point at which the participants and external observers alike are likely to 
find the story ironic.  
Regardless of the ambiguity concerning why many of them did not directly take part in 
the proposed database, what is evident is that they did not post messages in this regard 
until they heard of bcrose1’s demotion. According to other messages posted to the 
Forum, problems they were facing seemed to be commonly shared (e.g., understaffing, 
imbalances in inventory, meaninglessly frequent price changes and inspections, 
unreliable contractors appointed by the headquarters, etc.). They also appeared to 
perceive invariably that the distance between stores and the headquarters had gone well 
beyond that which could be tolerated as a necessary evil for maintenance of mutual 
autonomy. Thus, the database aiming at solving those problems could hardly be 
irrelevant for the interests of the majority of the participants in the Forum.  
This episode, therefore, demonstrates the intricacy of the processes by which the 
participants in the Forum assessed relevance of what they encountered. Specifically, it 
proves that the goal relevancy of the five criteria for relevance in Weick’s (1987) model 
(see Chapter 2) is not sufficient to determine subsequent alternative actions. Even just 
making simple rejoinders, if they were meant to reply to messages that the participants 
understood, asked for readers’ re-figuration of their material settings, or simply for 
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actual actions in their material settings, they needed to assess operational relevancy of 
the database. As was explained earlier, the operational relevancy concerns contexts, 
such as particular institutional settings, roles and capacities of concerned actors. Hence, 
the participants were supposed to have attempted to understand the contexts in which 
they were situated. Moreover, even if one could make sense of the idea and objectives 
of the database in reference to problems s/he had been encountering, thus, could manage 
to transcribe her/his experiences into what s/he read, expressing how s/he understood 
about the project is another story. Imagine that if you were the proponent of the 
database and found a message appreciating your project but no indication regarding how 
the respondents would contribute, such as disseminating the project, or providing the 
database with relevant data. Such messages would make little sense to you.  
In other words, the assessment of relevancy in terms of both substance (goal) and 
context is observed in the ways by which messages were posted as well as in messages 
in themselves. The fact that only few messages were posted demonstrated that the 
participants collectively assessed the proposed project as being less feasible. Also, 
judging from the many messages that appreciated the attempts at developing the 
database, the project can be understood by the participants to be of goal relevance. 
Moreover, it can further be inferred by focusing on the participants’ sense of evaluative 
and normative appropriateness that they should have managed these different 
relevancies in rather intricate ways. Specifically, the fact that the participants stayed 
away from directly intervening in the project of the database indicated the multiple 
dimensions of their sense of moral correctness: that in the Forum and that in their 
respective material real world. In the Forum, they showed considerateness to 
interlocutors in the Forum. Those who did not directly contribute to the proposed 
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project must have considered it to be inappropriate to post messages which did not 
respond in ways that the proponent wished. As for the context outside the Forum, 
judgments on the feasibility of the project by reference to respective workplaces appears 
to be supported by members’ faithfulness or commitment to the trade of retailing. Put 
differently, they did not allow themselves to talk about the problems that were actually 
of much relevance for them in ways that appeared unrealistic to them. 
These different normative considerations of the participants culminated in the patterned 
ways of posting messages, i.e., the fewer messages that directly contributed to the 
database project but expressed appreciation for it in response to bcrose1’s demotion, as 
well as the similar contents of their messages. More importantly, despite that those 
normative considerations appeared collective, they came about through each one’s 
diegetic enactments of the triad of mimetic processes. The triad of mimetic processes 
can account for the processes by which the proposed project failed to be materialized in 
ways that take into consideration each one’s senses of evaluative/moral appropriateness. 
The following analysis examines the responses to bcrose1’s message reporting his 
demotion by applying the alternate and diegetic manner of practicing ethics along the 
triad of mimetic processes. 
(1) But, back to bcrose. I was soooo thrilled to find out that someone from 
[the headquarters] was here [in the Forum] that was actually listening 
and trying to do something for the hourly employees. I was so excited. 
I couldn’t quit talking about it at work. Someone was actually listening 
to us. […], working outside the system to try to serve the customer. 
Here was a person who actually cared, who had an “in” in this system 
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that doesn’t work so well, and was using his power to try and change 
things. Boy was I excited. And then I heard you got demoted. My heart 
bled for you (22/2/2002 at 11:14AM by crazyXX2001); 
(2) I don’t know if they [the management of the Company] think we come 
here just to whine and complain about made up problems or what their 
[the management’s] problem is up there [at the headquarters], but the 
problems are real and you took the time to acknowledge that 
(22/2/2002 at 04:06AM by bluelightbluebelle); 
(3) Big change will get around to them [the management of the Company] 
maybe later than sooner but it will come. We are soo frustrated in the 
trenches with the way they chose to do things. UGH!! They would have 
to do a Miracle 180 degree change fast to save us (22/2/2002 at 
06:21PM by dopey1456560); 
(4) […] you have given us a voice to [the headquarters], even though they 
still choose not to listen even with the support from you. I think [the 
Company] is about to feel the pinch of losing many great associates 
who had many contributions to give. We do have to now focus on the 
associates who will remain and hope and pray they will be able to 
make a difference if someone up top will let them. (22/2/2002 at 
03:12AM by ewkt3) 
All of the excerpts shown above took bcrose1’s demotion to represent management’s 
negative attitude toward people who try to address fundamental problems and suggest 
solutions to such problems for making a successful turnaround from the bankruptcy. In 
these excerpts, management was established as villain who ‘still choose not to listen’ 
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and are ‘losing many great associates who had many contributions to give’. By so doing, 
problems they had been facing and the failure of the Company were categorized as 
management’s failure, and the participants were establishing their identities positively 
by dis-identifying themselves with management.  
At the same time, they appeared aware that by so doing, they might be seen ‘just to 
whine and complain about made up problems or what their [management’s] problem is 
up there [at the headquarters]’. Thus, they were concerned with how others outside the 
Forum or the Company might see them when their (mostly negative) experiences were 
expressed in the Forum. What is important here is that their primary interests were how 
they could express that ‘the problems are real’ (excerpt [2]). Although the reality in this 
context is no less subjective, it is not a complete fantasy. If we take it to be a fantasy, 
we had better refer to a more nuanced definition of it.  
According to Gabriel (1995), quoted in Brown and Humphreys (2006: 247), ‘fantasy 
can offer a third way to the individual, which amounts to neither conformity nor 
rebellion, but to a symbolic refashioning of official organizational practices in the 
interest of pleasure, allowing a temporary supremacy of emotion over rationality and of 
uncontrol over control’. As this definition of fantasy indicates, the implicit dichotomy is 
one in which ‘rationality’ and ‘control’ appear to be given a dominant status, so that 
even a fantasy retains, in a fairly intricate manner, linkages with the supposedly 
dominant version of reality.  
Worthwhile careful examination is thus the way in which the participants in the Forum 
constructed (and probably experienced) their version of intricate fantasy (‘intention for 
happiness’ by means of ‘power’ and ‘norm’) while retaining linkages with the dominant 
202 
 
discourses in particular ways. As the excerpts demonstrate, while the posters’ utterances 
appear to show ‘symbolic convergence’ (Bormann 1983 quoted in Brown and 
Humphreys 2006: 247) on management as villain, and on difficulties in taking actions 
to ‘make a differences’, none of them was directly communicated with one another, as 
was observed in Chapter 3. So, what do we, as external observers, see to be converging? 
Simply, our act of reading is connecting those materially discrete utterances. Hence, 
some may see them as disgruntled employees releasing tension by participating in the 
Forum and others may be willing to identify ‘real’ problems implicated in their 
utterances. Then, are mundane utterances irrelevant to analyses of reality construction 
because nothing is conclusive and anything goes? The answer is clearly no.  
The assumption that reality should exist as it is out there and such reality is supposed to 
be represented in utterances need to be obliterated. Rather, we had better assume that 
reality exists in a manner that is mediated symbolically; then, the symbolic convergence 
emerged as the posters pursued better ways of expressing that they had been suffering 
from ‘real’ problems in a manner that was refashioning the already mediated symbolic 
resources which could be appropriated from dominant discourses. In other words, while 
their ways of constructing reality may look like a fantasy to the extent that they can be 
likened to fictitious narrative, it is not because the substances of their messages were 
saturated with their subjective experiences, which were prone to be associated with 
imagination less grounded in objective and empirical facts but because the processes by 
which to come up with the utterances were identical to authoring and understanding 
either fictive or non-fictive narratives (the triad of mimetic processes), which always 
involves actors’ imagination. In short, when analyzing social reality through mundane 
utterances, what is to be noted is that regardless of variable perspectives, reality, 
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including acts of making sense of reality, interpreting and presenting one’s ideas, 
understandings, feelings and self, is managed by means of symbolically mediated media, 
that is, language. Put differently, ontological reality is managed through the acts of 
mediating (refashioning) it symbolically; thus, dispositions of the acts of symbolic 
mediation, i.e., the act of reading and uttering, should be seen to retain connections with 
ontological reality by means of language or other sign systems. 
Since symbolic mediation is supposed to proceed along the triad of mimetic processes, 
the important points are that: (1) the particular patterned dispositions (symbolic 
convergence) were symbolically mediated but the mediation was symbolic not because 
the participants self-interestedly pursued illusory emancipation to be fabricated by 
invoking discursive and interpretive freedom but because they each attempted to denote 
reality in ways that were plausible even to people outside the Forum, such as 
management or the general public as well as to other participants; and (2) the patterned 
dispositions were emergent of the turn-by-turn occurrence of mutually independent 
efforts at coming up with such denotation.  
This second point is particularly important when analyzing mundane utterances because 
utterances can be issued only on an assumptive basis. No single utterance defines either 
substantive or contextual meanings. Meanings are always created on the side of readers 
who are predisposed to understand them by constructing coherent and consistent wholes. 
Even more importantly, because of such an assumptive presentation and an orientated 
reading, the processes of meaning making are supposed to build on innumerable failed 
attempts. The fact that utterances do not represent anyone’s ontological reality means 
not only that each individual actor’s ontological reality is ineffable and is skewed by 
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actors’ pursuit of consensual validation with others but also that even when actors 
succeeded in enunciating their respective reality in words, the enunciation possibly fails 
to be so recognized by others if they do not find anything relevant in the enunciation, 
i.e., certain patterned dispositions or particular forms of expression shared between the 
actors and others.  
What is important is that regardless of whether or not read by others in such a way that 
an utterer wished, the fact that messages were posted to the Forum is evidence that 
participants did experience their respective ontological reality. They each assessed the 
relevance of their reality as they were mediating it through reading others’ messages. 
Put differently, each one’s sense of relevancy of reality could be achieved as one’s 
reality refashions and is refashioned by others’ denoted reality. The processes by which 
one mediates the substantive and the contextual understandings are indeed diegetic even 
at the individual level. So understanding is important to identify reality underlying the 
messages. Utterances are not issued to represent each one’s ontological reality but we 
can know of some aspects of reality by means of such partial, perspectival and 
contracted dispositions produced by actors’ interpretation. 
Taking into account the diegetic alternate successions between uttering and reading, the 
symbolic convergence among the messages are better understood as coming into being 
by means of (1) weak teleology in the sense that the utterer’s interests and concerns may 
or may not be read by readers/audiences as if to be motivated by the utterer and (2) 
particular irreversible sequential orders that are consensually validated between the 
utterer and readers/audiences. The participants’ ways of denotation appear to be 
converging on particular themes as were observed in Chapter 4, such as ‘Informing 
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reality’, ‘Encouraging fellow associates’, ‘Positive identity’, ‘Competency’, and 
‘Commitment/ loyalty’ (Table 4.2). However, all of these themes should be understood 
as cumulative consequences of the mutually independent messages that were means by 
which to stabilize meanings in particular ways and requested readers/assumed 
interlocutors to confirm the validity of such meanings in terms of both substance and 
context.  
Despite each person’s desire for coherent and consistent meanings of encounters and 
surroundings, since the realm of practice is premised on actions which could conclude 
ongoing interactions satisfactorily, messages posted to the Forum were not so much 
means to represent each other’s reality so much as to convey meanings efficiently and 
effectively in respect of consensual validation. In the realm of actual interactions 
between two or more actors, the practicing of the triad of mimetic processes proceeds 
through successive acts of reading and uttering. Neither uttering without subsequent 
reading nor reading without inducing subsequent uttering can produce meaning. For 
making utterances, we have to read. Without others’ utterances, reading never happens. 
An utterance has to be uttered before being read (cf., Weick 1979). The key is that the 
linkage between reading and uttering are always made diegetically or in a temporally 
contingent manner. No one can act on a unique and once occurring utterance at one 
moment on both of the acts of reading and uttering. While each actor experiences by 
her/his imagination the transpositions of the subject between a reader, an utterer and a 
mediator, in the realm of practical interactions between two or more actors, the acts of 
uttering and reading have to be distinguished strictly, for these each produces different 
meanings over one single utterance.  
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The participants were concerned with both the syntagmatic rules for consensual 
validation with other participants and the substitutability or generality of their 
substantive understandings of reality surrounding the Company, such as the ways of 
management, problems thereof, and possible solutions to them. Put in interactions with 
others, as was observed in 5.3.1, individual actors who are concerned with both the 
substantive and contextual relevancy utilize others’ utterances rather flexibly between 
substances and context-defining devices. The nesting and nested structure comprised of 
the triad of mimetic processes is indeed virtually infinitely entailing the substitutive 
reasoning (‘power’), the associative skills and knowledge (‘norm’) and the mediation 
between them based on the sense of appropriateness at particular points in time and 
space (‘intention for happiness’). 
The management of social reality by means of symbolically mediated media actually 
involves actors’ intricate ways of appropriating extant discourses, others’ denotation of 
reality and their skills and knowledge with which to validate, in a consensual manner, 
particular ways of presenting their understandings, actions and self. The key to identify 
and examine some aspects of reality behind enunciated words, such as the extant power 
relations and the processes by which they are being sustained through actors’ 
interactions by means of mundane utterances, is to know the fact that, even if playing a 
critical role in one’s establishing understandings, narrative or associative reasoning or 
one’s plotting heterogeneous properties cannot be captured in a processual manner 
(Bruner 1986a). What this means is that regardless of whether stories (others’ 
denotations) are utilized as generalizable events (substances) or models of denotation 
(context-defining devices), once recognized as expression devised with particular forms, 
these are dealt with as objects of which properties can be rather flexibly appropriated. 
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Rich descriptive information entailed in stories need to be so read. The role of readers is 
critical in this respect. If readers or those who encounter others’ particular denotation of 
reality do not assume the existence of such others’ ontological reality behind the 
denoted reality, such others’ realities will be brutally silenced virtually forever.  
Apart from such a humanistic concern about the silencing of someone’s reality, 
conceiving of social reality as a mere collections of substances, events or phenomena 
possibly prevents us from knowing how particular social orderliness emerges out of a 
flux of irregularity and inconsistency and how such emergent orderliness is being 
sustained in such an ever changing environment. It is for this reason that the triad of 
mimetic processes is invoked for investigating mundane discursive practices from 
which processes of organizing are emerging. The inclusion of processes of symbolic 
mediation in the triad of mimetic processes, in particular in the second mimetic process, 
which concerns syntagmatic rules with which to sequence heterogeneous properties into 
particular irreversible orders (Chapter 4), enables readers to interpret what is not 
enunciated in words from what is enunciated.  
A critical assumption is that signs, or management of material reality with signs, builds 
upon innumerable failed attempts simply because signs consist of information which 
denotes and does not denote what the material reality is. It is also important to assume 
that despite such innumerable failed attempts, signs are likely to sustain by formulating 
particular patterns and rules by means of diegetic and intersubjective checks in 
interactions. The triad of mimetic processes thus functions as logic along which we will 
be able to know how particular patterns and rules are emerging out of even fairly 
arbitrary ways of individual actors’ plotting a variety of properties. It becomes possible 
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to interpret in systematic ways what is not enunciated in words from what is enunciated. 
Behind the conspicuous symbolic convergence observed in the excerpts above, we will 
be able to read the power/rule constitution along the triad of mimetic processes. It is 
similar to mimicking the participants’ ways of interpreting reality along the triad of 
mimetic processes. 
The intricate intertwining of the dominant discourses and those in the Forum was 
typically observed in the participants’ ways of defining the activities in the Forum, their 
concerns and interests, and their real world experiences. The participants were observed 
to manage methodically the complexly intertwining different horizons or the meaning-
interpretation nexus by taking advantage of interactional relationships with others with 
whom to interact on a hypothetical and inferential basis. The participants clearly 
appreciated bcrose1’s efforts at ‘working outside the system to try to serve the customer’, 
and ‘using his power to try and change things’. These views reflect not only the posters’ 
sentiments for bcrose1’s demotion but also their own beliefs that they themselves 
shared the value for customer service and the attitude to change things for the better, 
which were supported by the posters’ sense of moral correctness or even faithfulness to 
the Company’s potentials and the trade of retailing. These substantive understandings 
are actually accompanied by the sense of moral appropriateness. 
As for the contexts related to their real world workplaces, they indicated difficulties to 
bring about changes as ‘Big change will get around to them [management of the 
Company] maybe later than sooner’, ‘a Miracle 180 degree change’, and ‘hope and 
pray they (remaining associates) will be able to make a difference if someone up top 
will let them’ (all emphases added). These clearly attribute the difficulties in bringing 
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about changes to management. What deserves attention is these posters’ positive but 
conditional speculations about business continuity grounded in their experiences at their 
respective locales. Positive, because they appear to believe that their company has 
capacities, including competent and committed employees, to make a successful 
turnaround from the bankruptcy. Conditional, because they assumed that the successful 
turnaround would not be materialized without fundamental changes in policies and 
decisions made by the management of the Company. These thus imply that the posters 
were ready to execute proper measures to make a successful turnaround from the 
bankruptcy but not in ways that took action to establish the proposed database, as is 
indicated by the fact that only few posts were posted in regard to the development of the 
database.  
Behind such reading of the weak but positive teleology of the posters, the unintended 
effects of the same excerpts can also be read. Specifically, these messages can be 
understood to represent that most of the participants in the Forum failed to find 
appropriate ways of denoting reality that concerned the intricate relations between the 
obviously relevant problems that could be addressed by the database, the extant 
institutional setups and what they could possibly contribute. These excerpts, in other 
words, set the limits on their interpretation of reality by demonstrating that it was 
possible for them to speak of both a variety of store-level problems that were of 
relevance for them and their sentiments for bcrose1’s demotion only by attributing all 
the problematics to management. Simply put, the posters said they had thus far failed to 
come up with any possible action other than keeping on serving the Company and their 
tasks as competent and committed retail workers. The excerpts above explain the ways 
in which the posters unwittingly defined the context of the Forum as that in which the 
210 
 
majority of the participants took part in the Forum not expecting that their activities in it 
would directly translate into tangible results in the real world workplaces or changes in 
the entire Company.  
As was indicated by the number of posts that conveyed gratitude and encouragement for 
bcrose1, it appeared natural and straightforward to show considerateness for others’ 
undeserved misfortune. Also, it would offer the posters a sense of empathy as those who 
shared with bcrose1 the sentiments about the unrewarded wishes to serve for the 
betterment of the Company. Nonetheless, it is also inevitable to segment the extant 
power relations only by expressing particular sentiments in natural ways, seemingly as 
if they were not at all concerned with the extant power relations in which they were 
involved.  
Power is actually circulating along the meaning-interpretation nexus. However, this 
does not mean that power has no indication for material reality. On the contrary, in 
order to analyze social reality, meanings and negotiations over interpretation of them 
need to be understood to arise from something that exists in the material world and that 
motivates actors to make sense of it. The reason why the posters’ simple expression of 
their sentiments for the demoted colleague serves to segment the extant power relations 
and why this is inevitable are because, in our normal consciousness, everything, even 
simple perception, is already symbolically mediated. Because of the symbolic mediation, 
each of us is necessitated to manage material reality by means of information that does 
not directly refer to the material reality being denoted as well as that which denotes it, 
such that, regardless of whether intended or not, one’s efforts at making sense of 
material reality inevitably generates the surplus of denotation which can be read by 
211 
 
others (or even by oneself) in virtually infinite ways. More importantly, despite the 
obvious unpredictability about how the surplus of denotation will be read and 
interpreted, readers/interpreters always carry with them their respective limits of 
interpretation. Denotation of reality by means of symbolically mediated media is 
without exception an intersubjective phenomenon predicated on each subject’s material 
reality. No sign floats completely apart from material real things. 
The fact that we use signs, thus, has profound indications for our ways of both being 
(ontology) and knowing (epistemology). Symbolically mediated being can be denoted 
in any way with signs. However, any denotation is interpreted by the knowing subject 
who never believes they have unlimited extension of interpretation simply because of a 
variety of limitations chiefly imposed by nature, such as unknowable but fated death, 
naturally originated regularity and materiality. While it is possible to create signs 
without knowing that the signs set particular limits in their extension, thus, without 
being concerned about the limitation of denotation, it is inevitable that someone 
becomes aware of signs or symbolically mediated denotation and starts interpreting 
these by reference to her/his sense of reality that will set the limits of her/his 
interpretation. As far as human beings cannot but be motivated by innumerable things, 
events, and phenomena, including fairly vague sensations, to make better sense of these, 
it is impossible even to pretend as if to respond only to material real things as they are, 
i.e., something not mediated symbolically at all. Denying the indication of meanings 
and interpretation for material reality is, thus, a false assumption that we can access the 




The key is the fact that utterances are not representational devices but emergent 
outcomes of each poster’s assessment of relevancy in terms of their substantive and 
contextual understandings and how to present these at a particular point in time and 
space. More importantly, utterances become meaningful when issued and paid attention 
to by two or more actors. In these diegetic and interactional processes, each actor 
pursues and examines as appropriate interpretation about reality as possible in terms of 
one’s desire for the maximum extension (‘power’) and the consensual validation with 
others in respect of the syntagmatic rules (‘norm’). By so understanding, the 
conspicuously converging ways of denoting the difficulties to bring about a successful 
turnaround from the bankruptcy as were observed in the excerpts above can be situated 
in the extant power relations. The symbolically converging denotations not only defined 
the purposes and raison d’être of the Forum but also served to sustain and thus 
demonstrate the ways by which the participants in the Forum were involved in the 
power/rule constitution along the meaning-interpretation nexus.  
Mundane discursive practices entwine actors’ skills and knowledge to make sense of 
reality, their senses of evaluative/moral appropriateness, experiences of power and the 
power/rule constitution through interactions between two or more actors. The analysis 
above, therefore, not only elaborated micro-processes in which the participants in the 
Forum made sense of their difficult situations caused by the bankruptcy and the 
subsequent reorganization but also elucidated why the power imbalances were 
irremediable and how the participants contributed to them through mundane discursive 
practices. The intricately intertwining power and each one’s ways of making sense of 
reality, involving one’s pursuit of evaluative/moral appropriateness, thus, have the 
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critical implications for analyses of social processes in both substantive and 
methodological terms.  
First, the descriptions above are all my creation along the framework comprised of the 
alternate and diegetic successions between reading and authoring in which each actor 
enacts the triad of mimetic processes (Figure 5.2). The framework represents my ways 
of making sense of the participants’ ways of making sense of their reality. It is, thus, 
obvious that the framework is not meant for proving that particular reality existed in 
either the Forum or the Company but for offering a method with which to unravel the 
entanglement of power and norm that constitutes processes of organizing.  
Second, starting by questioning the precedence of reasons to actions and based on the 
analyses in the preceding chapters, it was found that the triad of mimetic processes 
could be utilized as a tentative target of attribution for one’s understandings and actions. 
Typically, the triadic processes allow us to understand that we can act without any 
foundational evidence, rule or principle. Accordingly, it became manifest that there 
would be no foundational entity or kernel to which actions or reasons for them could be 
attributed. The awareness of one’s being or ‘intention for happiness’ is receptively 
evoked. Each one’s sense of evaluative/moral appropriateness can never be conclusive. 
What each of us is doing is continuously examining relevance of one’s encounters by 
reference to substantive and contextual aspects of reality on an inferential and 
hypothetical basis. In so doing, what is critical is the ethics as practice that keeps 
conversations going and that depends on the pure chance events of actions. Each actor 
normally is full of ambiguities and uncertainties that are inevitably left behind in our 
mundane examinations about the different relevancies.  
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What all those above mean is that when enquiring into social processes in which two or 
more actors interact with each other by means of each one’s interpretation of reality, we 
should focus on particular relationships that are defined by actors who can never 
directly see their own actions and being but only know aspects of these by reference to 
others’ responses to them. In other words, what is important is how to account for each 
one’s capacities to (re)construct one’s ambiguous and uncertain reality by reference to 
others’ actions/denotation of reality. Considering the situated relationality of each one’s 
imaginative capacities that are enacted in an alternate and diegetic manner, while 
operating in ontological reality, imagination that (re)constructs reality is not something 
that is possessed by any individual actor. Rather, it should be accounted for as a shared 
platform onto which each one’s reality can be projected. By so understanding, social 
analyses possibly reinforce it in ways that enable as diverse realities as possible to be 
projected, such that each one’s imaginative capacities can be developed in ways that 
nurture, rather than eliminate, the inevitable ambiguity and uncertainty accompanying 
one’s pursuit of sense of evaluative/moral appropriateness.  
Third, since imagination had better be conceived of as a socially shared platform, 
analysts are encouraged to reinforce it by pursuing better ways of associating properties 
and attributes, which they identify from data with rigorous scientific methods, with one 
another in respect of how to materialize engaged ways of reading of their assumed 
audiences. To do so, they need to be more conspicuous about their own investigative 
interests and concerns. Imagination is not as free and emancipating as is normally 
believed especially for social scientists who deal with the intricately intertwined 
interests and concerns of a diversity of actors. The alternate and diegetic model along 
the triad of mimetic processes is able to engage analysts with their subjects by means of 
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their investigative interests and concerns as well as rigorous methods. Researchers’ 
imaginative capacities are the key to produce narratives that could guide readers through 
in ways that reveal their implicit and context specific assumptions and principles. 
Fourth, by focusing on the significance of researchers’ imaginative capacities, social 
analyses can be assigned an alternative task that contributes to providing thickness to 
each one’s experiences of power premised on the irremediableness of power imbalances, 
rather than attempts to identify particular causal logic by abstracting each one’s 
experiences into variables as if power imbalances are problems that could be solved by 
applying particular causation. For instance, the following questions that are of relevance 
for management and organization studies can be asked in ways that provide thickness to 
each one’s experiences of power by taking into account the fact that each one is 
experiencing power and contributing to the power/rule constitution through mundane 
practices: Whether or not is it possible for a company to manage employees’ 
satisfaction by offering appropriate discursive spaces; with what institutions can a 
company devolve or concentrate authorities properly in respect of performances of both 
employees and the company; or what should happier lives in organizations be, typically 
for employees who are competent and readily committed like the participants in the 
Forum? More critically, since social reality entails virtually inexhaustible degrees of 
thickness with regard to each one’s everyday experiences of power through mundane 
practices, social analyses should pay more attention to how better and more legitimately 
reality can be abstracted in respect of materialization of fairer society, definitions of 
which inevitably encourage researchers to confront the fact that power imbalances are 
irremediable and each actor as an innately moral being is practicing ethics struggling 
with her/his ‘intention for happiness’ by means of ‘power’ and ‘norm’. 
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5.4 Plot and metaphor: Mimicking the triad of mimetic processes 
The analyses in this chapter confirmed that the participants’ sense of appropriateness 
appeared to be obtained by dealing with others’ denotation of reality both as substances 
and context-defining stories. The first episode, focused on the establishment of 
particular norms in the Forum, demonstrated that the availability of stories both as 
substances and the contextually relevant ways of denotation facilitated the process by 
which certain norms were established. Since most of the posters in this episode were 
observed to be concerned with appropriate ways of talking to other participants, the 
posters’ sense of moral correctness with regard to the contextual relevance appeared to 
culminate in particular norms, i.e., being positive, to be collectively subscribed to in the 
Forum.  
The practical knowledge and skills with which to manage the world of heterogeneous 
properties were more intricate than management of simple linear causation between the 
participants’ motivations and goals in terms of their participation in the Forum. The 
skills and knowledge are enacted in pursuit of not only belongingness to particular 
categories in terms of either substantive or contextual relevancies but also 
evaluative/moral appropriateness. Pursuit of evaluative/moral appropriateness, on the 
one hand, brings about positive collective effects, e.g., positive identity, caring for 
others and behaving in a positive manner. On the other hand, one’s ascription to 
particular values that emanate from appropriating others’ reality has broader extensions; 
these can relatively easily be generalized, such as the participants’ knowledgeability of 
the fundamentals of retailing and the virtue of employees’ commitment and loyalty to 
organizations they belong to. These contribute to sustaining extant power relations, i.e., 
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the Company’s organizational structures, typically so when such general and broadly 
acceptable reality remains unchecked intersubjectively but is dealt with as if it could be 
validated against certain values or principles by reference to broadly applicable 
meanings.  
Mundane utterances as reality denoted in words can be dealt with as both quasi-
substances whose properties and attributes can be apprehended and context-defining 
stories only when someone finds stories in them by reading her/his reality into them. In 
other words, as the alternate and diegetic model comprised of the triad of mimetic 
processes exemplified, the power/rule constitution along the meaning-interpretation 
nexus depends on how a kind of open space, which words create and into which 
different readers are allowed to read their respective realities, is utilized by concerned 
actors. Besides, whose realities can or cannot be read into particular denotations of 
reality can be imagined virtually infinitely according to interests and concerns of those 
who encounter the denotation. As such, by following the triadic ways of mundane 
examinations about the relevancies and their appropriateness, our understandings of the 
power/rule constitution can be extended even so far as to imagining realities that fail to 
be enunciated in words. 
The second episode, concerning the unrealized project of database development and the 
demotion of the key person at the headquarters, illustrated that the limits of 
interpretation were set by each person’s moral correctness rather than by objectively 
validated evidence or acceptability of the participants’ subjective sentiments. What is to 
be noted in particular is that although at first sight the participants appeared to be 
motivated by their respective subjective sentiments, such as concerns for fellow 
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associates, such sentiments were actually intersubjectively checked for them to be 
expressed in the Forum by reference to both substantive and contextual relevancies.  
More interesting is that the participants’ sense of moral correctness which was projected 
toward their substantive understandings as shown in their loyalty to retailing and the 
Company made it difficult for them to talk about problems which appeared to be of 
relevance for them because of the unavailability of appropriate stories with which to 
denote the relevant problems. As a result, the appropriateness of their substantive 
understandings appeared more effective for segmenting the power relations established 
in the Company than for changing them in such a way that employee voices could at 
least be heard by management.  
Table 5.4 Summary of stories 
Episode Stories as substance 
(Pursuing the maximum 
extension of interpretation of 
reality in positive terms) 
Stories as a device with 




in the Forum 
Past memories (as sharable 
negative experiences) 
Past memories (making the 
negative experiences 
presentable putting them into 
positive emotional state) 
 Episodes with customers (as 
sharable negative emotional 
state) 
Episodes with customers 




 Etiquettes, manners, norms in 
the Forum 
Etiquettes, manners, norms in 
the Forum 
 Positive identity 
(knowledgeability about and 
commitment to retailing) 
Positive identity (appealing to 
people outside the Company) 
Failed project of 
development of a 
database 
Development of a database N. A. (the participants’ limits 
of interpretation about the 
feasibility of the database) 
Problems to be addressed (e.g., 
inventory imbalance, 
communication between the 
HQ and stores) 
N. A. (the participants could 
not manage to express the 
relevant problems, and the 
inability to talk set the limits 
of interpretation of the reality) 
 Demotion of an employee at 
the HQ (management as 
villain) 
Demotion of an employee at 
the HQ (gratitude, 
encouragement) 
These analyses combined together tell us that mundane utterances may or may not be 
checked intersubjectively and diegetically with respect to the appropriateness in 
contextual, substantive and/or evaluative/moral terms. Specifically, while context 
transcending power can be observed in words that have meanings applicable to broader 
contexts in terms of either generality or moral correctness, the ways in which messages 
were posted also reflect the extant power relations by means of what the participants 
could or could not say in the Forum. However, while each may attempt to understand 
the extant power relations along the triad of mimetic processes and sets the limits of 
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their interpretation about reality, due to the asymmetrical relationship between readers 
and an author, no one can control how to read one’s utterances with whatever efficient, 
effective or virtuous reasons.  
Power relations are understood to be defined and redefined depending on such elusive 
ways in which utterances are dealt with. Considering such indeterminacy and 
unpredictability entailed in interactions with mundane discursive practice, it is 
considered important to acknowledge both the limits of our faculty of reasoning that 
enables us to examine relevancies in reference to particular criteria and our innate 
predisposition towards being good, represented by our pursuit of evaluative/moral 
appropriateness. It follows that, as the analyses of the two episodes indicated, the power 
of words should be appreciated as it provides everyone with open spaces into which 
her/his realities can be read for making better sense of them. Insofar as the power of 
words is conceived of instrumentally, such as strengthening the powerless by increasing 
opportunities to speak up, we will not be able to address the persistent problem that has 
long been pointed out concerning inequality: no one knows whether inequality can be 
attributed to nature and heredity or to human deliberate interventions. 
Despite the indeterminacy between nature and nurture, we should know that the 
inevitably and inherently unequally distributed resources determine substantial part of 
the power/rule constitution. First, the inevitable and persistent problems of inequality 
should be understood as consequences of our mundane practices of language use, which 
entail the ethics that keeps conversations going. Second, it is important to acknowledge 
that the inherent power imbalances are irremediable despite the seemingly emancipating 
effects of increasing discursive spaces like the Forum because words, especially those 
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which have broader extensions, allow anyone to read her/his reality into them, such that 
mere increase of opportunities to exercise power by speaking up is liable to reflect, 
rather than mediate, inherently varying endowments between actors. 
Since the inherent power imbalances are irremediable and power is exercised by 
everyone through mundane discursive practices that already involve ethical 
considerations, the power imbalances are not to be solved but to be appreciated as they 
are. To appreciate the irremediable power imbalances, it is necessary not only to 
understand how the imbalances are sustained but also to offer concrete measures to 
encourage, rather than prescribe, the ethics that keeps conversations going, and thus, to 
increase chances for each one’s implicit assumptions and principles to be revealed. This 
is so typically when many people’s allusion to sense of permanence has come to 
entrench their everyday sensemaking and actions such that many people have come to 
believe that reality can better be managed along the rational scientific logic and 
objectivist/empiricist view on reality.  
Note, however, that neither the rational scientific logic nor objectivist/empiricist view 
on reality needs to be undermined. These are actually superior in identifying particular 
principles and laws along which a variety of technologies can be developed to bring 
about material wellbeing. What is to be addressed are ethical implications that 
accompany them. Those squarely contradict the ethics that keeps conversations going. 
Ironically enough, because of orientations towards being good, one is predisposed to 
sanction one’s and others’ sensemaking and actions along the unwavering moralistic 
model of ethics. One does so believing that one can and ought to establish relationships 
with others by providing others with relevant information in terms of factual precision, 
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normative/institutional requirements and individual concerns/interests, although such 
relevancies always leave behind more or less ambiguity and uncertainty. Simply put, 
one is liable to over-evaluate one’s faculty of reasoning and impose more or less 
excessive moral obligations on self and others. In effect, we continue to overlook the 
fact that innumerable realities, typically those of the less powerful, are passing by 
without being accounted for or even being paid attention to. Besides such moral 
implications entailed in the rational scientific logic or the objectivist/empiricist view on 
reality, we also collectively reduce chances to come across emergent and innovative 
laws and principles that are possibly derived from seemingly meaningless/irrational 
events and phenomena (Alvesson and Spicer 2012, Hatch 1997, Weick 1974).  
Analyzing mundane discursive practices is important insofar as each utterance retains 
the processes by which two or more actors have interacted with each other’s pursuit of 
happiness by means of ‘power’ and ‘norm’. Utterances are, in other words, evidence 
that actors acted out particular dispositions along the triad of mimetic processes. Hence, 
from mundane utterances we can speculate that actors share capacities to understand 
actions in relation to other properties, such as actors, goals, competencies and 
circumstances, such that they can associate such a variety of properties to organize them 
into particular sequential orders in more or less plausible ways to others. Moreover, 
these shared capacities enable actors to act hypothetically; thus, actors can act without 
any absolutely foundational evidence, rule or principle while certain evidence, rules and 
principles are continually being pursued by actors for the sake of their going about a 
variety of surroundings and encounters in as coherent and consistent ways as possible. 
Mundane utterances are emergent of the acts of interpretation of two or more actors, 
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each of whom dispose and interpret each other’s hypothetical interpretations in 
anticipation of the existence of certain unity in each other’s reality. 
The framework comprised of the alternate and diegetic successions between reading and 
authoring along each one’s enactment of the triad of mimetic processes is capable of 
analyzing mundane discursive practices in ways that draw our attention even to the 
existence of reality that fails to be denoted in utterances. It enables this by seeing 
mundane utterances as both discrete data constituted by words, whose meanings can be 
defined in a more or less non-contradictory manner, and stories or story fragments that 
can provide us with the surplus of denotation by particular irreversible sequential orders. 
The key is how to identify proper protagonist(s) of such stories or story fragments. 
Simply, discrete data can be translated into stories in accordance with the constitutive 
elements as they are defined by theory of plot: acts, actors, scenes, goals and agencies, 
and it is (a) certain protagonist(s) as (a) mediator(s) who associate(s) discrete data with 
one another in accordance with these constitutive elements of plot (Kenneth Burke 
quoted in Czarniawska [1999], see also the semantic network of action in Ricoeur 
[1984/1990]). In other words, with this framework, one can not only understand one’s 
imagination as the triadic processes operating on the weak teleology in interaction 
settings but also simulate alternative realities in the manner of prototyping in 
accordance with the constitutive elements of plot, which I call protoplotting after 
Czarniawska (1999). Protoplotting serves as a meta-theory that explains how particular 
causal relations can be understood as both synchrony (variance) and diachrony (process). 
The next chapter will conclude this thesis by elaborating how to operationalize 
protoplotting by analyzing mundane discursive practices in order to understand 
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processes of organizing better. Based on the preceding analyses and findings concerning 
the hypothetical and inferential ways of emergence of reasons and meanings that guide 
the power/rule constitution through mundane discursive practices, the idea of 
protoplotting in tandem with the triad of mimetic processes will contribute to 
materializing ‘ethics as practice’ by diversifying repertoires of plot for both 
organization scholars and practitioners.  
For scholars, the meaning of their theorizing will be particularly emphasized, that is, to 
provide theories or narratives that could reveal practitioners’ implicit and context-
specific assumptions and principles. It is practically difficult for practitioners to be 
aware of their own theories and methods with which to plot the heterogeneous 
properties they encounter into appropriate sequential orders. Nor are they likely to 
become aware of how and why the practice of emplotment necessarily involves issues 
concerning power and ethics. Theories are, thus, expected to serve to reveal 
practitioners’ ways of making sense of reality in ways that could enable practitioners to 
reconstruct their realities along theorists’ narratives.  
As Weick’s (1987) five criteria of relevance succinctly explain, for theories to become 
relevant to practitioners, theorists are advised to take into account the non-obvious 
relevance as well as descriptive, goal and operational relevance and timeliness. 
Specifically, theorists are encouraged to expand their imagination to as far as what is 
not obvious by reference to what are obvious from their subjects, such as rational 
decision making, formal procedures, rules and regulations, including formally assigned 
capacities/authorities in accordance with particular organizational structures. In other 
words, protoplotting is expected to supplement theories or models that provide 
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particular rules or principles by abstracting reality with conventional methods by taking 
into account each one’s imaginative capacities to (re)construct reality.  
Protoplotting aims to not only encourage but also legitimate researchers’ imagination to 
account for what is not obvious. Legitimacy of researchers’ imaginatively accounting 
for what is not obvious resides in the fact that processes of organizing operate on chance 
events (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972, Czarniawska 1999). As the weak teleology of 
the act of uttering explains, whether or not an actor takes a particular action is not 
predictable. Also, meanings or interpretations of actions are defined and re-defined in an 
alternate and diegetic manner between actors’ embodying assumptions that are made 
hypothetically and observers’/readers’ reading their realities into the embodied 
assumptions; thus, social reality is imaginative construction of different actors. More 
critically, it is the weak teleology that enables the ethics that keeps conversations going 
from which particular social orderliness emerges. We, as readers/observers, should 
appreciatively understand actions/denotations of reality as actors’/authors’ acceptance 
that their actions/denotations could be read and understood by others in their own ways. 
By so understanding, it becomes manifest that reasons, purposes or motivations of 
certain actions/denotations are mediated between observers/readers and actors/authors. 
Ethics as we each practice it in everyday life is indeed a collaborative project between 
two or more actors.  
What is more, in practicing ethics, each one’s actions/denotations of reality leave behind 
more or less ambiguity and uncertainty about one’s sense of evaluative/moral 
appropriateness that drives one’s pursuit of ‘intention for happiness’ by means of 
‘power’ and ‘norm’. Despite (or probably because of) such remnant ambiguity and 
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uncertainty, and as we each play the roles of both reader/observer and author/actor, we 
are liable to assume that we each fulfill moral obligations for successful interactions in 
ways that we each take responsibility for accounting for each one’s reasons, goals and 
motivations for actions. As such, one’s innate pursuit of particular rules and principles 
necessarily draws one’s attention more to what is obvious, thus easy to be accounted for, 
in actions/denotation of reality in terms of both substance and appearance, i.e., forms 
and styles, than to each one’s evaluative/moral concerns, which is non-obvious.  
What is critical about such almost inadvertent allusion to particular rules and principles 
is that such rules and principles are dealt with as the targets of attribution of one’s 
evaluative/moral appropriateness. Simply put, one comes to show faithfulness or loyalty 
to particular rules and principles. In effect, it would get more and more difficult for 
actors to interact with each other by means of each other’s evaluative/moral concerns 
which are supposed to retain rich and immediate information about each other’s reality, 
even if ambiguous and inconclusive. Thus, the roles of researchers are important as 
mediators who account for the processes of each one’s imaginative mediation by 
reference to actions/denotations of reality. Rather than by pursuing particular rules and 
principles that can be applied to research subjects, researchers’ imagination can be 
legitimated by appreciating the weak teleology entailed in mundane discursive practices, 
which should culminate in the ethics that keeps conversations going. Researchers’ 
imagination for each one’s evaluative/moral concerns could contribute to ‘theorizing as 
engaged practice’ (Zundel and Kokkalis 2010) by offering as diverse plots as possible 
along which their subjects follow researcher’s narratives into which the subjects’ 
realities could be read. Analyses of mundane discursive practices will become a 
collaborative project between researchers and their subjects in ways that strengthen each 
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other’s capacity to nurture, rather than eliminate, the uncertainties and ambiguities that 
are inevitably left behind in our mundane examinations of reality by reference to 
substantive, contextual, and evaluative/moral relevancies. 
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CHAPTER 6 PROTOPLOTTING THE FUTURE  
6.1 Relevance of the Plot for Studies on Organizing 
Based on the hypothesis that mundane utterances can be seen as lay actors’ implicit and 
context-specific theories that denote their reality, this thesis has examined in detail 
processes by which actors are engaged with mundane discursive practices. Different 
from the conventional assumption that communication proceeds by exchanges of 
information between concerned actors, it assumes that communication is possible 
because each actor supplements, with her/his capacity of imagination, information that 
does not necessarily appear in either her/his own or others’ denotations of reality. 
Mundane utterances are regarded as lay actors’ theories to the extent that they guide 
their imagination in ways that enable them to manage to communicate with others. 
Drawing upon Weick’s (1987) model for the practically relevant theorizing of 
organizational communication, this thesis found that actors created their respective 
sense of relevance by imagining particular meaningful wholes out of others’ denotations 
of reality. More specifically, Weick’s model offers five criteria of relevance: descriptive, 
goal and operational relevance, timeliness and non-obviousness. Even though his model 
is primarily meant for theorizing of organizational communication, the model was 
found to be applicable to address the problem arising from the differences between the 
conventional scientific validity and the practical relevance of theories in management 
and organization studies (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011, Zundel and Kokkalis 2010) by 
taking into account the significance of the contextual and temporal transitions of 
relevance by reference to those five criteria. 
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Moreover, it was found that Weick’s model peculiarly resonated with narrative 
frameworks, which provide frames with which to theorize processes of mundane 
discursive practices. The resonance appears to reside in the attention of both Weick’s 
model and narrative frameworks to the implicit but critical function expected of formal 
theories in contrast with lay actors’ theories, that is, the revealing moment. This is, in 
narrative frameworks, represented as one of the functions of plot. As we follow stories, 
plot not only guides us through events sequenced in particular orders but also, in doing 
so, reveals in front of us particular consequences or changes in circumstances and/or 
characters’ fates unfolding (Boje 2001). This unfolding in time is of particular 
importance in actors’ making better sense of theories by reference to their reality. In 
Weick’s model, the effects of time in everyday human experiences can be accounted for 
by the five criteria of relevance. Moreover, both the five criteria of relevance and plot 
are capable of explaining how the non-obvious relevance or the revealing moment is 
enabled by actors’ practical skills and knowledge, enacted in their making sense of 
reality.  
As are often likened to models, theories become effective when actors acknowledge 
similarities/dissimilarities between the reality denoted in theories and their experiences. 
Hence, theories and models work better based on metaphorical or substitutive logic 
(Czarniawska 1999). Both of them also explain that such metaphorical functioning of 
theories is enabled by a variety of contextual information, i.e., descriptive and 
operational relevance and timeliness, which can be provided narratively. Hence, 
theories are not mere metaphors but are always accompanied by descriptive accounts in 
words as well as propositional accounts in words, equations, charts or other graphic 
devices. The non-obvious relevance is particularly important in that practitioners, when 
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offered a certain theory, should be enabled to make comparisons between reality 
denoted in the theory and that being experienced in ways that reveal the practitioners’ 
implicit and context-specific assumptions and principles, which can be regarded as lay 
actors’ everyday methods and theories. Weick’s model typically explains that theories 
as particular denotations of reality are likely to become more relevant when they are 
imagined in ways that a certain set of procedures are held together within a particular 
period of time punctuated by a particular beginning and an ending. Time we are 
experiencing, therefore, appears to be predicated more on time created by particular 
ways of plotting a variety of events into particular sequential orders, which reading 
offers to us as so-called narrative temporality (Cunliffe, Luhman and Boje 2004) rather 
than as inorganic chronological time. 
The processes by which actors experience narrative temporalities are of particular 
relevance for theories with which to understand mundane discursive practices, 
consisting of lay actors’ denotations of reality. As the analyses in the preceding chapters 
demonstrated, mundane discursive practices proceed through the alternate and diegetic 
successions of denotations of reality and reading others’ denotations, which are given 
particular styles/forms through actors’ establishing the three distinct understandings 
along the triad of mimetic processes, that is, substantive; contextual, and 
meaningfulness at a particular point in time and space. Through the diegetic successions 
of the triadic processes in mundane discursive practices, actors make sense of reality 
because the diegetic successions enable actors to provide their feelings and thoughts 
with particular intelligible forms/styles and utterances serving as symbolic resources, 
both as substitutable episodic events and as examples of possible ways of denoting 
reality. More importantly, mundane discursive practices are of significance for offering 
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actors opportunities to establish the sense of non-obvious relevance by mediating 
appropriate symbolic resources in terms of both the substantive and the syntagmatic 
relevance. This process of mediation contributes to actors’ making better sense of 
reality by experiencing narrative temporality in the same way as formal theories. The 
triad of mimetic processes is thus capable of exemplifying the common logic along 
which particular denotations of reality become relevant even if when, for whom, for 
what purposes and with what capacities, are all dependent on virtually infinitely 
variable contexts. 
The triad of mimetic processes, which is derived from Ricoeur’s (1984/1990) theory of 
emplotment, is further found to be capable of accounting for the power/rule constitution 
along the meaning-interpretation nexus (Clegg 1989) because of the intrinsic normative 
quality entailed in the processes of emplotment. Hence, plot is found to be a powerful 
framework with which to explicate the less visible processes of imagination enacted by 
each individual actor to make sense of reality by providing rather ambiguous and 
ephemeral feelings and thoughts with particular intelligible, and hopefully, plausible 
forms/styles by reference to both substantive and contextual relevance.  
With regard to the relevance for studies on organizing, the triadic model of emplotment 
is capable of enhancing analyses of mundane discursive practices as constituent part of 
processes of organizing. It will do so based on an assumption that human ways of 
knowing should be hypothetical and inferential. Starting from the question about the 
precedence of reasons for actions, this study elaborated processes by which reasons 
appear to take precedence over actions despite the fact that the order is vice versa. As 
the intricate transitions of the sense of relevance are accounted for, people are actually 
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muddling through the uncertain future with their imagination, which can be traced by 
reference to the five criteria of relevance. They do so by paying attention to the 
substantive and the contextual aspects of reality to establish hypotheses that are as 
reliable as possible. What is the most critical is the existence of one who mediates all 
the information into particular meaningful wholes. This represents the human critical 
ability to imagine one’s self in ways that can be moved around in relation to a variety of 
others (Vygotsky 1978). Without this ability to divide things into subjects and objects, 
human beings could not have developed such complex sign systems as language. Hence, 
it is important to confirm that reason and language are enabled by human ways of being 
in the world in which simple and reflexive actions already involve judgments about 
relevance or appropriateness of actions, caused by the innate and immutable character 
of making sense of reality by means of substitution/contrasting (Taylor and van Every 
2000). 
Ricoeur’s theory of emplotment comprised of the three-fold mimesis explains the 
involvement of judgments at the practical level of mundane language use. The simple 
skills and knowledge with which to establish connections between relevant properties in 
appropriate ways, which are indispensable to establish understandings by means of 
symbolically mediated media, already involve a normative quality. Even if starting from 
simple skills and knowledge to make syntagmatic connections, insofar as presuming 
interactions with others, particular rules develop and concerned actors come to put 
certain values on their compliance with such rules backed by a positive sense about their 
successes in communications with others. As such, human ways of simply being in the 
world inevitably generate and continuously renew a variety of institutions none of 
which is value-neutral or a priori defined. 
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What is important in examining processes of organizing is, however, the aspect of such 
self-generating institutions that enables the hypothetical inferences with which actors 
take actions. Rather than pursuing a priori coherent and consistent rules and regulations, 
actors act as long as they can establish actionable hypotheses. Such hypotheses are 
actually invaluable because without them further sophistication of institutions through 
innovation and invention is difficult to be expected. As established by the evolutionary 
views on social development, diversity increases the chances of adaptive change (Weick 
1979). More crucially, rules and regulations that organize behavior or social orderliness 
can never be conclusive but are continuously being negotiated. Thus, diversifying 
hypotheses and continuously sophisticating institutions are crucial to organizing 
individuals’ thoughts and actions and a variety of social entities and associations.  
In order to counter the foreseeable difficulties in or resistance to the diversification of 
actors’ seemingly unreliable hypothetical inferences, it is necessary for actors to devise 
practical methods. The triad of mimetic processes is one such method, which makes 
visible how feelings and thoughts change by paying attention to the substantive and the 
contextual aspects of reality in reference to our own sense of relevancy. The triad 
exemplifies the nesting and nested relationship between conventional scientific 
reasoning and practical syntagmatic reasoning, both of which are inevitably affected by 
the seemingly irrational and illogical sense of appropriateness felt by each actor at a 
particular point in time and space. 
Since the triad of mimetic processes is only capable of illustrating processes that are 
being practiced on a day-to-day or rather a moment-by-moment basis, it is actually 
difficult to become meaningful on its own in the practical settings. In Weick’s terms, 
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the triad of mimetic processes is ‘obvious’ rather than ‘non-obvious’. To supplement 
certain values of everyday practices a framework comprised of certain substantive 
properties is needed. Narrative frameworks provide five constitutive elements of plot in 
this regard: acts, actors, scenes, purposes and agencies (Czarniawska 1999, quoting 
Kenneth Burke). It is expected that actors will be empowered in terms of the capacities 
of plotting a variety of properties by reference to the five constitutive elements of plot 
and the triadic processes of emplotment. For instance, goal setting, which is practiced 
ordinarily in organizations, can be done along either rational scientific or contextual 
associative logic by reference to the triadic model. The former will be enabled or 
constrained by concerned actors’ competencies (agencies) and/or varying choice 
opportunities (scenes) while justified by the seemingly value-neutral and relatively 
accurate methods with which to obtain particular goals by identifying rules or principles 
as universally applicable as possible along the logic of substitution. In contrast, the 
latter should pursue contextual relevance, which is inevitably inconclusive and arbitrary 
but possible to be inclusive if as many patterns between the five constitutive elements of 
plot as possible are taken into consideration by carefully examining concerned actors’ 
competencies, including locally available context-specific knowledge and even 
seemingly irrational emotive capacities, and a variety of institutions and cultures, 
including informal norms and habits.  
In what follows, the chapter elaborates why and how it is important to empower 
capacities of plotting a variety of properties even if all of the plots so established cannot 
be materialized. It starts by exemplifying the intricate linkages between the human ways 
of being in the material real world, time and words. To understand the linkages, it is 
necessary to address the persistent problem, probably impossible to eliminate, of 
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inequality. Because it is inevitable and it concerns the intrinsic morality of human 
beings, inequality needs to be countered by practically feasible and sustainable 
strategies. The goal to be pursued by such practically feasible and sustainable strategies 
is to increase the number of plot as many as possible. Strengthening the capacity of 
emplotment primarily sifts the flux of information by reading, rather than by prescribing 
particular ways of plotting reality. If we become confident in our abilities to read, we 
will not have to be worried too much about flooding denotations of reality. What is 
important is to acknowledge that as far as certain denotations take particular shapes, 
someone’s efforts at making better sense of reality must be behind them and such 
efforts cannot or ought not to be dismissed as if non-existent. Denotations of reality 
should not be seen as representation of anyone’s reality (Lorino, Tricard and Clot 2011) 
but as evidence of someone’s being in this world.  
The chapter concludes by discussing possible contributions of plot to establish a 
disciplinary identity of management and organization studies as a genre (Czarniawska 
1999), which studies people’s everyday practices in the variably but intensively 
interwoven textures of institutions in organizations. Writing reports on organizational 
events and phenomena is an important means with which to examine reality by 
mediating science and humanity into meaningful wholes in light of materializing ethical 
practices. The reports so produced will serve as resources for subsequent examinations 
of life of a broader spectrum of audiences, i.e., those who work with organizations, than 
academics and/or managers.  
To do so, what is critical is to enable conversations even between seemingly mutually 
less relevant reports. The framework consisting of the triadic processes of emplotment 
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and the five constitutive elements of plot serves as a guideline for both how to read 
others’ reports and how to develop researchers’ investigative strategies, including how 
to write reports. The theories about plot and emplotment draw our attention to the 
remarkable ability of human imagination that appropriates both mimetic and diegetic 
patterns, which are available in the form of symbolic resources, in ways that 
occasionally transcend physical or conceptual boundaries and hierarchical orders. Such 
transcendence occurs in actors’ attempts to make better sense of reality while they are 
aware of their finitude but also of infinite possibilities toward it. Insofar as no one can 
be sure of any definitive boundaries between either physical or conceptual constructs, it 
is rather detrimental to presume a priori some (unknown) absolutely foundational rules, 
principles or evidence. It is important to enrich the diversity of plot, rather than to 
discipline and prescribe how to plot, with which to produce as many actionable 
hypotheses as possible, such that the hypotheses will later be refined with either 
substitutive or syntagmatic logic. Imagining as many possible futures as possible by 
suspending disbelief will certainly contribute to better ways of managing the uncertain 
future in terms of both fulfillment of intentions for happiness and somewhat improved 
predictability.  
As far as time is created by human actors’ paying attention to things and/or some 
ineffable but perceptible substances, prediction cannot only concern obtaining accurate 
results by calculation as per some universal causal laws but also gives particular shape 
to vague and ambiguous feelings or perceptions. Giving some intelligible shape to 
reality or enabling ourselves to acknowledge the existence of something ineffable but 
perceptible is certainly critical for us to identify/classify particular variables. 
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Predictability in conventional terms will also be increased by devising as enriched 
varieties of plot as possible. 
6.2 Being, time and words: Everyone’s deserved dignity 
The triadic model of emplotment with which I analyzed mundane discursive practices 
that took place in an Internet discussion forum is primarily meant for examining the 
processes of sensemaking. The analyses exemplified what actors did in reading and 
issuing mundane utterances to manage uncertainty and anxiety about the future caused 
by the bankruptcy. The model is, however, powerful enough to transcend the specific 
local context of the case online forum. An implication was presented as to the model’s 
applicability to the analysis of the power/rule constitution along the meaning-
interpretation nexus, which is ubiquitously observed in organization settings.  
What I discuss below continues, from the previous chapter, concerning ‘ethics as 
practice’. The triadic model of emplotment serves to make visible processes of 
sensemaking in ways that relate the less visible processes of imagination to the 
‘intention for happiness’, which is pursued by means of ‘power’ and ‘norm’. In order to 
emphasize further the model’s strength of accounting for the less visible processes of 
imagination, I elaborate below the intricate linkages between human ways of being in 
the material world, time and words, which can be explained by grounding these in the 
processes of symbolic mediation. Although the triadic model is meant for analyses of 
mundane discursive practices, it entails the nesting and nested structure of mediation 
that is possible to trace back as far as the origin of consciousness, the isomorphic and 
fractal development of a variety of organic substances. It is probably this way that 
particular physical laws emerge out of seemingly random chaos, if we follow the 
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process of abductive inferences persistently, which can be understood to entail already 
an interpretative aspect
2
. Those who are concerned with predicting the future need to 
pay attention to processes in which particular rules and laws are emerging without a 
priori foundational rules and principles in order to appreciate the significance of the 
capacities of abductive inference especially in rapidly changing environments. 
For the purpose of addressing one of the critical problems concerning social ontology, 
that is, inequality or unevenly distributed resources, the following deliberations are 
limited to the level of practical language use by means of which ordinary people 
manage a variety of material and immaterial resources. I argue below that in order to 
address inevitable inequality, we need to understand that we are self-interpreting beings 
whose conducts can never be exempted from segmenting extant variable resource 
endowments regardless of our good (or bad) intentions. Put simply, if one is better 
endowed with particular resources, her/his conducts inevitably bring about effects that 
appear as if s/he took advantage of her/his better endowments than others’ because s/he 
cannot take any action without exerting power that is enabled by their capacities of 
utilizing symbolic resources, and more critically because s/he never knows what the 
absolute truth is, how definitive boundaries between either physical or conceptual 
                                                 
2
 The processes appear interpretative simply because nature is saturated with innumerable substances. In 
such a realm saturated with innumerable substances, particular events and phenomena take place more or 
less often than others. Such purely probabilistic emergence of patterns naturally organizes innumerably 
existing substances into different levels of patterns, meaning that other substances that are not directly 
involved in particular events and phenomena constituting certain patterns can also appear to constitute 
certain other patterns. As such, a world saturated with innumerable substances is actually saturated with 
innumerable patterns that are more or less closely related to one another.  
The point is the fact that in such a world saturated with patterns there exist some substances that receive 
continuously same information transmitted from particular patterns. Hence, such substances are capable 
of identifying some aspects of patterns, including identities of substances constituting patterns. This 
allows us to call the processes of the naturally emerging patterns interpretative.  
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constructs can be drawn, thus, the inability to know her/his own finitude, definitive 
capabilities or choice opportunities. The self-interpreting being thus refers to one who 
constitutes processes of symbolic mediation by which a variety of resources is defined, 
mobilized and (re)distributed and, at the same time, who is struggling with making 
better sense of reality in front of unknown finitude and infinite possibilities. To 
understand the processes of symbolic mediation and human beings participating in the 
processes better, I start by explaining the differences between time that are used as one 
of the resources being managed as if it is a material substance; time created as human 
beings make sense of reality by sequencing heterogeneous properties into particular 
orders. 
Time is, as we observe, one of the critical resources to be managed in organizations. 
However, there is no such thing as time in an ontologically objective world. Time is 
being produced by human beings’ paying attention to a variety of things, events and 
phenomena. When time is dealt with as a quasi-material resource, we do not usually 
understand that time involves any intervention on our part. This is closely related to the 
prevailing rational scientific ways of seeing reality. According to the triad of mimetic 
processes, the rational scientific way of reasoning plays the central role in the realm of 
substances. The rational scientific way of reasoning serves to find out a certain 
generally applicable rule or principle by attempting to identify things, events and 
phenomena with non-contradictory identities along the substitutive or metaphorical 
logic. As was explained in the preceding chapters, since the triad of mimetic processes 
constitutes the nesting and nested structure, the apprehension of conspicuous attributes 
of certain objects is not possible without conceptual networks in which relevant 
properties are related to one another in particular ways. However, because in the realm 
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of substances, actors are concerned with the substantive aspect of reality, the existence 
and the critical function of such conceptual networks are rarely recognized. In the realm 
of substances, actors are liable to pay less attention to the fact that accumulated 
experiences over time are indispensable for and necessarily affect their apprehension of 
what they are encountering. In consequence, the realm of substances necessarily 
becomes a timeless world consisting of substitutable things, events and phenomena, 
including human beings.  
In the realm of substances, a situation emerges in which time becomes a quasi-
substance which can be measured by clock or other means. Put differently, everything 
in the realm of substances is given a non-contradictory identity that makes everything 
substitutable so that it comes to serve as a certain variable to be counted and measured 
to discover a certain causal logic. There is no such thing as time in an ontologically 
objective world, of course: time is always created by human beings’ imagining things, 
events and phenomena in particular contexts. By imagining these in particular contexts, 
a sense of temporality emerges because one puts these into particular sequential orders 
in ways that are meaningful. Time one experiences is in principle narrative time but it 
has now become common that time is dealt with as composed of substances. 
What this situation indicates is that narrative time can be abstracted in order to give 
certain feelings, which constitute and are constituted by the sense of temporality, a 
particular name. This is simply because one must be feeling something when 
encountering particular things, events and phenomena and associating these with one 
another into particular sequential orders. Such feelings are probably concerned with a 
variety of changes and transitions that occasionally draw actors’ attention. Simply 
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because the world consists of both relatively stable and unstable things, such a term as 
‘time’ that enables denotations about changes and differences in speeds, durations and 
intervals is demanded and useful to communicate a variety of changes and transitions in 
reality to other actors.  
The critical but subtle difference between narrative and abstracted time can best be 
understood by relating to differences between processes and variances. The former is 
advantageous in describing transitions of events and phenomena in ways that provide 
particular contextual information. The latter contributes to identifying/classifying a 
variety of movements at a particular point in time and space. It even enables analyses of 
time-series data by putting discrete data into chronological orders. Narrative time is 
created by referring to a variety of events and phenomena already elapsed. Abstract time, 
by contrast, is demanded for management of either immediate or distant futures, which 
requires certain rules and principles with which to make as accurate predictions as 
possible, albeit that such rules and principles build upon one’s skills and knowledge to 
make appropriate connections between heterogeneous properties.  
In addition to the dichotomous contrast between abstract and narrative time, it should be 
noted that there must exist one’s being at a particular point in time and space, without 
which there would be nothing, no time or whatever, to which a particular form/style 
needs to be given by means of words or other forms of signs. What is the most critical 
about the proliferation of abstract time is the relatively lesser visibility of one’s being in 
it as well as the different temporal orientations mentioned above between narrative and 
abstract time. In order to take into account the existence of one’s being at a particular 
point in time and space, narrative time can be understood to be abstracted along the triad 
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of mimetic processes, meaning that it originates in certain feelings or stimuli an actor 
receives from nature at a particular point in time and space. In such stimuli, certain 
accumulated experiences over time with regard to variable regularities/irregularities, 
such as movements of celestial bodies and climatic changes, must hold a critical part 
(Ricoeur 1984/1990). The triad of mimetic processes is, therefore, mimetic in the sense 
that human beings are capable of mediating a variety of stimuli they are receiving from 
nature in terms of both discrete and continuous data into particular ways of denotation, 
such as abstract and narrative time.  
These processes of symbolic mediation occur around the production of different 
meanings by means of the term ‘time’, which consists of intricate combinations between 
processes and variances, or diegeses and mimeses. Human beings are capable of 
perceiving both transitions/changes over time and synchronic patterns. More 
importantly, they are capable of making sense of these by mediating them into particular 
meaningful wholes. What is to be noted in the processes of symbolic mediation is that 
because one’s being, who plays key part in mediating processes and variances into 
particular meaningful wholes by means of certain symbolically mediated media, 
belongs to the material real world and receives a flux of information concerning it, it 
happens that when acting, one necessarily brings about changes in material settings, and 
such changes to material settings necessarily affect subsequent symbolic mediation. 
More critically, these inevitable connections between one’s material reality and 
symbolic mediation are necessarily blinded by the act of denotation by means of 
symbolically mediated media.  
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Here, we need to pay attention to the fact that human ways of being in the world, time 
and words are related in peculiar ways. While time is one of the words that denote 
virtually nothing specific, it is created by practical demands for managing ever changing 
but in some ways stable and patterned reality. Human beings become involved in 
symbolic mediation as they denote, by using the term ‘time’, aspects of reality 
consisting of a variety of substances, other actors, events and phenomena, including 
subjective feelings and perceptions, all of which are of both more or less invariant 
structures/shapes/attributes and more or less regular/irregular changes/movements in 
terms of either quality or frequency. The term ‘time’ actually has even more significant 
effects than the efficient and effective management of a variety of resources by utilizing 
the term in the sense that it can, in an extreme manner, abstract out a vast amount of 
information, typically that concerning processes, to the extent that all the ineffable 
senses can completely be canceled out, chiefly for the sake of obtaining non-
contradictory identities for measurement and identification of some universal causal 
laws. The fact that we use the term ‘time’, thus, appears as if the term contains all the 
processes by which human beings became able to utilize a variety of symbolic resources 
as we are presently experiencing. 
Time actually represents a significant role in making us self-interpreting beings, as well 
as in denoting reality without knowing what it exactly is. The fact that we use the term 
‘time’ without knowing what it is exactly suggests that words, not only limited to the 
term ‘time’, are an emergent property of human beings’ efforts to make better sense of 
reality. Hence, words are best understood as dispositions acted out by actors on a 
hypothetical and inferential basis, in particular ways for particular purposes, in 
particular contexts, rather than being instruments with which to represent aspects of 
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reality and/or to communicate particular information to others. It is difficult to assume 
that one can at any time manage to use words in ways that satisfy one’s a priori defined 
interests and purposes by denoting reality correctly in terms of pragmatic rules of use, 
other contextual (normative) relevance and the logical coherence and consistency 
between attributes of innumerable substances being denoted. At the individual level, 
one can denote reality in any way by means of words. The limits of denotation are set 
by each individual’s senses. In interaction settings, insofar as it is making sense to two 
or more actors, any denotation can be sustained. The limits are set by each one’s 
referring to the substantive and the contextual aspects of reality and one’s sense of 
meaningfulness (interests and concerns). The act of denoting reality by means of words 
is not actually structured by any other means than the triad of mimetic processes. As 
was explained in Chapter 4, therefore, the act of denoting (narrating) reality is of critical 
meaning on its own. In the act of denoting reality, what is most critical is the fact that 
one manages to denote reality in any way. The processes by which to denote reality by 
setting certain limits are more important than particular denotations as outcomes, i.e., 
meanings and styles/forms. Teleology in terms of the act of denoting reality is actually 
weak; in other words, by one’s own act of denoting reality one blurs one’s reality, 
mostly not purposely. Words can even tell lies without any vicious intention (see also 
p.85).  
Furthermore, words could be abstracted in varying degrees in terms of the diegetic 
connections from the past. Abstracted words sound strange because words are normally 
understood as a tool with which to abstract reality in particular ways. The abstracted 
words refer to words that pay little or no attention to the diegetic accumulation of 
experiences, history and knowledge without which words would not appear with 
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particular forms and styles as well as meanings. They are understood ‘correctly’ only if 
every reader is educated/trained properly in accordance with universally applicable rules 
that can be established along rational scientific lines or through a substitutive logic and 
method. Because of the orientation towards a mechanistic view of words as implied 
above, we should take seriously the abstraction of words, which is one of the effects of 
the act of denoting reality. Once denoted in particular ways, words can be read by 
readers in virtually infinite ways.  
Two pitfalls are perceived, which seem to entrap us, to divert our attention from 
different agencies bestowed on words and ourselves. One concerns the actually floating 
problem of the attribution of the moral obligations over use of words; the other appears 
to be arising from the substantiveness of words, particularly of written texts. Despite 
weak teleology, considering the intrinsic normative quality in simple syntagmatic rules, 
those who manage to denote reality in particular ways are supposed to believe that they 
comply with particular rules in terms of pragmatic rules of use of language and/or 
norms and socio-cultural values relevant in particular contexts. Nonetheless, their 
denotations will possibly be read otherwise. Hence, it should be understood that neither 
authors nor readers are able to hold themselves accountable for fulfilling moral 
obligations for particular denotations, grounding them in either the contents or the 
manner of the denotations. While it is obvious that how to read is invisible, unless 
readers explain it in their words; authors would say that they denoted in ways that were 
intelligible to readers such that authors can hold themselves accountable only for their 
faithfulness to their denotations rather than their denotations in themselves. Whether or 
not readers understand denotations and how depends on how they read. 
Communications between actors, in other words, depend on acceptance of each other’s 
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assumptions that each should be communicating in accordance with each one’s faith in 
purposes, competencies and worthiness of the reality being communicated. Denotations 
in words convey particular information but also they mediate, rather than directly 
engage, authors’ and readers’ respective senses of appropriateness in ethical terms.  
Communications by means of denoted reality involve, in a subtle way, negotiations over 
ethical appropriateness as well as exchange of information between actors. Despite the 
critical role of mediation between authors’ and readers’ senses of ethical 
appropriateness, insofar as words have their substantiveness, they are inevitably 
conceived of as quasi-substances. When conceived of as substances, words should be 
apprehended based on a variety of attributes and appearances, such as spelling, 
dictionary-meanings of terms, grammatical correctness/mistakes and logical coherence 
of and between sentences. When one is concerned with the substantive aspect of reality, 
understandings are oriented toward non-contradictory identities of a variety of 
properties, such that one will become able to obtain a positive sense that things belong 
to particular appropriate categories (Ricoeur 1984/1990). Apart from the positive sense 
arising from the identification/categorization, according to the triad of mimetic 
processes, even if implicit, actor’s attention is supposed to be paid between the 
substantive aspects and the contextual aspects of reality, and more or less affected by 
each actor’s judgments on or beliefs in the appropriateness of the rational scientific 
methods and reasoning along the substitutive and metaphorical logic. As has been 
repeated, human beings make decisions based not on discrete data but on data 




Because of the implied evaluative appropriateness in the processes by which to 
understand the substantive aspect of reality, making sense of denoted reality focusing on 
its substantive properties, i.e., dictionary-meanings, grammatical correctness/mistakes 
and coherence in and between sentences, requires careful examination. Specifically, the 
substantive understandings or apprehension of seemingly conspicuous attributes of 
simple material objects always require certain targets of attribution. This is simply 
because human beings are not capable of identifying things with discrete data but only 
capable of doing so by relating relevant data to other data. Such is the case with 
substantive aspects of denotations in words. Thus, the intricate relationship between the 
floating attribution of moral obligations explained as the first pitfall and the targets of 
attribution required for one’s substantive understandings deserves careful attention.  
In the latter attribution, people pursue targets in coherence of denotations in terms of 
such substantive aspects as assuming certain meaningful wholes in denotations. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3 and 5, such an assumption about coherence (or absence of it) is 
actually created on the part of readers by imagination. Hence, if readers focus 
exclusively on the substantive aspects of denotations to make sense of them, they are 
fated to overlook the fact that they are actually negotiating with author(s) by means of 
each other’s assumptions about each other’s responses, thus, each other’s preferred 
ways of presenting themselves. Missing out the contextual and situated relationality of 
communication by means of denoted reality has a serious implication for ethical 
practicing as well as mutual understandings (see Lorino, Tricard and Clot 2011). It 
actually under-evaluates both their own and authors’ imaginative capacities. Too much 
focus on the substantiveness of denotations in words also implies problems concerning 
ethical practicing of communication by means of words. 
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As for the floating attribution of each actor’s sense of moral obligations, the triad of 
mimetic processes needs to be referred to again. According to it, one’s focus on the 
substantive or the contextual aspects is supposed to be affected by certain dominant 
discourses, institutions and socio-cultural values, which are constituting and constituted 
by one’s experiences. In other words, if one focuses more on the substantive aspect than 
the contextual aspect, there must exist many others who do so. Otherwise, one’s 
preference for the substitutive logic and the world of substances with non-contradictory 
identities would not culminate in her/his dispositions or habits through repetition. What 
is to be noted in the interactions between an actor and certain dominant forces is the fact 
that each actor’s experiences are always involved even if how they mediate the 
substantive and the contextual aspects by what focus cannot be predicted. Put 
differently, in order for one to show a certain disposition, certain ‘success stories’ must 
be continuously supplied to one’s experiences. These need to be ‘success stories’ in 
terms of material and moral consequences. They will not become success only with 
material consequences but also with positive evaluative values. Stories always connote 
certain morally ideal types as well as contexts that are provided by events and 
phenomena sequenced into particular orders (Ricoeur 1984/1990).  
Despite the necessity of morally appropriate stories, when many people allude to the 
substantive aspect of reality, what concerns them most is predictability in terms of 
material consequences backed by tangible empirical evidence. This is first and foremost 
because we are fated to suffer from the unknown future. Despite the fact that 
predictability in terms of material consequences will not solve completely the problems 
arising from the unknown future, it certainly relieves people, not only by increased 
predictability but also by actually improved security and wellbeing in material terms. 
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Hence, people’s allusion to the rational scientific or substitutive logic that identifies 
things with non-contradictory identities and, in consequence, certain definitive causal 
laws, is much more irresistible than that of possible discretionary power to define the 
future narratively. In short, without actual positive material consequences, people may 
not like to believe the substitutive logic. Or rather, success stories necessary for 
sustaining people’s allusion to rational scientific logic can be substituted by certain 
material consequences only if these contribute to actual material wellbeing. Put 
differently, rational scientific logic has a kind of self-reinforcing aspect in the sense that, 
insofar as material positive consequences continue to be brought about, such material 
consequences are capable of representing people’s evaluative preferences and thus, by 
implication, their senses of moral correctness. It is not unusual to find us feeling loyal to 
particular things (Ricoeur 1990/1992). 
What this indicates is that when people remain in the realm of substances in which the 
substitutive logic plays the central role, they are likely to be exempted from the burdens 
that they would have to bear to establish and maintain their own senses of evaluative 
appropriateness. Such are burdens because evaluative appropriateness is actually 
situational and relational, meaning that each one needs to negotiate with others on a 
case-by-case basis by reference to the substantive and the contextual aspects of reality.  
The significance of the rational scientific logic should, therefore, be re-examined. It is 
actually capable of making substitutable not only things by giving them non-
contradictory identities but also quasi-things, such as time, words, stories and a variety 
of abstract concepts, all of which actually consist of irreversible sequential orders. What 
is the most critical about the allusion to the rational scientific logic for people’s 
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everyday practices is not the validity of the rational scientific or substitutive logic per se 
in terms of accurate predictions about material consequences but the fact that it has now 
become difficult for people to find any other appropriate plot than the rational scientific 
logic with which to plot a variety of stimuli they are continuously receiving in everyday 
life.  
According to theories about plot, plot can be seen to consist of five constitutive 
elements: acts, actors, scenes, purposes and agencies (Czarniawska 1999 quoting 
Kenneth Burke). The significance of the rational scientific logic with regard to the 
effects that constrain people’s ways of plotting a variety of properties of reality can 
better be understood by putting it onto the framework comprised of the five constitutive 
elements. As has already been explained, the substitutive logic does not start working 
without already networked data in particular ways at the level of practical language use. 
Thus, it works in connection with heterogeneous properties.  
Considering the self-reinforcing aspect of the rational scientific logic that is conditioned 
by positive material consequences, it is assumed that when certain consequences are 
paid attention to, the rational scientific logic should immediately associate the five 
constitutive elements with one another so that it can rationalize the processes by which 
to make sense of such consequences. More specifically, people’s desire for predicting 
the future is so strong that insofar as certain consequences are and appear to continue to 
be positive, such consequences immediately become purposes of the five constitutive 
elements with less regard to the other elements, i.e., actors, acts, scenes and agencies. In 
consequence, the positive material consequences start telling stories, rather than an 
author labors to associate those elements with one another to make sense of the 
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consequences and/or how these have come about. Put differently, in the realm of 
substances, moral sentiments are liable to be concealed behind tangible material 
consequences, despite the fact that apprehending the substantive aspects of such 
consequences is not possible without stories driven by and thus supposed to connote 
people’s moral sentiments.  
What is to be noted in particular is that moral sentiments or motivations are critical in 
making better sense of reality even if the processes by which to construct evaluative 
appropriateness by means of plot are rationalized in significant ways when the rational 
scientific logic is preferred; thus, people focus more on the substantive tangible aspect 
of reality. This is of critical relevance for diminishing trust in science as observed in the 
anti-vaccination movement. Although some continue to approach the increasing distrust 
in or diminishing legitimacy of science as one of problems that arise from insufficient 
understandings of the general public about scientific knowledge, it actually represents 
ways by which people attempt to make better sense of reality, in which science 
constitutes only one of the three realms of people’s experiences. In other words, the 
diminishing legitimacy of science needs to be addressed in ways that take into account 
the intricate relationships between actors’ experiences in the realms of substances, 
practices and self, as are denoted in the triad of mimetic processes. These pitfalls 
together indicate that the act of denoting reality in words entails, in intricate ways, 
problems concerning the intrinsic human sense of morality or ethics and the attribution 
of moral obligations. Since the act of denoting reality generally proceeds in interaction 
settings not only between actors but also between actors and denotations, it is necessary, 
in understanding the intricacy, to examine the different agencies bestowed on words and 
human beings in ways that relate these to one another.  
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From the analyses above, words appear to have three distinct agencies: denotation, 
commanding and mediation. Denotation refers to words’ capacity to represent authors’ 
efforts at identifying/classifying a variety of substances and quasi-substances. 
Commanding can be understood as words’ capacity to command others’ reading them 
by presenting particular forms/styles that embody authors’ assumptions about responses 
from others. Because of this embedded interactivity as well as visibility 
(substantiveness), the words’ agency of commanding is supposed to operate bilaterally 
between words and actors. Mediation signifies words’ capacities that create and offer 
actors a kind of open space where actors see their own and/or others’ substantive and 
contextual understandings to become meaningful by reference to their respective 
interests and concerns. This agency of words represents the fact that meanings of words 
can change in any way through interventions from actors who each attempt to make 
better sense of the world, being and selfhood along the triad of mimetic processes, 
which alternately succeeds between authoring and reading.  
As the three distinct agencies of words above suggest, these are almost identical to the 
agencies normally bestowed on human actors. Specifically, according to the triad of 
mimetic processes, actors are capable of identifying/classifying objects external to them, 
establishing assumptions about how others might be seeing them and thinking about in 
various ways who (or what) they are. Words are, thus, not completely separated from 
actors both as utterers/authors and readers. Reading others’ words necessarily reflects 
one’s attitudes not only towards the words s/he is reading and/or the authors/utterers of 
the words but also towards one’s self, simply because of the third agency of mediation 
of words. The open space created by the mediating capacity of words enables actors’ 
substantive and contextual understandings to be mediated into certain meaningful 
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wholes and such wholes already mediated symbolically can further be projected onto 
the same word since it is a virtually open space, rather than a rigid frame of meaning. 
Put simply, this is so-called self-referencing of words by means of which actors’ selves 
that emerge only as a result of mediating their substantive and contextual 
understandings can be denoted in words.  
What is important in this intricate relationship between words and actors is that both 
words and actors’ selves are only emergent symbolic beings that can be denoted in any 
way. Words can thus be understood to belong to both everyone and no one in the sense 
of the term of modern private ownership. By any means, human beings need to be 
related to, or entrust something with sufficient substantiveness, to speak for their beings. 
Words are such substantive predicates of human beings who want words to denote their 
beings in infinite ways. Because human beings can never stop anticipating the future 
while they are only aware of their finitude confronted by infinite possibilities, words 
endlessly build and dismantle ways of denoting reality. Words will never be able to be 
defined by any other logic than the triad of mimetic processes or the abductive 
inferential logic (see Boje 2001). Words are belated images of human beings about 
whom they can only assert that they are existent rather than non-existent. 
Table 6.1 Agencies of words and human beings 
Words  Human beings 




Denotation  Identifying/classifying 






The realm of 
practices 
Present 
Mediation  Imagining one’s self The realm of self Past 
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The fact that we can denote reality in infinite ways indicates the weakness in discourse 
(see also Chapter 4), meaning that the infinite possible ways of denotation do not mean 
that human beings have infinite capacities or extensions. On the contrary, obviously 
inconclusive meanings and interpretation necessarily require negotiations; thus, the 
power/rule constitution by means of meanings and interpretation in which limits are set 
by each one’s sense obtained along the triad of mimetic processes. In the power/rule 
constitution, vagueness of meaning occasionally exerts more power in terms of 
commanding others’ reading than do definitive ones. Ethical negotiation cannot be 
materialized only by invoking (or prescribing) the rational scientific logic with which 
one’s sense of limitation might be described as precisely as possible. In regard to the 
ethical negotiation over power, it is possible to state that any assertion that pretends to 
define reality in a conclusive manner is ethically dubious even if logically true because, 
as has just been stated, everyone is inevitably struggling with the unknowability of the 
finiteness and the infinite possibilities. Suppose that one who can never be sure of what 
the absolute truth about equitable resource distribution is talks about means by which to 
distribute resources in such a conclusive manner as if her/his denotation could realize 
equitable society: this cannot be understood as ethical practicing. 
It is, thus, important to admit that each of us is a self-interpreting being who is fated to 
confront problems regarding how her/his intention for happiness should be pursued by 
means of power and norms in front of perceived finitude and infinite possibilities 
towards it. To do so, everyone more or less agrees to interact with others by means of 
words or other symbolically mediated media by enacting the simplest skills and 
knowledge to establish syntagmatic connections between innumerable properties in 
appropriate ways. So understanding is important to address inevitable inequality. 
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Especially those who are relatively better endowed need to acknowledge the practical 
impossibility of denying any possibility that these skills and knowledge may have been 
enacted by taking advantage of a variety of imbalances in terms of innate and inherent 
competencies or other material resources. No one can be sure which part of skills and 
competencies is innate predispositions and which is acquired dispositions. It is simple 
and straightforward to state that we ought to overcome a variety of problems by 
developing our skills and knowledge, typically those concerning the rational scientific 
reasoning. However, saying so may turn out to be complacency about one’s abilities to 
understand reality correctly, for instance in terms of rational science, without regard to 
one’s material and other endowments. The only solution to this ethical dilemma arising 
from the impossibility of distinguishing categorically between nature and nurture is to 
denote reality by inducing everyone’s reading in a positive or associative manner, rather 
than in a substitutive or reductionist manner. Otherwise, we continue competing in an 
ethical landscape that is inevitably diminishing because of our own efforts to establish 
as definitive ethical standards as possible, despite our intention with respect to ethical 
conducts. Each one sets limits of extension by reference to each one’s sense of reality at 
a particular point in time and space while being forced to stand on such a fragile ground 
as that on which one has to manage the uncertain future without knowing even what is 
needed for one’s subsistence. 
The problem is how one can denote reality in ways that induce others’ positive reading. 
In this respect, I propose to utilize the triad of mimetic processes and the five 
constitutive elements of plot with which to investigate a variety of practices in 
organizations in ways that induce as wide a range of readers as possible to enrich the 
diverse variety of plots by suspending often rather hasty disbelief. Rather ambitiously, I 
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assume that management and organization studies will be able to establish a kind of 
disciplinary identity that studies people’s everyday practices in the sphere where a 
variety of institutions is intersecting variably but intensively, that is, organizations. 
Probably, one of the important contributions of studies on practices in organizations or 
organizing will be to enable continuing conversations by means of study reports that are 
capable of inducing imagination about as many possible realities as possible by 
appreciating human knowledge in conventional sciences and humanities as they 
accumulate over time. History matters in the sense that it reveals to us what practicing 
ethics in everyday life should be and how. Studying everyday practices by focusing on 
the processes by which actors are plotting a variety of properties in particular ways 
should enhance our understandings of how we are and how we know, while entwined in 
the processes of symbolic mediation from which a variety of institutions emanates. The 
next section elaborates one possible strategy by organization scholars to denote reality 
in ways that induce conversations between different actors by means of plot. 
6.3 How to plot to open up as many possible futures as possible 
As the focus has now shifted to ‘theorizing as engaged practice’ (Zundel and Kokkalis 
2010), what follows is a proposal on how theories of processes of organizing can 
address inevitable inequality by utilizing theories about plot or emplotment. The key are 
the unavoidable chance events that tend to be left out in conventional formal theorizing. 
As we act on a hypothetical and inferential basis, it will not be reasonable to expect that 
our mundane sense of ambiguity and uncertainty can be eliminated by any rational, 
political/ethical, aesthetic or theological method. The acknowledgement and acceptance 
of chance events should, however, be directed toward certain sustainable and 
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practicable methods, rather than uncritical allusion to reflective diligence or 
mindfulness (Lynch 2000).  
Drawing upon narrative frameworks, specifically Kenneth Burke’s five constitutive 
elements of plot: acts, actors, scenes, purposes and agencies, three points of reference 
are suggested: purposes, scenes as choice opportunities and agencies (Czarniawska 
1999). On top of these, with a particular aim to address inevitable inequality and 
significance of chance events in tackling inequality, three meanings are proposed: 
namely, everyone’s deserved dignity, situated and relational definitions of desires, and 
innumerable failed attempts to sensemaking and/or acting. These additional meanings 
aim to orient researchers’ attention more towards difficult moral choices in front of the 
irremediable problem of inequality than towards discovery of particular causal laws to 
solve inequality. Since the three points of reference and the additional meanings 
constitute plot or the nesting and nested processes of emplotment, in combination they 
enable actors to protoplot heterogeneous properties in such a manner as prototyping.  
On the part of theorists, the difficult moral choices concern the fact that they need to 
theorize reality by saying something in advance as if they make predictions, even if they 
do not know whether or not their predictions can be correct. Saying something about 
reality in advance is, to put it differently, abstracting the narrative time experienced by 
other actors (practitioners) in particular sequential orders. Abstracting others’ narrative 
time implicates abstracting others’ being by denotation because, in narrative time, 
different from chronological time, each actor’s being at a particular point in time and 
space is woven into particular sequential orders. Thus, opportunities for appropriate 
negotiations with such others should be created for their beings to be paid attention to in 
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an ethically engaged manner. The virtue of abstraction in advance resides in how it 
enables others’ emplotment by revealing their implicit and context-specific assumptions 
and principles. 
Nonetheless, since the act of plotting occurs to an actor at a particular point in time and 
space, it is virtually impossible to predict or reproduce it, even if the processes of 
emplotment can be explicated as in this study. The countermeasure that I propose for 
theorists is to imagine the ‘non-obvious’ from the ‘obvious’, in Weick’s terms (1987, 
1974). Based on the three reference points and the three additional meanings above, it is 
possible to direct theorists’ attention to what is not present by reference to what they 
observe.  
Specifically, by taking into account everyone’s deserved dignity in reference to the 
scenes as one of the reference points, theorists’ attention can be directed at certain 
seemingly irrational or illogical decisions (the ‘non-obvious’) as well as rational choices 
(the ‘obvious’). No one is born human either by choice or by knowing where to be born, 
with what resource endowments, including physical and intellectual competencies. 
Besides, no one can be sure of her/his own or others’ finitude while knowing virtually 
infinite possibilities toward its accomplishment. It is, therefore, important not to assume 
that one should always act for rationally chosen objectives in ways that are plausible to 
either researchers or generalized others. By theorists’ protoplotting themselves with 
assistance of the triad of mimetic processes and the five constitutive elements of plot, 
certain seemingly irrational and illogical decisions of their research subjects can be read 
in ways that mimic as precisely as possible the ways by which the subjects’ reality is 
being plotted in particular choice opportunities as well as reasons and competencies. By 
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so doing, analysts are expected to take into account what is not present to them by 
reference to what they observe. 
As for purposes as a constitutive element of plot, the additional meaning, ‘situated and 
relational definition of desires’, can be associated such that theorists will be able to 
imagine alternatives to certain goals which their research subjects appear to pursue. By 
so doing, theorists may become able at least to encourage their subjects to see 
alternative possible reality by suspending disbelief in seemingly unfeasible goals, such 
an example as the improvement of company-wide operations by developing a database 
as was observed in the case online forum of this study (even if it failed to be 
materialized).  
As for the agencies, theorists may direct their attention to the additional meaning, 
‘innumerable failed attempts of sensemaking and/or acting’, by reference to repetitively 
observed actions, such as routines and habits. By assuming failed (or failing) attempts 
behind certain repetitively observed actions, theorists may be able to plot what they 
observe in ways that exploit their research subjects’ inventive and serendipitous 
creativity. In effect, processes in which ostensive and performative aspects constitute 
particular routines and habits in a rather creative manner (Dionysiou and Tsoukas 2013, 
Pentland and Feldman 2005) can be accounted for. The triad of mimetic processes 
should, in this respect, serve as logic along which theorists follow what they observe by 
imagining their subjects’ interacting with each other by each enacting their capacities of 
emplotment on the hypothetical and inferential basis.  
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The framework first and foremost contributes methods with which to establish as many 
alternative plots as possible. By so doing, it will help theorists and actors alike to 
suspend disbelief and imagine a different possible reality in a positive manner. As 
design thinking emphasizes the importance of prototyping, to have as many possible 
plots as possible empowers actors’ creative and inventive capacities. Even if such 
empowered creativity and inventiveness is naturally constrained by a variety of 
conditions, it is important to have methods with which to give particular styles or forms 
to one’s rather ambiguous thoughts and feelings. 
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First, one’s ambiguous thoughts and feelings constitute reality. Hence, it is important to 
make them visible and easier to be managed (following Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). 
While it is apparent that visibility would not solve all the problems concerning the 
management of complex reality or rather would make it more complicated, it is 
expected that since writing and reading are co-related (Czarniawska 1998), the 
anticipated increased complexity due to the increasing variety of denoted reality can be 
overcome by the strengthened capacities of reading that sift through a flux of 
information. Subtly but more importantly, expressing one’s seemingly ineffable feelings 
and sensations in words should have a significant implication for one’s wellbeing 
considering the intricate relationships between the human ways of being in the world, 
time and words as were discussed above. Protoplotting may thus bring about a more 
engaged manner of treating words and the power of them by imagining the virtually 
identical agencies bestowed on human beings and words. 
Second, by understanding that desires are motivated by a variety of others and being 
defined socially, it is possible that particular goals first be proposed and later be 
negotiated with relevant others by reference to other elements of plot. Apart from the 
diversification of possible plots, such a way of proposing and negotiating a multitude of 
goals must have a positive moral implication. Instead of attributing one’s or others’ 
moral appropriateness as well as precision in empirical and logical terms to what they 
each denote, it should be much healthier and more constructive to entrust each other’s 
words to mediate each other’s moral concerns. 
Third, protoplotting encourages innovative and even adventurous inferences. 
Repetitions and habits are important in this respect. Even if each actor is capable of 
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creating rather arbitrarily particular meaningful wholes, the processes of emplotment are 
mimetic since s/he acts on a hypothetical and inferential basis without any absolutely 
foundational evidence, rule or principle. Put differently, hypothetical inferences are 
enabled by mimetic processes that take advantage of massive data in which particular 
sets of events and phenomena naturally occur more or less often than others. Such 
processes of pattern-generation occurring without any human volitional intervention are 
mimetic as well as probabilistic to the extent that particular events and phenomena 
repetitively occur; thus from the point of view of an interpreter, some of them appear as 
if they were mimicking themselves to formulate particular patterns.  
Quantity matters: this is in the sense of the same event happening many times, although, 
when it does so it is rather frequently threatened by varying qualities (and vice versa). 
Moreover, because of our inability to identify/classify innumerable substances only by 
observation, we compensate by constructing narrative identities, which allow us to go 
about everyday encounters in hypothetical and inferential ways while creating a sense of 
permanence in the narrative time (Ricoeur 1990/1992). Our remarkable ability to 
recognize a variety of patterns in terms of both process and variance, or mimesis and 
diegesis is enabled by the ability to associate relevant information with one another out 
of innumerable sense data. Such networked information may be called schema or 
cognitive type. However, I prefer to call it story fragments (after Boje [2001]) in that the 
narrative time we are experiencing changes and transitions in time can be connoted. 
In order to induce innovation or to capture subtler improvisation, we need to know 
processes by which stories or story fragments are rather quickly formulated to create a 
sense of permanence without which we could not even obtain sense that we apprehend 
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certain conspicuous attributes of certain simple material objects. This is of relevance for 
studies on affordance (Gibson 1978), materiality of a variety of material artifacts and 
technologies (Barad 2003, Iedema 2007, Leonardi 2011, Leonardi and Barley 2008, 
Orlikowski 2007) as well. As has been mentioned earlier, things tell stories in 
accordance with varying contexts in which such things and human beings are situated. 
Without appropriating such stories or story fragments by imagination, theorists would 
not be able to account for their research subjects’ innovative and inventive ways of 
pattern recognition and the often unpredictable effects of them. 
Fourth, protoplotting possibly exemplifies the intricate relationship between the natural 
purely probabilistic processes of pattern-generation and the human imaginative 
appropriation of patterns, something that is felicitous. By understanding this 
relationship better, it is expected that our imaginative capacities based on hypothetical 
inference can be more intently exploited at the level of everyday language use. Even if, 
with our normal cognitive capacities, it seems difficult to discern the processes by 
which innumerable sense data are related to one another in particular ways (Schechner 
1986), it is considered to be possible to attempt, in virtually infinite ways, to give what 
we are continuously receiving from nature and generating inside us, i.e., perception and 
feelings, particular forms/styles by means of words. As has been pointed out, both 
natural pattern-generation and human hypothetical inferences are mimetic. Hence, it is 
possible by enhancing protoplotting to read and eventually account for the virtually 
unpredictable emergence of patterns and rules, which should culminate in particular 
orderliness in terms of both nature and human society, by focusing on the creative 
aspect of mimetic processes. 
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These four points guide how to operationalize the proposed framework, which builds 
upon an ontology that sees both human beings and words to be self-interpreting and 
hypothetical and inferential ways of knowing. What holds the critical key is, however, 
to acknowledge the peculiar relationships between human beings, time and words. In 
particular, the three distinct agencies bestowed on words, which are identical to those of 
human beings, deserve special attention. As was explained earlier (in 6.2), the words’ 
capacity of mediation that allows self-referencing, which is generally understood to be 
troubling from the point of view of logically coherent denotations of reality, should be 
understood to play a significant role in mediating different actors’ hypothetical 
assumptions in both ethical and substantive terms. Ethics is being practiced in a 
parrhesiastic manner along a norm of answerability (see p. 164 in Chapter 5). So 
understanding is expected to enhance development of innovative and effective 
methodologies in terms of production of practically relevant theories of processes of 
organizing, which are capable of renewing understandings and ways of utilizing the 
power of words, eventually bringing about both individual and organizational wellbeing 
in ways that address inevitable power imbalances. 
6.4 Concluding remark 
Delving into mundane discursive practices, this study has confirmed that processes of 
organizing can be accounted for as interactions between actors by means of everyday 
language use. It found that interactions were made possible by each actor’s enacting 
her/his capacities of making sense of reality by reference to the substantive and the 
contextual aspects of reality and by mediating these into particular meaningful wholes. 
While this might seem individualistic for attributing source of social orderliness to 
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individual actors’ capacities it reminds us that human beings are inherently social 
beings who are privileged to have feedback from others on their assumptions about a 
variety of events and phenomena, including subjective mental ones. By focusing on 
individual processes, the significance of one’s capacity of imagination for sensemaking 
can be elaborated in ways that predicate the invisible processes of imagination on what 
is enunciated in words. Another notable finding from the analysis of individual micro-
processes is that norms and ethics emanate from rather simple rules that enable us to use 
a variety of symbolic resources. Thus, mundane discursive practices are constitutive of 
processes of organizing to the extent that they can account for the power/rule 
constitution by means of each actor’s everyday language use. 
Narrative frameworks, particularly Ricoeur’s (1984/1990) theory of emplotment, 
contribute to exemplifying the processes entailed in mundane discursive practices, 
including each actor’s imaginative interactions with others, and accordingly, her/his 
nearly innate orientations towards ethical conducts. Typically, this study demonstrated 
that narrative frameworks were not a mere metaphor borrowed from literary studies to 
analyze organizational events and phenomena but a more powerful and effective 
accounting device, on that is capable of literally narrating what actors are doing in 
mundane language use and what effects are to be brought about for both individuals and 
organizations in such ways that particular consequences unfold and allow readers to 
experience particular causalities virtually. Plot is, as Ricoeur’s theory elaborates, not 
simply about how to structure stories but about collaboration between authors and 
readers. It is thus powerful and relevant to theorizing in that the sense of non-
obviousness (Weick 1987, 1974) is more likely to be induced by following particular 
plot in comparison to propositional accounts. 
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Since narrative deals with language, or more specifically, stories, the actions that 
narrative frameworks account for as a theoretical/analytical frame are acts of 
narrating/writing, hearing/reading understanding and interpreting. Among these, this 
study found particular importance and relevance of reading for theorizing processes of 
organizing, following previous scholars’ efforts at drawing attention to writing 
organizations and management (Czarniawska 1999, Rhodes 2001, see also van Maanen 
1988). As they pointed out, writing and reading are inseparable from each other 
(Czarniawska 1998). Even if the capacities required are almost identical between 
writing and reading, considering the existence of innumerable sentiments which remain 
untold (Boje 2001) and inevitable power imbalances implicated, it is necessary to pay 
more attention to how we can read organizations effectively.  
Reading effectively is of particular relevance for the increasingly accelerating world. 
Things are continuously flowing into our daily lives. More critically, quasi-things, 
especially words and concepts become fairly easily commoditized or made simple, 
striking and appealing slogans. People show their fidelity, loyalty, and moral 
appropriateness toward such things and quasi-things. The same applies to stories. We do 
not author narrative in our everyday lives in proper literary terms. Nor, is it practically 
feasible to see our ways of speaking or establishing understandings as if to tell stories. 
To read effectively, we need to devise better plots, as diverse as possible, and enhanced 
skills and knowledge about how we plot a variety of properties that we encounter day 
by day. Theories about plot and emplotment tell us that we make sense of reality on the 




In the processes of making sense of reality by means of hypothetical inference, there 
have been accumulating innumerable failed attempts to give appropriate forms/styles to 
one’s ambiguous thoughts and feelings. Patterns that can strengthen the hypothetical 
inferences emerge out of such innumerable failures as well as logically coherent 
patterns that can be confirmed by conventional scientific methods after the fact. In the 
world of hypothetical inferences, even if once turning out to be a failure, the same or 
similar kinds of failure, when accumulated innumerably, may contribute resources for 
successful denotations of reality in the future. It has been confirmed, at least anecdotally, 
in practical settings that theories are first accepted and then understood better at a later 
stage (Weick 1987, 1979). Human beings abduct particular patterns even from 
denotations that appear irrelevant according to the internal unity of any extant theory or 
conceptual network or logical coherence between extant conceptual networks. Human 
serendipity often transcends internal hierarchical orders in particular conceptual 
networks. 
Hopefully, by reading better in the sense that innately hypothetical and inferential ways 
of knowing are fully taken account of, people extend their imaginative capacities to 
questions about what happiness is, what better lives are, and what work means as a 
means to materialize a happy life. People spend substantial part of time of their lives 
working for work organizations. These questions are neither too romantic nor 
philosophical questions, I believe, but of considerable practical import. 
Narratives that have been and will be produced by studying organizations potentially 
provide opportunities to reveal people’s implicit and context-specific assumptions and 
principles. It is considered worth examining such potentials among researchers with 
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existing and forthcoming literature. Typically, such an attempt will make researchers 
confront their moral sentiments that rarely appear or are paid attention to in their reports. 
Rather than simply critiquing methodological rigor and/or relevance of studies, 
confronting each other’s moral choices over research questions and investigative 
strategies and accompanying sentiments will serve to re-define researchers’ roles and 
possible contributions of their research. In addition to provide solutions to particular 
problems, management and organization studies can address the intricate 
intertwinement of institutional/structural forces and human ways of conceiving of and 
managing these in front of a variety of encounters, which appears more often than not 
difficult to be structured in neat and tidy ways. Even if hardly visible, innate 
evaluative/moral concerns need to be paid attention to, if not to be accounted for. 
Researchers deal with human knowledge for betterment of human beings who are 
innately evaluative/moral beings (Sayer 2011).  
To pay attention to each other’s evaluative/moral sentiments is possible by 
understanding them in interactions between two or more actors. Insofar as no one can 
see directly one’s actions, what one can do best is to allow or rather ask others to speak 
their truths as frankly as possible. Even though no one knows what one’s truth is, 
imagining that others might tell their truths is the best strategy if one wishes to be 
faithful to one’s truth. Reviewing each other’s moral sentiments should, thus, serve to 
showcase how such a parrhesiastic chain of communication can be materialized by 
means of research reports that contain organizational reality identified and denoted with 
scientifically rigorous methods. It is hoped, in so doing, that researchers’ narrative can 
be developed by taking into account the triadic agencies of words and creatively 
arranging different temporality: synchrony and diachrony to reproduce as verisimilar 
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